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cumulative volume (million m3) 
Executive	  Summary	  
South Africa is a water scarce country; with a mean annual precipitation of only 600 mm in 70% of the 
country and one of the lowest rain-runoff conversions in the world.  South Africa consumes 31% of the 
available water resources, a high percentage by world’s standards (National Planning Commission, 2011). 
Analysts predict that as South Africa approaches 40% consumption, South Africa will face a binding 
water constraint. Concern around future water supply is heightening due to increased demands from all 
sectors of the economy and growing awareness to protect our ecological reserves. Debates around future 
water supply are increasing; water reallocation in agriculture is being considered as a way to increase 
efficiencies and government is looking at capital intensive infrastructural developments to augment 
supply.  
Nelson Mandela Bay Municipality (NMBM) faced severe water shortages in 2010 and projections 
estimated that future demand would outstrip future supply if no action was taken. NMBM receives 70% 
of its water supply from the Western system, a concentrated area with similar rainfall and weather 
patterns. As a result, the Department of Water Affairs and the NMBM are investigating possible supply 
schemes with the intention to maximise supply, minimise risk and minimise average costs.  
Some of the proposed schemes include building a desalination plant, utilising groundwater from high-
yielding boreholes, expanding existing dams and tapping into more of the Orange River water. An 
incremental cost curve, using the mean average cost of water, is created in this paper to compare the 
relative costs and supply of each proposed scheme. The comparison takes place over a 25 year timeframe 
and different methodologies are examined. The cost curve is a useful heuristic in understanding current 
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The analysis indicates that although the proposed desalination plant and the Nooitgedagt Low-Level 
schemes were expensive (averaging R6.18/m3 and R3.52m3 respectively), the schemes minimise risk by 
diversifying the current NMBM’s bundle of water supply and provide the most water (432 million m3 and 
468 million m3 respectively). The cheapest water included water trading and the reuse of agricultural 
return flow schemes, averaging R1.4/m3. However, these schemes do not minimise risk and only augment 
water by an estimated 61 million m3.  
Catchment management is proposed as a possible augmentation scheme for the NMBM. The Kromme 
River, which supplies the Western system’s dams, provides 40% of the NMBM’s total water demand. 
However, the catchment is heavily degraded due to the invasion of alien invasive plants, the destruction 
of palmiet wetlands and poor farming practises. Not only do black wattles consume a lot of water, their 
roots are shallow which makes the river banks unstable, exacerbating erosion. Functioning wetlands 
usually provide water filtering and stabilising services and act as a buffer to floods. Ecological activists 
warn that the degradation of the catchment is compromising the NMBM’s supply of water.  
Using a cost-benefit analysis approach, the economical viability of restoration in the Upper Kromme 
Catchment over a 25 year period was examined. ‘Working for Water’, the main restoration intervention, 
has cost around R22 million. The expected and quantifiable benefits of restoration include improved land 
productivity for the private farmer and increased river yield, for the end-user, NMBM. The economic 
benefits amounted to R1.2 million in agricultural benefits and R8.5 million in hydrological benefits. The 
cost-benefit analysis showed that restoration is not an economically viable investment in Upper Kromme 
Catchment over both a 25 year and 50 year timeframe.  
Using the incremental cost curve as the medium for comparison, it was investigated whether restoration 
in the Upper Kromme Catchment should be considered a possible augmentation scheme for the NMBM. 
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Additional water from the Upper Kromme costs R3.23/m3 and thus falls within the cheaper group of 
schemes. Nevertheless, it only provides an additional 7.31million m3 over 25 years and thus does not 
contribute significantly to the augmentation of NMBM’s water supply sources and at the same time, does 
little to minimise the risk. 
Nevertheless, one should not discard the importance of restoration as a means of catchment 
management. The delivery of the existing yield will be threatened if no action is taken and river flow 
losses are estimated at 0.115 million m3/annum, costing the NMBM just under R20 000/annum.  
The possibility of water trading within the agricultural sector and across urban (NMBM) and agricultural 
sectors as a means of achieving allocative efficiency is explored in the final chapter. The opportunity cost 
of water, the foregone agricultural benefits, is used as a proxy for the economic value of water. Three 
agricultural areas which compete for water with the NMBM, the Gamtoos Valley, Lower Sundays River 
Valley and the Upper Kromme Catchment, were selected.  
 
The economic value of water in the NMBM is greater than the agricultural value of water in both the 
Upper Kromme Catchment and Gamtoos Valley. It is suggested that water is transferred away from low-
yielding agricultural uses towards high end urban uses to meet a Pareto efficiency condition. Alternatively, 
water should be transferred away from NMBM, towards agriculture in the Lower Sundays River Valley. 




Location Total Yield  (million m³) 
NMBM Opportunity  
Cost (R/m3) 
Agricultural Opportunity  
Cost (R/m³) 
Upper Kromme Catchment 74.58 1.61 0.99 
Gamtoos Valley 896.00 3.53 1.44 
Lower Sundays River Valley 1725.79 4.47 6.46 
Comparing agricultural and urban value of water 














This thesis emerged from funded research by ASSET Research, contracted by Water Research 
Commission1. The project is co-funded by the ‘Working for Water’ programme. It forms part of a series 
of interdisciplinary studies focusing on the restoration of natural capital at nine sites throughout South 
Africa. The research stems from the hypothesis that restoring degrading landscapes has the potential to 
provide a quality flow of water, sequester carbon and improve land productivity. The studies will be 
merged in a meta-analysis using a systems model by a PhD student, drawing generic conclusions on 
restoration in South Africa.   
The prescribed site was the Upper Kromme Catchment in the Eastern Cape, focussing on quaternary 
catchments K90A and K90B.  
Quaternary catchments which constitute the Kromme River on a) the map of South Africa and b) as part of tertiary 
catchment ‘K90’ which extends into the Eastern Cape 
 
 
I was one of two researchers on this site, working alongside Alanna Rebelo, an ecology master’s student 
at the University of Stellenbosch. Alanna’s research focused on the physical aspects of the Kromme and 
the change in the landscape and hydrology of the system over time, whilst I examined the economic 
consequences of these changes and restoration interventions. Our research was independent, yet in order 
to gain a holistic understanding of the study, my paper should be read in conjunction with this study. 
Even though this study focuses on a small catchment in the Eastern Cape, with little significance to South 
Africa as a whole, these findings can be generalised across South Africa.  
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South Africa is a water scarce country; with mean annual precipitation of only 600 mm in 70% of the 
country and experiences one of the lowest rain-runoff conversions in the world.  South Africa consumes 
31% of the available water resources, a high percentage by world’s standards (National Planning 
Commission, 2011). Analysts predict that as South Africa approaches 40% consumption, South Africa 
will face a binding water constraint. Concern around future water supply is heightening due to increasing 
demands from all sectors of the economy and the need to protect our ecological reserves. Debates around 
future water supply are increasing; water reallocation in agriculture is considered as a way to increase 
efficiencies and government is looking at capital intensive infrastructural developments to augment 
supply.  
The year 2010 has seen the Nelson Mandela Bay Municipality (NMBM) in the Eastern Cape, yet again 
experiencing severe water shortages. Flows in many nearby catchments reached critical levels and for the 
latter half of the year, the city’s reservoirs were around 30% capacity. Figure 1 illustrates the change in 




The region, being prone to both floods and droughts, has a history of water shortages. The NMBM has 
continually struggled to match the ever increasing water demand, whose increase is largely attributed to 
































































































Figure 1: Western dam levels showing critical levels 2009-2010 















The graph shows the correlation between historical population and water demand. As expected, a 
significant and positive correlation coefficient of 0.91 exists. 
The water planners’ problem has two major aspects, one concerning the mean water in storage, and the 
other risk at the lower tail of the storage distribution. The first means ensuring the volume of water 
ordinarily available is sufficient for normal needs; the second, involves ensuring that there is sufficient 
water in poor seasons to meet the city’s minimum needs. The NMBM municipality is looking for ways to 
increase water volume and decrease risk by building new supply schemes, expanding existing sources and 
managing the municipality’s demand. It is already clear that future water demand will outstrip current 
supply, and therefore efforts need to be undertaken to prevent this outcome (Eberhard, 2009). The ‘Water 
Reconciliation Strategy Study for the Algoa Water Supply Area,’ commissioned by the Department of Water 
Affairs (DWA, 2010), will guide the NMBM on how to respond to the widening gap between water 
supply and water demand. Recommendations to augment water supply range from constructing 
desalination plants, to expanding existing infrastructure, to recycling and reusing water and exploiting 
productive boreholes.  
The restoration of the Upper Kromme River Catchment is here being considered as a possible sustainable 
long-term means of augmenting NMBM’s water supply. The Churchill Dam, which is supplied by the 
Kromme River, is a vital source of water for the NMBM, providing the municipality with a quarter of its 
water demand. The Churchill Scheme (which consists of Churchill Dam, Impofu Dam, Churchill and 
Elandsjacht Water Treatment Works) provides NMBM with an estimated 122Ml/d or roughly 36.5Mm3 


























































































































population (10 000) Water consumption (million m³/a) 
Figure 2:  Historical Water Demand Trends 1970-2007  
R2 = 0.8866 













Since 1950, the deterioration of the wetlands in the Kromme River has escalated. The invasion of alien 
invasive plants (AIPs), overgrazing and ploughing of the flood plains, the tarring and construction of 
roads and bridges and the channelling of the river have accelerated the degradation and compromised 
much of the catchment’s health. Environmental activists have expressed fears that the Upper Kromme 
Catchment can no longer provide important ecosystem services and that this may threaten the future 
security of PE’s water.   
Should NMBM invest in catchment restoration in order to secure the expected benefits of improved 
water yield and water quality? This would involve the post-clearance follow-ups and the maintenance 
needed to control the further spread of AIPs, and rehabilitation of the wetlands. This improved 
catchment management option needs to be compared to alternative recommended water supply options 
in order to guide NMBM in its decision making.  
This paper is divided into four chapters.  Chapter One discusses the NMBM’s existing water sources and 
future augmentation schemes. It establishes an average incremental cost supply curve, so that the cost of 
a cubic metre of water can be compared across proposed schemes and sources. An incremental (marginal) 
cost curve enables a value to be placed on the additional water expected from the Kromme River. This 
incremental cost curve also allows for the comparison of additional water coming to the NMBM from the 
Kromme, with additional water from elsewhere.  
Chapter Two will focus on the restoration of the Kromme River Catchment. An overview of the site, 
restoration activities and background information commences the chapter. An in-depth investigation into 
the costs and benefits associated with the restoration activities follows so that a cost-benefit analysis can 
be performed to determine whether the restoration is economically justifiable. This chapter also 
establishes the cost of a cubic metre of water, so that restoration of the Kromme can be incorporated 
into the supply cost curve and be compared to other schemes. 
A discussion around the opportunity cost of water in agriculture is contained in Chapter Three. 
Competition between agriculture and urban demands are increasing and water trading is continually raised 
as an option for securing future water supplies. Chapter Three investigates the opportunity cost of water 
in three agricultural areas in the Algoa Region where the water being used in agriculture, could be 
supplying the NMBM. The average opportunity cost of agricultural water is calculated and compared to 
the cost of securing water from the proposed schemes.  
The dissertation concludes in Chapter Four with a summary of the key findings. It highlights the 
limitations of the study and provides recommendations for further research.  
	  













THE	  ECONOMICS	  OF	  NELSON	  MANDELA	  BAY’S	  
WATER	  SUPPLY	  
A rational water manager faces a bounded rationality problem. He needs an array of water supplies that 
will maximise supply, minimise risk and minimize average costs. Since all three desires cannot be achieved 
simultaneously, the manager must take it step by step, choosing the most secure cheap water at each stage 
(Leiman and van Zyl, 2000). 
This chapter is divided into two sections. The first section examines NMBM’s current water sources, 
investigates the correlation and covariance among existing sources and determines the cost of current 
water supply. Section two describes the future augmentation schemes, analyzes the costs and ascertains 
the average cost of producing a cubic metre of water from each proposed scheme thereby enabling a 
marginal average cost curve for water as a whole to be created. 
1 Nelson	  Mandela	  Bay	  Municipality’s	  current	  water	  supply	  
1.1 Current	  Water	  Sources	  
Given the capacities of the present dams and water schemes, the total available water for urban use in the 
NMBM is 99 million m3 per annum and irrigation use is set at 48.5million m3/annum (DWA, 2010).   
Figure 3 describes the NMBM’s water sources and shows the locations each source.  
 
 
Figure 3:	  Overview of NMBM's water sources 






































The supply sources can be divided into three systems, namely the Western, Eastern and Secondary 
Systems. The Churchill Dam, Impofu Dam, Kouga Dam and the Loerie Balancing Dam make up the 
Western System, and together provide the bulk of supply to the NMBM, roughly supplying 66% of all 
water to the municipality as shown in Figure 4 (DWA, 2010). Figure 5 illustrates the proportion of water 









There are agricultural activities above the Churchill Dam, and the extent to which these compete with 
municipal demands are an issue of interest. There is also competition for the water in the Kouga Dam, 
which not only supplies the NMBM with water, but also the towns of Hankey and Patensie and the 
farmers in the Gamtoos Valley. Around 28% of the allocated water flows from the Kouga Dam, via 
canals, into the Loerie Balancing Dam. Water from the Loerie catchment also flows into this balancing 
dam, which then supplies NMBM.  
There are agricultural activities above the Churchill Dam, and the extent to which these compete with 
municipal demands are an issue of interest. There is also competition for the water in the Kouga Dam, 
which not only supplies the NMBM with water, but also the towns of Hankey and Patensie and the 
farmers in the Gamtoos Valley. Around 28% of the allocated water flows from the Kouga Dam, via 
canals, into the Loerie Balancing Dam. Water from the Loerie catchment also flows into this balancing 
dam, which then supplies NMBM.  
 depicts characteristics of the Western Supply System2. It is interesting to note that Churchill Dam 
imparts the highest proportion of its water to the NMBM. Irrigation-intensive agriculture in the Gamtoos 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2The average volumes and the change in net capacity have been calculated over the life of the respective 
dams and therefore differ according to each dam. The information pertaining to the NMBM is based on a 
20 year average. 
Source: Raymer, D., pers. comm. 2010. 25 May 












Valley, situated below the Kouga Dam competes for water, and limits the share accessible by the NMBM. 
The ecological reserve requirements demand releases from the Impofu Dam to protect the 14km long 
Kromme estuary. The amount made available to NMBM is further restricted by the demands of the 
coastal towns and an estimated 650 hectares of irrigation which depend on the Impofu Dam for water 
(Mallory, van Vuuren and Pashkin, 2008; Weitz, F., 2011 pers. comm., 9 March).  
Table 1: Characteristics of the Western Supply System  
Characteristics Unit of measurement Churchill Impofu Kouga Loerie 
dam's maximum capacity million m3 35.69 105.84 129.58 3.33 
mean annual volume million m3 26.06 74.98 85.70 2.97 
mean % full % 73 71 66 89 
change in net capacity % 3.18 -1.40 -3.03 -10.89 
mean annual supply to 
NMBM million m
3 18.19 13.32 




% total NMBM 
consumption % 23.7 17.29 / 28 
20 year average rainfall mm 642 706 580 723 
Source: DWA unpublished (2010), NMBM unpublished (2010) 
 
The Secondary system only provides NMBM with an average of 10 million m3/annum (around 10% of 
NMBM’s water demand) and consists of the Sand Dam, Bulk Dam, Van Stadens Dam, Kwa Zunga Dam, 
Uitenhage Springs and Groendal Dam. The Groendal Dam also provides irrigation farmers with 2.4 
million m³/annum (DWA, 2009).  
The transferred water, which flows from the Gariep Dam, via the Orange-Fish tunnel, along the Fish-
Sundays canal into the Darlington Dam, makes up the Eastern System and supplies the NMBM with 
26million m3/annum (see Figure 6). This water diversifies NMBM’s water supply, by having a low 
negative covariance with the other sources it decreases the risk of water shortages in the city’s overall 
water supply portfolio. The covariance between the Western supply system and the Eastern system is -
0.004. This Orange River water provides the NMBM with some insurance against water shortages. 
During the 2009/10 drought in the Eastern Cape, the Gariep Dam was 80-90% full, a stark contrast from 
the capacities seen in Figure 1. 
Irrigation farmers, within the Lower Sundays River Water User Association, obtain water from the same 
system and are allocated 99 million m3/annum. This allocation is expected to increase to 155 million 













m3/annum as part of an irrigation expansion project, which aims to serve poor farmers (DWA, 2010). 
The Department of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries’ draft irrigation strategy targets to increase 
irrigated land in South Africa by 50%. Revitalisation, re-development and water allocation reforms fall 
part of the strategy (DAFF, 2010).  
 
	  
1.2 Current	  Water	  Supply	  Costs	  
In 1881, South Africa saw its first significant interbasin transfer, the Van Stadens River Waterworks 
Scheme. The Sand River Dam (1905) and the Bulk River Dam (1907) were constructed to meet the 
growing demand for water. Unfortunately no cost data is readily accessible for these dams. 
Raymer’s Streams of Life (2008) reveals the historical construction costs of NMBM’s dams. The Groendal 
Dam was constructed in 1934, costing £310 000. The Churchill Dam, which took 11 years to build, 
opened in 1943 and the Churchill Water Scheme, which was finalised five years later, cost the city £2 
250 000. Due to a rising population and increased water demands, the city constructed a second pipeline 
from Churchill Dam, which passed 11 major river crossings, 30 kloof crossings, and was effective by 
1962. 1970 saw the completion of the Kouga Dam and Loerie Balancing Dam, costing R9.6 million. The 
Impofu Dam, built twelve years later, totalled R17.4 million. The continued rising water demand put 
pressure on the city to build a canal to tap into the Sundays/Orange-Fish river water and in 1992, the 
extension was finished, amounting to R93.6 million (Raymer, 2008). Correcting these costs for 
subsequent inflation one obtains the following: 
Figure 4: Orange River Project 













Table 2: Current Water Schemes 
Date Scheme Cost in 2009 Rand (R million) 
Mean volume   
(million m3) 
Ave cost  
(R/m³) 
1943 Groendal Dam 101.97 9.690 10.52 
1948 Churchill Dam 969.39 26.06 37.20 
1970 Kouga Dam 680.99 85.7 7.95 
1982 Elandsjacht (Impofu Dam) 279.92 74.98 3.73 
1993 Sundays River transfer 
scheme 316.26 25.55 12.38 
 
The dams owned by the municipality also have annual expenses for their maintenance and upkeep. 
Catchment management has been incorporated into the dam maintenance budget since 2009 and 
constitutes a significant proportion of the annual costs. Alien clearing forms the basis of the catchment 
management expense. 
Table 3: Catchment Management Budget (2009 Rand) 
Scheme Catchment Management 
Bulk R 148 916 
Sand R 301 283 
Van Stadens R 321 379 
Loerie R 17 581 
Churchill R 859 142 
Source: unpublished NMBM (2011) du Plessis, P, 2011, pers. comm., 8 August 
One of the arguments for catchment management is that it reduces sediment loads and cuts the risk of 
poor water quality. This might manifest itself as a saving in water treatment costs. Before pronouncing on 
this, however, one needs to know the nature and relative magnitude of these costs. Using annual budgets 
from the six Water Treatment Works (WTW), ten years of expense data was collated from 2001-2011. 
The cost data does not include the NMBM distributional costs or pump station costs, but merely the 
costs relating to treatment of the water itself. The operating and annual depreciation of the WTW are 
divided into seven major cost categories, as seen in Figure 5. 













Figure 5: Distribution of operational and capital costs of the WTW 
 
  Source: NMBM raw data (du Plessis, P, 2011, pers. comm., 30 June) 
The chemical and labour costs, the largest expenditures, each constitute 30% of the total water treatment 
costs. The support services, which form the lowest costs, represent the specialised scientific services 
required at each treatment works. The electricity costs are fairly low at all the treatment works, except at 
Loerie (which is a balancing dam), where they make up 40% of the total costs. The repairs and 
maintenance costs are equivalent across all the sites and contribute 11% to the total costs. A breakdown 
of the average costs, adjusted for inflation and assuming a base year of 2009, for the major WTWs is 
shown in Table 4. This is of interest as it shows the cost variation across the three main water supply 
sources.  
Table 4: Breakdown of the average costs per cubic metre of water at the main WTW (new 2009 prices) 
 Chemicals Labour R&M Electricity 
Churchill R 0.26/m3 R 0.16/m3 R 0.06/m3 R 0.00/m3 
Loerie R 0.31/m3 R 0.10/m3 R 0.08/m3 R 0.37/m3 
Nooitgedagt R 0.19/m3 R 0.11/m3 R 0.07/m3 R 0.03/m3 
 
The average cost of treating water at each site was determined by dividing the total annual costs by the 
Water Works’ output. An average cost per cubic metre of treated water per scheme and the relative 
output of water supplied to NMBM is displayed in Table 5.  
Table 5: The average cost per cubic metre of water at each WTW (new 2009 prices) 
 Springs Churchill Nooitgedagt Groendal Elandsjacht Loerie Linton 
Average Cost 
 (R/m³) 0.20 0.54 0.64 0.70 0.83 0.93 1.64 
Average annual output  
(million m3) 2.00 18.18 16.21 3.89 13.32 21.02 2.12 
 



















Using the relative average costs from each scheme, an incremental average operating cost curve is created 
for the NMBM. 













































Cumulative volume (million m³) 












Figure 6: NMBM’s Incremental Average Operating Cost of Water from the WTWs 
 
	  
The Springs WTW supplies the cheapest, and one could argue, the cleanest cubic metre of water, costing 
the municipality R 0.20/m3. Nevertheless, it plays an insignificant role in NMBM’s water supply portfolio, 
providing less than 5% of the municipality’s total water. Churchill water, followed by the Orange-Fish-
Sundays water at Nooitgedagt is the next cheapest source of water. Together these sources supply almost 
half of all NMBM’s water and are substantially cheaper and cleaner than water from the Loerie Dam. The 
water from the Sand, Bulk and van Stadens dams, which is treated at Linton WTW, is the most expensive 
water, at R1.64/m3, but it makes-up less than 3% of the NMBM’s total water supply.  
It is necessary to look at NMBM’s water costs as a whole and data was sourced from the municipality 
water budgets (2002-2011). The municipality pays the Department of Water Affairs (DWA) a 
consumptive charge for water from DWA-owned dams. Additionally, the municipality pays a compulsory 
Water Research Management (WRM) and Water Research Levy (WRL) fee for water from all dams. 
These costs, as well as any purchases of water from Irrigation Boards or Water User Associations, make 
up the Water Purchases entry in Table 6.  
Table 6: Distribution of NMBM’s water supply costs 
Break-down of Water Costs NMBM % 
Employee Costs 23 
General Expenses 14 
Bad debts 8 
Repairs & Maintenance 26 
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Internal Costs 3 
   Source: NMBM (du Plessis, P, 2011, pers. comm., 1 July) 
According to the municipality tariff budgeting, the bulk water costs makes up 57% of all water expenses 
and the supply/distribution costs make up the remaining 43% (Groenewald, S, 2011, pers. comm., 14 
April).  The distribution, bad debts and chemical costs are excluded in the calculation of the current 
average water costs. This is justified on the grounds that the augmentation schemes analyzed in this study 
compare water at source-value and do not include the relative distribution or treatment costs.  
For the purposes of this study, the average water cost divided by the mean water supply (over the past 
nine years) will be used to represent the current water supply costs. The average cost of water in the 
NMBM is R1.43/m3 (new 2009 prices).  
Water budgets fail to reflect the scarcity value of water as they only consider the abstraction, distribution, 
treatment and storage costs of water. The opportunity cost of using water for any one purpose needs to 
be accounted for in order to determine the true economic cost of a resource. (Marais et al, 2001). For 
example, the foregone benefits of using the water for agricultural activities, instead of urban 
consumption, are not included in these budgets. These budgets only deal with the financial transactions 
and fail to reflect the true economic cost of water. Chapter 3 delves further into the issues surrounding 













2 Nelson	  Mandela	  Bay	  Municipality’s	  Proposed	  Augmentation	  
Schemes	  
Population growth and immigration lead to increased water demand. Faced with this, a rational water 
manager has two basic responses to the problem of securing adequate future water supplies. He can 
increase supply and provide more water or he can manage demand and try to shift the per capita 
demand curve backwards through the use of water tariffs.  
The ‘Water Reconciliation Strategy Study for the Algoa Water Supply Area’, undertaken by the DWA to secure 
future water supply for the NMBM and surrounding towns, responds with the first two choices. 
Nevertheless, the NMBM has been using prices as a means to change residents’ behaviour, and it 
increased water tariffs steeply during the drought (Groenewald, S, 2010, pers. comm., 28 July). Another 
potential reason for increasing water tariffs is because the municipality was selling less water during the 
drought and thus need to charge more per unit of water to maintain their revenues.  
The constitutional imperative that the public has a right to clean safe water, makes pricing problematic 
as a means of regulating the water demands of the urban poor. Nonetheless, the NMBM used water 
tariffs to manage water demand during the drought and thus this section begins with a theoretical 
review of using prices for residential demand management. Following the literature review, the supply-
side schemes and WCDM proposed in the Algoa Reconciliation Strategy will be discussed. The analysis 
of residential demand for water in NMBM is not within the scope of this paper.  
2.1 Using	  Prices	  in	  Demand	  Management	  
There is a trend towards demand management in dealing with the growing scarcity of potable water 
and thus the importance of price efficiency has gained recognition (Jones and Morris, 1984, Arbués, 
Garcıa-Valiñas and Martınez-Espiñeira, 2003). Economists suggest price as a means to achieve 
allocative efficiency and it is also the medium through which governments endeavour to reach social 
objectives, such as equity and redistribution. Methods such as water tariffs, metering or charges are 
used to control demand and achieve a balance between supply and demand (Stephenson, 1999:115). 
Before prices are utilized in policies or as a demand management tool, it is imperative to appreciate the 
impact that changes in price have on consumers’ demand for water. This is dictated by the price 






Consumer demand functions, grounded in utility theory, are derived by maximising utility subject to a 
budget constraint (Espey, Espey and Shaw, 1997:1369). Residential water, the only category whereby 
water is consumed directly and therefore classified as a final consumption good, competes with other 
items in the household budget (Nieuwoudt, Backeberg and Du Plessis, 2004). The price elasticity and 
consequently, the value of water can be determined from the demand schedule. The total value of 












(Williams, Veck and Bill, 2008:15). Economists assume that it behaves like any other good, insinuating 
that consumers change their water consumption in response to changes in price (Young, 2005:248). 
For most residential uses, it is assumed that water is a normal good, displaying positive income 
elasticity and negative own-price elasticity of water demand (Hanemann, 1998). Water demand is 
generally rather inelastic, due to the fact that water has no close subsitutes. In addition, it forms a small 
proportion of income and hence, consumers are not sensitive to the tariff structure. However, as long 
as price elasticity is different from zero, prices can still play a role in demand management  (Arbué et al, 
2003:84).  
Inductive methods (using econometric models) are the most common form of evaluating residential 
demand for water and these usually employ secondary data to evaluate at-site water values (Young, 
2005:248).  Like other goods, the price of water (PW), the price of other goods (Pa), consumer income 
(Y) and a host of factors (Z), such as consumer tastes and preferences, seasons and policies, influence 
the demand for water: 𝑄! =   𝑄!   (𝑃! ,𝑃! ,𝑌,𝑍) (Renzetti, 1992:153).  
Demand often fluctuates and it is important to delve a bit further into the explanatory variables which 
influence water demand. There has been much debate around specifying the price variable (PW) – 
should one use marginal or average prices? Foster and Beattie (1979) determined the urban residential 
demand for the United States of America using the average price of water and they justify this by 
stating in (1981) that average price is “more likely to motivate consumer response” as perfect 
information, necessary for marginal pricing, is not plausible. Foster and Beattie (1979) represented 
urban demand as a function of average price, median family income, precipitation and average number 
of residents per square meter. An exponential form of the function was used to allow for the variation 
in price elasticity. Price elasticities varied across cities from -0.27 in Calumet City to -0.76 in Colorado 
Springs, indicating that water demand differs across sub regions in the United States.   
Table 5 Price Elasticities of South African residential demand for different income groups 
Study Area Source High income  price elasticity 
Middle income  
price elasticity 
Low income  
price elasticity 
Greater Letaba River 
Catchment 
Williams et al, 
2008 -0.29 -0.250 -0.397 




 -0.35 -1.12 
 
Billings and Agthe (1980:73) introduce the issue of block rates in the tariff schedule and argue average 
prices overestimate price elasticities when block rates are in use. Rates that do not correspond to 
consumption levels are called intramarginal rates and under block rate tariffs it is difficult to analyze the 
effect a change in intramarginal rates has on demand (Arbués et al, 2003:84). A solution to this 












two-variable representation of water price (Young, 2005:252). This features both the marginal price and 
a “difference” variable, which is the difference between the actual total water fee and the water fee if all 
the units were taken at marginal price (Billings and Agthe, 1980:74). The “difference” variable was 
expected to represent the income effect of changes in intramarginal rates; however empirically it has 
been without much success.  
Weather variations have a strong seasonal impact on water consumption. Wong (1972) discovered in 
his time-series analysis, that average summer temperature has a significant impact on water demand for 
communities in and around Chicago. Foster and Beattie (1979:50) used a precipitation variable to take 
into account the impact of weather and found that it was significantly and negatively related to water 
demand.  
The independent variable income (Y) is a significant determinant of residential water demand. Usually 
average income is used, such as in Wong (1972:38), where average household income was used. Foster 
and Beattie (1979:47) refrained from using variables such as value of homes, lawn area or household 
characteristics or preferences instead of, or in addition to income, for fear that these variables were 
interrelated and correlated with income. Jones and Morris (1984:198) created a comprehensive 
replacement for household income using property value, age of residence, education level of head of 
house and car ownership in order to bypass autocorrelation.  
Some studies have estimated different demand functions for different income levels so that the income 
effect can be analyzed. It has been hypothesized that wealthier consumers are less sensitive to water 
prices as the total water fee embodies a lower proportion of their income (Arbués et al, 2003:85). 
Williams et al (2008) derived municipal water demand for low, middle and high-income groups in the 
Greater Letaba River Catchment Area in Limpopo using contingent valuation techniques.  
Greengrowth Strategies cc (2003), commissioned by the Water Research Commission, undertook a 
study of the economic value of water in the Vaal River Catchment. The study investigated the price 
elasticities of municipal demand for different income groups, namely the Upper Middle (above 
R26 900, 1998 price levels) and Lower (below R26 900, 1998 prices) and noticed that the price 
elasticities varied substantially. The study divided residential water demand into two components, 
indoor and outdoor use. In accordance with other literature it was found that outdoor water demand 
was more elastic than indoor for both income groups (Greengrowth cc, 2003).  
Conradie (2002) found that the price elasticity of municipal water demand in the Fish-Sundays River 
transfer scheme was -0.47, and was the same across different income groups. Van Schalkwyk (1996 
cited in Conradie, 2002 ) carried out a study which looked at the water demand of low-income groups 
situated in informal settlements in the Northern Transvaal. It was found that people living in informal 
settlements obey the same laws of demand as those who live in formal settlements and that water 












day, season, number of household members and number of visitors” (Conradie, 2002). Jansen and 
Schulz (2006) argue that pricing is an effective tool to manage water demand among the rich, yet 
ineffective among the poor.   
2.2 Proposed	  schemes	  
There are several supply augmentation options that the NMBM is considering. These range from 
desalination plants, tapping into ground water supplies, advancing the infrastructure of surface water 
schemes, and water trading with irrigation farmers. All these options look at increasing the stock of 
water available to the NMBM and keep the water demand function constant. The simple neoclassical 




New dams built in the NMBM area would increase the stock of water available, as seen in Figure 9, but 
do little more. Raising the Kouga Dam or building the new Guernakop Dam, would not make the 
water supply more reliable to NMBM as neither reduces the risk of drought, leaving the entities in the 
water supply portfolio with the same naturally positive covariance. Municipalities need to look at ways 
to increase the reliability of water supply, allowing water managers to exploit more fully the reserve 
supply of water, currently kept for drought-situations. NMBM needs to look at interventions that 
simultaneously reduce the risk within the water supply portfolio while increasing supply. The 
Nooitgedagt Scheme and the Swartkops desalination plants, at which the salt and minerals from 
seawater are removed to make it suitable for human consumption, are such supply programmes. 
The NMBM currently receives most of its water from a concentrated area, whose catchments have 
similar rainfall and weather patterns. This increases drought risk. Thus, when a drought hit this area in 
2009/2010, 70% of NMBM’s water supply was under threat. A positive covariance between supplies 
has implications for water-resource management. Although the inflows in the Western System’s dams 
are closely correlated, the city manager does not deplete the dams evenly. The result is that ‘percentage 
full’ shows a positive but low covariance across the Western System dams of 0.03.  The Orange River 
Project Nooitgedagt Low-Level Scheme’s tender process is being fast-tracked and the design modified, 
Figure 7: Increase Supply Side 












in order to secure water delivery by December 2011 (DWA, 2010). This intervention is considered 
crucial for development at the Coega IDZ. The Low-Level Scheme will increase the capacity, of the 
existing works so that they can treat the additional water. There are many competing water users for 
the Orange River water and most of the water has been fully allocated. However, according to the 
DWA Internal Strategic Perspective, there is yet another 41.3Mm3/a available for the NMBM, for 
which the municipality have submitted an application (DWA, 2009).  The Orange River water is 
expected to increase to a total of 58.3M m3/a when the Nooitgedagt Low-Level Scheme is complete. 
Another supply-side scheme that forms part of the Emergency Intervention is the Swartkops 
Desalination Plant. The brine from the desalination plant will combine with the water from the 
Fishwater Flats Water Treatment Works and be discharged via the existing sea outlet (DWA, 2010). 
The water is to be distributed to the Western areas of the city (those which are served by the Churchill 
pipeline), and will therefore help insure the Western System against localised droughts (DWA, 2010). 
Progress on this development has been delayed whilst larger sites are being investigated (DWA, 2011). 
Although the initial capital costs and the annual running costs of a desalination plant are expected to be 
high, in terms of local rainfall the plant is risk-free. This means that the size of buffer stocks in city 
dams, which water managers usually keep against the possibility of future drought, can be reduced. It 
also means that even when it is not running, the desalination scheme can generate revenue.  
Water trading is also considered as a form of supply augmentation. It typically involves the selling of 
agricultural water rights to the NMBM and thus a transfer of water away from agriculture towards 
urban use. 
The NMBM is also exploring water recycling through the treatment of effluent. Proposed schemes 
consider treating effluent, subjected to flocculation, rough screening and a compulsory ‘treatment 
train’, in order to reach industrial (non-potable) standards (DWA, 2009). 
Although water recycling is normally viewed as a supply-side scheme, the demand for fresh water from 
the municipality is met in part by supplies of the substitute. Figure 10 indicates the shift in the demand 
of fresh water D1 to D2, and the second diagram denotes the increase in the supply of recovered water 


















The final intervention focuses on the conservation of water and demand management. The 
intervention is a response to the excessive wastage of water in the system, estimated to be a third of all 
water supplied (DWAF, 2008). The investment involves leakage repairs, tariff adjustments, adopting 
water efficient technologies and public awareness programmes. A change in the by-laws has been 
instigated by the NMBM to allow for the harvesting of rainwater (DWA, 2011).  
The diagrams in Figure 11 illustrate the implication of non-price based demand side options. These 
diagrams represent the introduction of water efficient technologies, improved metering and leakage 
controls, repair and awareness programmes. Each can be interpreted as in A, as a reduction in the flow 




Table 7 below lists all the options considered by the NMBM. The report, ‘Water Reconciliation Strategy 
Study for the Algoa Water Supply Area’ commissioned the DWA, incorporates all the capital and running 
costs of the schemes, along with the associated yields. The study was compiled and prepared by 
Aurecon South Africa (Pty) Ltd, although much of the engineering costing was undertaken by Afri-
Coast Engineers SA (Pty) Ltd.  
Figure 8: Recycling Water 
Source: Leiman and van Zyl (2000) 
Source: Leiman and van Zyl (2000) 
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2.3 Proposed	  schemes’	  costs	  of	  water	  
2.3.1 Review	  of	  methodology	  
This section develops a cost curve for NMBM’s water supply, illustrating the relative costs of the 
proposed schemes and their associated yields. Literature differs on which indicators best assess the 
costs of water development schemes. The Unit Reference Value (URV) has become a common 
indicator in South Africa, used to evaluate projects in the water services sector, while scholars 
elsewhere often advocate the use of levelised costs (LCs) or average incremental costs (AICs). A short 
review of each methodology will be discussed, followed by an explanation of the methodology chosen 
for this paper, and how it deviates from the others.  
The URV has a become a popular cost reference in South Africa, due to the fact that the Department 
of Water Affairs and Environment’s water engineers use this term to evaluate water augmentation 
schemes (Blignaut et al, 2010). The URV, found in engineering computations, is calculated as the ratio 
between the present value of the costs over the lifespan of the project and the present value of the total 
yield over the same time (Africoast, 2010 and Aurecon, 2010). It is site and time specific and is not 
documented to be a representative for the unit cost. It assumes that a scheme’s total yield is equal to 
the shortage that would occur should the scheme not be implemented and no explanation is given as to 
why the yields are discounted (Hoffman & du Plessis, 2008). There is no typical guideline for URVs 
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which indicate whether the scheme is favourable or not; however it is suggested that a URV between 2 
and 4 is standard for a development project (Blignaut et al, 2010; Marais & Wannenburgh, 2008).  
Blignaut et al (2010) and Marais and Wannenburgh (2008) use the URV ratio as a means of determining 
the economic feasibility of respective water augmentation schemes. The restoration in the Maloti–
Drakensberg mountain range is considered in Blignaut et al (2010) and the economic impact of clearing 
alien invasive plants is analysed in Marais and Wannenburgh (2008). The URV was used because it is 
directly comparable to the Department of Water Affairs and Environment’s calculations of future 
augmentation schemes. However, the URV described in these papers differs as it was calculated as:  
URV= 
𝑃𝑉  𝑜𝑓  𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙  𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑠  𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟  𝑙𝑖𝑓𝑒𝑠𝑝𝑎𝑛  𝑜𝑓  𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑗𝑒𝑐𝑡
𝑃𝑉  𝑜𝑓  𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙  𝑏𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑓𝑖𝑡𝑠  𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟  𝑙𝑖𝑓𝑒𝑠𝑝𝑎𝑛  𝑜𝑓    𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑗𝑒𝑐𝑡
 
(Marais and Wannenburgh, 2008). 
This is not a URV calculation, but an economic Cost-Benefit Ratio (CBR), which divides the 
discounted costs of the scheme by the discounted benefits of the scheme over the same timeframe. If 
the ratio is greater than one, the costs outweigh the benefits and vice versa. This cost-benefit ratio is 
broader than the URV they claim to be calculating and therefore these calculations are not strictly 
comparable to URVs.  
Levelised Costs (LC), based on the methodology of least-cost planning, is an economic approach that 
measures the cost-effectiveness of the water supply schemes and is used to compare supply and 
conservation options. The use of LC was developed in the 1980’s by the electricity industry in the 
United States of America and is determined as: 
𝑃𝑉  (𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑠)
𝑃𝑉     𝑤𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑟  𝑑𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑑  𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑒𝑑  𝑜𝑟  𝑠𝑢𝑝𝑝𝑙𝑖𝑒𝑑
 
(Fane, Robertson and White , 2003).  
Levelised costs is a simplified version of Average Incremental Costs (AIC), which is defined as the 
discounted value of all incremental future supply costs divided by the discounted physical volume of 
additional water (Warford, 1994:6). This means that the incremental costs of each projected are taken 
and discounted back. While AIC is dependent on future demand and future prices, LCs assume that 
future water demand is independent of marginal costs (Fane et al, 2003).  
 
The issue of capital indivisibility makes the implementation of strict marginal cost pricing problematic. 
Since supply schemes are meant to meet demand for numerous years, the problem involves the 
spreading the capital costs over time (Warford, 1994:6). Due to the initial large capital expenditure 
common to many supply-side schemes, marginal cost pricing causes significant price fluctuations and 












because it smoothes out prices and provides a reasonable price approximation for long term water 
supply costs.  
 
All the mentioned methodologies agree that the denominator (water conserved, water supplied or 
incremental water supplied) should be discounted and this is to account for the time preference of 
consumption. A more basic reason given is that discounting the physical volume allows one to work 
out a cost per unit volume that is not skewed over time. If the costs are discounted, but the volumes 
are not, future water appears unduly cheap.  
Discounting the denominator is also justified mathematically by implying that yield is a function of 
future demand met, and not just a volumetric term. Fane et al (2003) explain that the LC can be viewed 
as the price per unit of water needed to break even in Present Value terms and therefore needs to be 
discounted.  
Average Incremental Costs (AIC) will be used to explain the mathematical analysis, although this term 
is interchangeable with Levelised Costs (LC). AIC is the average cost of water and is constant over 
time, WS represents water supply and ES is expenditure stream or cost of the scheme (World Bank, 
n.d).   
𝑃𝑉 𝑊𝑆 ∗ 𝐴𝐼𝐶 = 𝑃𝑉(𝐸𝑆) 





This mathematical formula is validated by the fact that the AIC is constant in real terms over time and 
can therefore be taken outside of the bracket.  
Although this paper accepts LC and AIC methodologies and the rationalisation for discounting water 
yields, it questions whether there is still a need to discount water yields. It also argues that, when 
building an incremental cost function, in which the next 25 years of operation are taken as a common 
unit, there is no need to discount water yields. 
2.3.1.1 Is	  the	  time-­‐preference	  of	  consumption	  applicable	  in	  water	  supply	  scheme?	  
The positive discount rate and the theory of time preference of consumption are based on the premise 
that ‘consumption today is preferred to consumption tomorrow.’ Intertemporal choice, which reflects 
society’s desire for consumption at different points in time, is not necessary when establishing the 
relative costs of the water augmentation schemes: 












The expected annual yields estimated for each scheme form part of the NMBM water allocation. Each 
year there is a fixed allocation of water, which is distributed accordingly. Although individual 
consumers may choose not to consume their full allocation, this analysis is taken from a macro 
governmental perspective and therefore intertemporal choice is not relevant.  
• If water is not consumed it today, the commodity will not be saved for tomorrow  
If the water is not utilised ‘today,’ it will not necessarily be saved for ‘tomorrow,’ but rather reallocated, 
evaporated or lost out to sea.  
2.3.1.2 Is	  future	  water	  disproportionately	  cheap?	  
When yields are not discounted, there is an inherent bias in favour of water schemes with initial high 
capital costs, such as the construction of a dam. However, this can be interpreted as a true reflection of 
water costs, because future water will become increasingly cheaper, as the dam is amortized. In the 
future, when the dams’ costs are fully amortized, the cost of this water will be cheap because the annual 
operating and maintenance costs are low. Society views the initial capital costs of the present dams as 
sunk costs; hence the cost of water at any point in time is calculated as the present running costs. 
2.3.2 Methodology	  
The water scheme costs will be analysed using two different methods to account for the above 
arguments. Seeing that one cannot discard the accepted and well-documented methodology, the 
levelised costs (LC) of water will be used to compare the cost of water from different schemes over 25 
years. This method will show how discounting yields influences the attractiveness of large scale 
schemes.   
The formula used is shown below: 
𝑳𝑪 =
  𝑃𝑉 𝐾𝑡 + 𝑀𝑡 + 𝐸𝑡 +𝑊𝑡
1 + 𝑟 𝑡
𝑌
1 + 𝑟 𝑡
 
 
K:  Capital Costs  
M : Maintenance costs  
E: Electricity usage  
W: Water purchases 












The annual costs are discounted using a real interest rate of 4%, based on the current opportunity cost 
of riskless government bonds and the yields are discounted at the same rate. The denominator becomes 
a function of demand and it is assumed that the expected yield of the scheme is equal to water demand. 
The Present Value of the stream of costs generated by the scheme is divided by the total expected yield 
of the scheme, to give the average cost of water over a 25 year timeframe. The annual costs are 
discounted using a real rate of 4%, but the volumetric yield is not discounted.  
 
𝑨𝒗𝒆𝒓𝒂𝒈𝒆  𝑪𝒐𝒔𝒕 =   





It will be interesting to compare these methodologies and evaluate whether there are substantial 
differences in the results. In order to compare the costs of the schemes a marginal supply curve will be 
created. 
The average costs from each scheme are ranked, along with their volumes, from cheapest to most 
expensive. The series gives the incremental or marginal average cost curve for water as a whole. This is 
useful in comparing the relative schemes’ costs and the relative output each scheme can produce. 
The graph will assist in guiding public decision making on how best to expand the supply of water, 
minimise the risk of drought, while at the same time minimising the average cost of water. It is also 
useful in comparing new recommendations, such as investment in restoration activities to enhance 
better catchment management.  
A sensitivity analysis is performed, to test the receptiveness of the assumptions and the robustness of 
the results. A change in the discount rates and the time horizon is tested to see whether the results 
differ substantially and whether the ranking of the schemes is significantly altered. Furthermore, the 
importance of the initial capital costs is investigated by assuming the capital costs sunk and by only 
comparing the annual operations and maintenance costs. The impact these changes have on the rank of 
the schemes is examined.  
2.3.3 Data	   
Raw data for all the engineering supply augmentation, recycling and demand management schemes was 
sourced from Aurecon South Africa (Pty) Ltd and Afri-Coast Engineers SA (Pty) Ltd (van Reenen, D. 
2011, 6 May; Versfeld, K. 2011, 12 May). The data contains the details of estimated costs and expected 
yields over a 25 year projection level. 2009 prices are used for all the schemes. A 3.5% linear growth in 












on the estimated future economic and population growth rates. It is anticipated that the Coega 
Industrial Development Zone will not only increase economic productivity for the region, but also 
increase the demand for water. 
2.3.3.1 Desalination,	  Surface	  Water	  Schemes,	  Ground	  Water	  and	  Re-­‐use	  of	  Water	  
It is assumed that the initial capital costs of these schemes are incurred over the first two years. Capital 
costs also encompasses the cost of reservoirs, dams, pipelines and pump stations, each apportioned 
into electrical, mechanical and civil engineering costs. Annual maintenance costs comprise 0.25% of 
total civil costs, 4% of total mechanical and electrical costs and between 0.35% and 0.5% of total 
pipeline costs. The labour costs are included in all the above costs (Dr M. Shand, 2011 pers. comm.7 
July). 
Water purchases and electricity costs form part of the annual costs. The impending electricity hikes 
were taken into consideration by assigning a R0.50/KWh tariff to electricity, double the average 2009 
electricity tariff. Many of these schemes have significant electricity requirements: the desalination plants 
demand between 18-92 million KWh/annum; the recycling schemes require between 7-28 million 
KWh/annum, and the groundwater schemes need between 1-3 million KWh/annum. Further 
electricity increases will have a severe impact on the costs of thes  schemes.   
The Swartkops Desalination plant was placed on NMBM’s Emergency Intervention list, but 
unfortunately there is no available cost data relating to this scheme. Preliminary reports exclude details 
of the Swartkops site and therefore raw data referring to other desalination plants will be used as a 
proxy for the Swartkops Plant. 
2.3.3.2 	   Demand	  Management	  
The water conservation and water demand management scheme (WC/WDM), calculated by Afri-Coast 
Engineers SA (Pty) Ltd, involves a different cost formulation.  The demand management scheme is 
already part of the municipality’s annual budget and a fixed figure of R5 million/annum and R7.7 
million/annum has been dedicated to the respective schemes. The water conserved by the WC/WDM 
is expressed as additional water supplied.  
2.3.3.3 	   Water	  Trading	  
Secondary data was used in calculating cost of the water trading in the Baviaanskloof and Upper Fish 
River. Information was sourced from the report, ‘Water Reconciliation Strategy Study for the Algoa Water 
Supply Area’ commissioned the DWA (2010), and from the various preliminary documents (DWA, 
2009; DWA, 2010). Details of the capital and annual costs and the exact incremental annual expected 
yields are therefore not available.  
The costs were based on the purchase price of irrigation rights on approximately 500ha and 1500-
2000ha of land within the Baviaanskloof Valley and Upper Great Fish River Valley respectively. Costs 












and developed entitlements in the Baviaanskloof Valley and R35 000/ha and R88 000/ha in the Great 
Fish Valley.  
The impact of water trading on agriculture and secondary businesses has not been included. Only the 
direct financial implications of the scheme have been assessed and therefore these prices do not reflect 
the total economic cost.   
2.3.3.4 	   Existing	  Water	  Schemes	  
The cost of water from the existing schemes is included for interest of comparing the water prices 
across old and new schemes. It merely acts as a ball-mark figure. For the purposes of comparing like 
with like, it is assumed that the historical capital costs are incurring now. The costs and yields are thus 
projected over the same 25years time-frame as the other proposed schemes. In order to determine the 
average cost of water, the yields are taken as the average volume over the life of the dam thus far. This 
does not equate to NMBM’s water demand, because not all the water from these dams is distributed to 
the NMBM. The maximum capacity was neither chosen, because the dam is rarely at full capacity.  
The capital costs are taken from Raymer’s Streams of Life (2008). For the most part, the expansions of 
the dams, such as Churchill’s second pipeline and the additions made to Impofu Dam, have been 
accounted for. However, there is no cost data for the second stage of the Kouga Dam and this water 
will therefore appear unduly cheap. The schemes built before 1943 cannot be incorporated due to 
unavailable cost data. 
The average annual maintenance costs are taken from 7 years of annual budgets. These include the 
maintenance and upkeep of the dam and nearby facilities, but do not include the operations and 
running costs. For this reason, the estimates used for the proposed schemes by Aurecon and Afri-
Coast have been included.  
3 Results 
This presents the results of the analysis in table and graph format. It compares the results of both 
methodologies mentioned. Table 8 and Figure 12 represent the schemes’ average cost of water by 
means of average costing. On the other hand, Figure 13 and Table 9 use the Levelised Cost approach, 
whereby both the yields and costs are discounted. 
The x-axis depicts the cumulative yield supplied by the schemes and the y-axis is the average cost of a 
cubic metre of water. In terms of the existing schemes’ yields, only the yield allocated to NMBM is 
illustrated on the graph. Not all the labels depicting the schemes are shown in Figure 12, however all 
the data can be found in Table 8. The labels indicated in bold represent the cost of water from existing 
schemes. The stepped-graph can be interpreted as an incremental average cost curve for supplying 





























































cumulative volume (million m³) 





















































Supply augmentation  R million million m3 R/m³ 
Desalination 
Coega desalination 2 528.40 671.60 3.76 
Seawater 2 825.95 755.55 3.74 
Sundays River 592.64 251.12 2.36 
Surface water schemes 
Nooitgedagt Low-Level 1 652.46 753.73 2.19 
Gamtoos river irrigation return flows 176.03 173.38 1.02 
Tsitsikamma River diversion 75.71 22.08 3.43 
Guernakop Dam 1 745.45 640.25 2.73 
Kouga replacement 2 075.04 640.25 3.24 
Groundwater 
Bushy Park 84.92 46.17 1.84 
Jeffrey’s Arch 144.37 69.68 2.07 
Coega fault 87.48 71.36 1.23 
Van Stadens 126.98 93.59 1.36 
Water Trading 
Baviaanskloof 17.67 22.50 0.79 
Upper Fish River 443.59 393.75 1.13 
Recycling      
Re-use of water 
Industrial standards FWF WWTW 989.39 363.18 2.72 
Treated effluent from Coega 1 015.20 397.85 2.55 
Echodale: potable standards 1 535.47 348.67 4.40 
Demand Management      
Water Conservation & 
Demand Management 
Upstream of meters 85.83 80.30 1.07 
Downstream of meters 133.90 80.30 1.67 
Existing Sources      
Dams 
Groendal 322.37 242.25 1.33 
Churchill 962.14 651.50 1.48 
Impofu 493.00 1874.50 0.26 
Kouga/Loerie 976.66 2216.80 0.44 
 
The x-axis in Figure 13 portrays the discounted cumulative yield of water generated over 25 years by 
the respective schemes. The existing schemes’ yields represent NMBM’s water allocation discounted at 
4%. The y-axis depicts the mean cost per cubic metre of water. As a whole, the graph can be 
interpreted as the marginal incremental average cost curve for supplying water to the NMBM over 25 
years. The existing schemes are once again highlighted in bold and are depicted merely to provide a 





































































cumulative volume (million m3) 



















































Supply augmentation  R million million m³ R/m³ 
Desalination 
Coega desalination 2 528.40 417.13 6.06 
Seawater 2 825.95 448.24 6.30 
Sundays River 592.64 152.37 3.89 
Surface water schemes 
Nooitgedagt Low-Level 1 652.46 468.32 3.53 
Gamtoos river irrigation return flows 176.03 109.55 1.61 
Tsitsikamma River diversion 75.71 13.71 5.52 
Guernakop Dam 1 745.45 366.29 4.77 
Kouga replacement 2 075.04 366.29 5.66 
Groundwater 
Bushy Park 84.92 28.68 2.96 
Jeffrey’s Arch 144.37 43.28 3.34 
Coega fault 87.48 44.32 1.97 
Van Stadens 126.98 57.99 2.19 
Water Trading 
Baviaanskloof 17.67 14.62 1.21 
Upper Fish River 443.59 255.89 1.73 
Recycling         
Re-use of water 
Industrial standards FWF WWTW 989.39 221.33 4.47 
Treated effluent from Coega 1 015.20 240.98 4.21 
Echodale: potable standards 1 535.47 208.59 7.36 
Demand Management         
Water Conservation & 
Demand Management 
Upstream of meters 85.83 48.90 1.76 
Downstream of meters 133.90 48.90 2.74 
Existing Sources         
Dams 
Groendal 322.37 157.43 2.05 
Churchill 962.14 423.40 2.27 
Impofu 493.00 1218.20 0.40 
Kouga/Loerie 976.66 1440.65 0.68 
	  
Excluding the existing schemes, a comparison in the cost of water as estimated with the two 
methodologies is compared in Table 10 and Figure 14. The difference in the ranking of the schemes is 














































cumulative volume (million m3) 
Incremental Cost of Water by Scheme - a comparison 
 
Table 10: A comparison of the ranking of schemes according to each methodology 
R/m³ SCHEMES - no discounting of yields SCHEMES - 4% discounting of yields R/m³ 
R 0.7854 Baviaanskloof Baviaanskloof R 1.2085 
R 1.0153 Gamtoos river irrigation return flows Gamtoos river irrigation return flows R 1.6069 
R 1.0689 Upstream of meters Upper Fish River R 1.7335 
R 1.1266 Upper Fish River Upstream of meters R 1.7554 
R 1.2260 Coega fault Coega fault R 1.9739 
R 1.3569 Van Stade s Van Stadens R 2.1896 
R 1.6675 Downstream of meters Downstream of meters R 2.7384 
R 1.8392 Bushy Park Bushy Park R 2.9612 
R 2.0719 Jeffrey’s Arch Jeffrey’s Arch R 3.3359 
R 2.1924 Nooitgedagt Low-Level Nooitgedagt Low-Level R 3.5285 
R 2.3600 Sundays River Sundays River R 3.8895 
R 2.5517 Treated effluent from Coega Treated effluent from Coega R 4.2129 
R 2.7243 Industrial standards FWF WWTW Industrial standards FWF WWTW R 4.4701 
R 2.7262 Guernakop Dam Guernakop Dam R 4.7652 
R 3.2410 Kouga replacement Tsitsikamma River diversion R 5.5203 
R 3.4287 Tsitsikamma River diversion Kouga replacement R 5.6650 
R 3.7403 Seawater Coega desalination R 6.0614 
R 3.7647 Coega desalination Seawater R 6.3046 
R 4.4038 Echodale: potable standards Echodale: potable standards R 7.3612 













3.1.1.1 Methodologies	  –	  question	  of	  discounting	  
The most apparent difference between the schemes is that the LC curve is much steeper and is spread 
over a shorter range. The LC approach yields higher costs per unit volume because it discounts future 
physical yields.  
It is of further interest that the ranking of the schemes is very similar. This means that the policy 
implications will be almost identical and thus the debate over the methodologies can be deemed 
redundant. It is recognised that schemes with higher capital costs are identified as less favourable, and 
hence the Seawater Desalination and the Kouga Dam Replacement have higher average costs when 
calculated using the LC approach.  
A change in the discount rate also has little effect on the ranking of the schemes. When the discount 
rate changes to 10%, the ranking is almost unchanged, the exception is the Kouga Dam Replacement 
which, having a very high initial capital outlay is rendered even less favourable.  
3.1.1.2 Existing	  schemes	  
Although crude data and assumptions were used to calculate the cost of water from existing dams, it is 
interesting to note how much cheaper the water is compared to the new proposed dams. For example, 
water from the Guernakop Dam costs R4.77/m3, compared to R2.27/m3 from the Churchill Dam, the 
most expensive current water. The capacity of the new dams is substantially smaller than the current 
dams and thus illustrates the impact of economies of scale. If nothing else, it reinforces the lesson that 
the number of effectual and economically efficient dams that can be constructed in an area is limited.   
3.1.1.3 Cheapest	  options	  
The Baviaanskloof Trading scheme is the cheapest source of water in both graphs, largely due to the 
low start-up capital and low annual costs. There are only 16 major landowners in the Baviaanskloof 
area; a small enclave of agricultural activity within the Baviaanskloof Nature Reserve where livestock 
farming is the predominant activity (de Paoli, 2009). An estimated 300-500 hectares of land is irrigated 
and farmers envisage moving towards eco-tourism to supplement their earnings (Jansen, 2008). Given 
the type of farming activity and the low level of current irrigation usage, it seems that the opportunity 
cost of buying irrigation entitlements in this area is low. On the other hand, seeing that their farming 
activities are not wholly dependent on irrigation, they may be willing to sell their irrigation rights to 
supplement their incomes. 
The Baviaans River feeds into the Kouga Dam, but only contributes an estimated 25-40 million 
m3/annum (27% of instream flow). Given the low level of irrigation activity, it is not surprising that 
water trading in the Baviaanskloof will yield a mere 0.9 million m3/annum. This source does not 
diversify NMBM’s water supply sources as it experiences the same weather patterns and drought cycles 












The Kouga, Baviaans and Groot Rivers combine to create the Gamtoos River. However, the Kouga 
Dam has no flood outlet valves, and thus only supplies water to the Gamtoos in times of flood, when 
the dam overflows. The Gamtoos River is further restricted by the Loerie Dam. The Groot River is the 
only river that feeds the Gamtoos with free-flowing water, and as a result the Gamtoos River is starved, 
with high salt concentrations and high electrical conductivity, making it unusable for human 
consumption or irrigation. 
The diversion of the lower Gamtoos River irrigation return flows provides the second cheapest source 
of water. The start up capital needed to construct the pipelines connecting the Gamtoos River to the 
Loerie Balancing Dam is a relatively low R102.4 million. Thereafter, the electricity costs, needed for 
pumping and reverse osmosis, needed due to the high salinity make up 79% of the annual costs at 
R0.53/m3. The high dependency on electricity makes it vulnerable to future electricity price hikes. 
Gamtoos Valley irrigation farmers obtain all their water from the Kouga Dam, and thus this scheme 
enables more of the water from the Kouga Dam to be used by the NMBM. Nonetheless, during 
previous droughts water supplies to farmers from the Kouga Dam have been severely restricted, 
suggesting that this scheme will do little to supplement NMBM’s water in times of drought. 
The exploitation of ground water falls within the lower third of all the water costs. Ground water 
schemes’ electricity costs make up 77% of the total annual costs. Although the additional yields are 
relatively low (ranging from 2-4 million m3/annum), ground water provides a new source that is 
somewhat independent of the weather patterns and is not related to the other schemes. Ground water 
acts as some security against drought, although the pumping, and consequent electricity costs, will rise 
during droughts, when the water table falls. Ground water acts as a necessary component of the 
NMBM’s bundle of water sources, as it provides a source of cheap water and acts as some security 
during droughts. 
3.1.1.4 Recycling	  
These schemes deal with the augmentation of non-potable water, and are critical to meet the expected 
water demand increases as a result of Coega IDZ. Echodale is the most expensive scheme, because the 
intervention encompasses both the construction of a new dam and the recycling of water. The Fish 
Water Flats WTW and the treated effluent at Coega are both expensive schemes, but diversify 
NMBM’s water portfolio by freeing up fresh potable water for residential consumption. Nevertheless, 
available water also tends to decline during droughts.   
3.1.1.5 Capital	  intensive	  schemes	  
 
Nooitgedagt Low Level 
The Low-Level scheme at Nooitgedagt is imperative to augment local supplies with Orange-River 












supply by 30.5 million m3/annum at R2.19/m3 and because the supply comes from a different 
catchment, it spreads the risk of drought. As shown, there is a negative covariance between average 
volumes of dams in the Western System and the Gariep Dam. This scheme is crucial as it paves the 
way for schemes such as the Upper Fish transfers and the desalination of the Sundays River.  This 
scheme provides the most water compared to any other proposed schemes, supplying 468million m3 
over 25 years.   
Dams 
Dams are capable of storing vast quantities of water; although they do have finite volumes. They need 
to be managed in a risk-averse manner as they generally act as a buffer stock of unused water, which is 
kept back in dry seasons, in case the dry spells persist. The proposed dams are all situated within the 
same catchment areas as the existing dams and thus although they will increase their storage, they will 
not diversify the current basket of water supply.   
The Gamtoos Valley farmers will benefit from the Kouga Dam Replacement scheme as it will reduce 
competition between urban and agricultural water demand. 
Desalination  
Desalination plants provide the second most expensive source of water. Nevertheless, this option 
should not be discarded straight away. Unlike dams, desalination plants do not have a finite volume, 
and their entire capacity can be utilised. The plant provides risk-free water that can be employed in 
times of water shortages. Although the running costs are extremely high and they are heavily dependent 
on electricity, desalination plants make o her sources more economically feasible and impact the way 
other supply sources can be operated and viewed.  
If a dam manager knows that he has a desalination plant as reserve in case of drought, he can sell the 
cheaper dam water and treat the dams in a more risk-loving approach. Recycling of water becomes 
cheaper as this water does not have to be saved as a buffer.  
It would be useful to have a desalination plant included into the bundle of water sources, as it provides 
a dependable water source that only has to be utilised in times of drought. Literature describes 
desalination plants as the ultimate ‘back-stop’ source (Rogers, 2002).  
3.1.2 Sensitivity	  Analysis	  
3.1.2.1 Annual	  Running	  Costs	  
It is interesting to analyse the cost of water for one year only. One assumes that capital costs are sunk 
costs and hence only the operating and running costs are evaluated. The current cost of water supply is 













































Cumulative Volume (million m3) 
Incremental Annual Average Cost of Water by Scheme 
Most of these schemes will outlive the 25 year time frame examined, and the initial capital costs will 
slowly be amortised. The running costs examined will need to be recovered year after year if the 
schemes are to continue functioning. Figure 15 portrays the annual average costs of the respective 
schemes and includes the cost of current water at R1.43/m3. Further details pertaining to the ranking 
and annual costs of the scheme are displayed in the Appendix A: Table 62. 
It is not surprising that desalination plants have the highest running costs per cubic metre of water 
produced. The annual running costs are expected to increase with rising electricity prices. A striking 
result is that the Guernakop and Kouga Replacement Dam are regarded as much more favourable 
options when only considering their annual running costs. The WC/WDM scheme jumps to the third 















3.1.2.2 Looking	  beyond	  25	  years	  
The time frame is adjusted to 50 years ceteris paribus. This is a reasonable modification as most of the 
proposed schemes will last for more than the projected level of 25 years. It is also important to test 
whether the rank of the schemes changes significantly when the timeframe is extended to 50 years. 
The average water costs are cheaper when examined over 50 years. There are no significant changes in 
the ranking when compared to the schemes after 25 years. Details of the schemes’ average costs and 
rank are displayed in Appendix A: Table 63 and Figure 49.  












The Coega Desalination overtakes the Seawater desalination and Echodale dam as the most expensive 
water in the long run. This can be attributed to the fact that the Coega desalination plant has the 
highest annual costs, and in the long run, the initial capital costs no longer have as great an influence on 
the average water costs.  
4 Conclusions	  and	  Shortcomings 
The water manager’s main concern is to simultaneously augment supply, whilst minimising cost and 
risk. This chapter, through the construction of the incremental cost curves has been a useful heuristic 
in understanding current and historic policy. A summary of the proposed interventions as 
recommended in the Algoa Reconciliation Strategy and the associated average costs is in Appendix A: 
Table 64. The following conclusions can be deduced from the discussion above: 
- Desalination Plants: expensive, but augment supply and minimise risk significantly 
- Water Trading & Gamtoos Return Flows: cheapest options, but do not augment supply or 
minimise risk sufficiently 
- Groundwater: relatively cheap, minimises risk, but does not augment supply sufficiently 
- Nooitgedagt: expensive, but reduces risk considerably and augments supply amply 
- Additional dams: expensive, augment supply but do not decrease systemic risk 
- Recycling: expensive, but augments supply and reduces risk, though only to a degree 
The Levelised Costing approach is advisable as it is rendered as a more conservative policy 
recommendation. The outcome yields higher costs per cubic metre and promises lower yields over 
both the 25 and 50 year timeframes. Seeing that the impact of Climate Change has been ignored in this 
analysis, one should adhere to a more conservative approach.  
This chapter’s major shortcoming is that only financial costs have been incorporated. The total 
economic cost of each scheme needs to be investigated and this includes the opportunity costs of the 
schemes and the quantification of externalities. The environmental and social impacts of the proposed 
schemes need to be quantified before a true cost comparison can be undertaken. 
There is a limit to how useful the incremental cost curve is and a major limitation is its failure to 
incorporate risk. Climate change is a pressing concern and further research could examine different 
climate and weather change scenarios.  
The results from this chapter will be used to compare the cost-effectiveness of land rehabilitation in 
Upper Kromme Catchment in Chapter 2 and water trading possibilities in Chapter 3. The Levelised 
Cost approach will be used in the remaining sections of this paper. 













ECONOMIC	  APPRAISAL	  OF	  RESTORING	  THE	  
UPPER	  KROMME	  RIVER	  CATCHMENT	  
This chapter investigates the economic viability of restoration in the Upper Kromme Catchment and 
assesses whether it should be considered as a scheme to augment NMBM’s water supply. It has been 
argued that degradation of the natural capital is threatening the delivery of ecosystem services and 
therefore action needs to be taken to reverse the situation. In particular, it is believed that the 
degradation of the wetlands and the spread of alien infestations are threatening the supply and quality 
of water entering Churchill Dam. Nelson Mandela Bay Municipality is reliant on this water as it makes 
up a quarter of their demand. 
It is hypothesized that the restoration of natural capital will improve water flow and water quality, land 
and agricultural productivity. The argument is that effective land management practises will increase the 
delivery of ecosystem services and optimise their economic benefits. ‘Working for Water’ and ‘Working 
for Wetlands’ in Kromme River form part of the proposed catchment management and it is suggested 
that their work will ensure the recovery of the natural capital, improving the delivery of watershed 
services. 
It is anticipated that the restoration activities will have an impact on the ecosystem services, 
demonstrated in 	  Table 11. The expected benefits resulting from restoration activities predominantly 
accrue to the NMBM, as they are the end-users of the water. The municipality’s willingness to pay for 
these services will be influenced by the municipality’s current supply cost curve and the costs of their 
alternative water sources.  
Table 11: Expected change in ecosystem services provided by restored the Upper Kromme River Catchment 
Classification Ecosystem Service Impact 
Provisioning and Regulating 
Service Water regulation & yield 
Amplitude smoothing Stabilises 
stream flows; increases reliability 
and decreases risk; increase in 
yield 
Regulatory Service Water quality 
Well functioning wetlands 
decrease turbidity & trap sediment 
& pollutants. 
Regulatory Service Flood attenuation 
Reduces peak flows; curbs 
downstream damage; decreases 
sediment loads 
Provisioning Service Land productivity Augmenting nutrients & soil fertility on floodplains 
Source: Adapted from Millennium Ecosystem Assessment (2003), Turpie et al (2009), Costanza et al 













This chapter begins with an overview of the selected site, providing background information to the 
geographic layout, the socio-economic and agricultural setup and insight into the restoration activities 
taking place in the Catchment. This is followed by a literature review on the valuation of ecosystem 
services and the Payment for Ecosystem Services (PES) scheme, which aims at linking conservation to 
the market place. An in-depth study of the costs and benefits associated with the restoration activities 
ensues, whereby a cost-benefit analysis is performed. The inclusion of restoration as a NMBM-funded 
scheme to augment the municipality’s water supply is discussed.  
It should be mentioned at the onset that due to ecological data limitations and poor archiving of 
economic data, an economic assessment of ‘Working for Wetlands’ could not be undertaken. Working 
for Wetlands has only been rehabilitating the wetlands since 2000 and thus it is too soon to measure 
their impact on the wetlands.  
1 Background	  
1.1 Geographic	  Layout	  
The Kromme River was named by the Dutch settlers, because of the numerous twists and turns it 
made in the narrow valley (Raymer 2008:52). Its catchment (Tertiary Catchment K90), is 155 631ha in 
extent and is situated in a ravine between the Suuranys Mountains in the interior and the Tsitsikamma 
Mountains towards the southern coast of the Eastern ape (Haigh, Illgner, Wilmot and Buckle, 2008). 
The river, 95km long, runs past the town of Kareedouw, through agricultural zones, along the R62 
before flowing into the Churchill Dam (34º 00’S 24º29’E). About 20km downstream, the Diep River 
joins the Kromme River and it flows into the Impofu Dam (34º05’S 24º42’E) (Mander et al, 2010:14; 
Haigh et al, 2008). The Kromme estuary, which is classified as permanently open and therefore a 
lagoon, opens at St Francis Bay (Sale, Hosking and Du Preez, 2009:263). The estuary is “fresh water 
starved” as the dams’ storage exceeds the mean annual rainfall and therefore prevents the normal 
inflow of freshwater (Bate and Adams, 2000:329).   
The Kromme River Catchment contains peatlands, mainly dominated by palmiet (prionium serratum). 
Historically peat basins covered 547ha (2.6% of the total area of the Kromme River) and were situated 
within K90A and K90B quaternary catchments (Kotze & Ellery, 2009:114). Alluvial fans, are a feature 
of the Kromme River valley floor, and are apparent at the distal ends of tributaries entering the 
Kromme. These fan-shaped deposits stretch into the palmiet wetlands, restricting their spatial coverage, 
and are also to blame for the increased rate of sediment delivery at these places (Haigh et al, 2008). 
Flooding erodes the distal ends of the fans which result in steep banks developing and contributes 
towards the advancement of headcuts.  
Wetlands, another trait of the Kromme River, can be described as having a sponge-­‐like effect, as they 












regulating flow (NMBM, n.d). Wetlands provide important regulating services and have the ability to 
stabilise riverbanks thereby protecting the embankments from soil erosion. The palmiet bends sideways 
against the banks during excessive water flows, shielding the banks from erosion and lowering silt loads 
in the river. The Kromme River can be described as a high-energy system, which means the runoff is 
steep and moves very quickly. The wetlands play a significant hydrological buffering role in the 
Kromme system as they absorb initial flooding; hold back the water and hence break the force of the 
water flow. This regulatory ecosystem service can be classified as flood attenuation as it absorbs flood 
peaks and lengthens the flood period at a lower level, resulting in reduced flood damages to 
downstream users (Turpie, Lannas, Scovronick and Louw, 2009:31). The wetlands also act as natural 
water filters by trapping sediments and pollutants, thereby improving the water quality and reducing 
high sediment loads from entering the dams (Woodward & Wui, 2001:259; Turpie et al, 2009:35).  
Since 1950, the deterioration of the wetlands and Kromme River has escalated and its health is under 
threat. The invasion of black wattle, overgrazing, draining and ploughing of the flood plains and 
wetlands, the tarring and construction of roads and bridges and the channelling of the river have 
accelerated the degradation. The catchment’s health has been compromised and it is feared that much 
of the Upper Kromme Catchment can no longer provide important ecosystem services and that the 
alien invasive plants are compromising the water flow to NMBM and other users (Buckle, J pers. 




1.2 Socio-­‐Economic	  Setup	  
The K90A and K90B quaternary catchments, the focus area for the study, form part of the Kou-
Kamma Local District Municipality in the Eastern Cape. Joubertina, Louterwater and Kareedouw are 


















Change in Palmiet wetlands 
Figure 14: Change in the size of palmiet wetlands from 1954-2007 in the Upper Kromme Catchment 












Catchment. Kareedouw, which was established in 1905, accommodates the administrative centre for 
the Kou-Kamma Municipality (Haigh et al, 2008).  
The Municipality has experienced positive economic growth in the past few years and according to the 
CDM report (2008) agriculture is the third highest contributing sector to the Local Municipality’s 
economy, after finance and trade respectively, as portrayed in Figure 17. Agriculture is an integral part 
of the local economy – employing 46% of formal sector workers and 35% the total population of 
roughly 41 000(Cacadu District Municipality, 2008). As Figure 18 shows, agriculture is the largest 
employer in the Kou-Kamma Local Municipality. As stated in the CDM report (2008), a quarter of the 
population were living in poverty in 2007, though in that same year there was less than 10% 












Figure 15: Contribution to Kou-Kamma economy per economic sector  
Figure 16: Total employment per economic activity in Kou-Kamma  
Source: CDM (2008) 
Source: CDM (2008) 












The town of Kareedouw which consists of an estimated 4 500 people, obtains its water from the 
Assegaai tributary and from storage tanks situated at Drie Krone on municipal land,  as this is much 
cheaper than pumping from the Kromme River below them. This small town is known for its timber 
treatment industries and agricultural enterprises.  
1.2.1 Agriculture	  
The Langkloof valley has long been an agricultural hub; the first grazing permits were rented as early as 
1703 and title deeds were granted from 1820 onwards. In the 1800s, stock farming, mainly consisting 
of sheep and cattle, took place in the Kromme River. Minimal pastures were planted; instead the 
animals grazed on the veld which was burned regularly (Haigh, Grundling and Illgner, 2002). In the 
1900s, apples and soft fruit became the popular choice of produce and World War I provided an 
impressive market for such fruit. The Apple Express assisted in transporting the fruit to the export 
market and in 1929, almost 20 000 tons left the Langkloof and Kromme River (Haigh et al, 2002). The 
1931 flood ended a 3-year drought, but ripped up orchards and swept away topsoil causing substantial 
erosion. Many soft-fruit orchards were re-established, especially on floodplains (previously wetlands) 
and the temporary floodplain zones, which consisted of themeda triandra (red grass), were transformed to 
produce grains and fruit. Kikuyu was considered a successful pasture grass to plant and many farmers 
changed towards dairy and beef production after 1935 (Haigh et al, 2008). 
Wetlands have been ploughed and rivers beds bulldozed to change the course of the river in order to 
plant pastures and orchards in the fertile flood plains. According to the Vincent Egan Report (Haigh et 
al, 2002), 95% of the wetlands at Krommedraai were destroyed, resulting in deep gully erosion. 
Overgrazing causes excessive silt to enter the river and the mining of rock and sand at Kammiesbos 
























Figure 17:  Changes in agriculture in the Upper Kromme Catchment 













The changes in the extent of agricultural activity from 1954 to 2007 are indicated in Figure 19. The 
impacts of the changes in agriculture on the hydrology of the catchment were quantified by Rebelo 
(MSc dissertation in prep). The removal of AIPs is expected to have large positive externalities for 
agriculture, the economic benefits of which are computed in this paper. 
1.3 Legal	  Considerations	  	  
The Kromme River Catchment (K90) falls into the Fish-Tsitsikamma Water Management Area (WMA) 
as declared in the National Water Act (Act 36 of 1998, Section 5). This framework aims to implement 
the national policy of protecting South Africa’s water resources and associated ecosystems through 
promoting water conservation and demand management. 
The agricultural activities in the Kromme Catchment need to be discussed and evaluated in light of the 
various environmental laws. The Conservation of Agricultural Resources Act (CARA Act 43 of 1983) 
endeavours to control the over-utilisation of natural agricultural resources and advance the 
conservation of soil and water resources and natural vegetation. It states that authorisation is needed in 
order to drain or cultivate any vlei, marsh or water sponge – which therefore includes wetlands. 
Permission is also needed before land can be cultivated within the flood area of a water course or 
within 10 metres of the flood area of a water course (CARA 1983). It would appear that the Kromme 
farmers do not abide by this law as many have planted pastures in the floodplains and the wetlands 
have been drained or cultivated. Nevertheless, it is possible that these areas were planted before the law 
was introduced. For example, Krommedraai, Krugersland and Jagersbos farms have orchards in the 
floodplains and Kammiesbos and Hudsonvale have kikuyu planted in the floodplains of the 
watercourse. The legal ramifications of these actions are beyond the scope of this paper and it is 
unknown whether these farms have authorisation to carry out these actions. 
The New Government Regulation GNR 398 of 26 March 2004 authorises the impediment or diversion 
of water flow if the structure does not exceed a foundation width of 15 metres and a length of 200 
metres. The GNR 389 of 24 March 2004 allows a person to alter the beds, banks or characteristics of a 
water course if the alteration activity does not extend for more than 50 metres continuously or is an 
accumulative distance of 100 metres. These regulations are consistent with the National Water Act (Act 
36 of 1998). The modifying activities may not take place within 500 metres upstream or downstream 
from the boundary of a wetland. The government regulations only permit these actions if the water 
flow volume is not reduced, strict erosion control measures are put in place and if the water quality is 
not adversely affected.   
Consistent with the GNR 1191 of October 1999 (Government Gazette 20526), the Kromme 
Catchment falls within Groundwater Abstraction Zone C. Abstraction from this drainage region is 












Authorization 399 (Government Gazette 26187, 2004) for taking surface water, which sets abstraction 
at 15litres per second. However, the legal limit for storing water, set at 50 000m³, does apply to the 
Kromme River Catchment and authorisation is needed for storing more than 10 000m³ of water per 
property (Gazette 26187, 2004). In June 2010, GNR 514 of June 2010 (Government Gazette 33290) 
restricted the abstraction of water by irrigators for agricultural use in the Kromme to 5 600m³ per 
hectare per annum.  
If enforced, these laws have the potential to protect the integrity of the Upper Kromme Catchment and 
the delivery of ecosystem services. The restoration activities carried out by ‘Working for Water’ and 
‘Working for Wetlands’ need the support of these laws to ensure the benefits of their work are not 
reversed by illegal activities.  
1.4 Restoration	  activities	  
1.4.1 Working	  for	  Water	  
Concerns over introducing alien invasive plants to replace natural vegetation in South Africa can be 
traced back as early as 1888 and 1908 to Peter MacOwan and Rudolf Marloth respectively. However, 
Professor Wicht, in 1945, was the first to highlight the detrimental impact AIPs have on water supply 
(van Wilgen et al, 1997). Attempts to control AIPs were haphazard as ecological and concrete scientific 
evidence was still lacking. Hydrological experiments took place in Jonkershoek and between1970-1974, 
18 000 hectares of AIPs were cleared. The clearing and control efforts slowed during the 1980s as 
management and funding was lacking. The end of the 1980s saw the publication of the Fynbos Biome 
Project which integrated the knowledge and understanding gained over the past decades. The 
publication’s dire warnings and predictions led the then Minister of Water Affairs, Kader Asmal, to 
renew the alien control campaign through the programme: ‘Working for Water’ (van Wilgen et al, 
1997). 
It is now common knowledge that black wattle infestation reduces stream flow and catchment yield (de 
Wit, Crookes and van Wilgen, 2001; Marais and Wannenburgh, 2008; Cullis, Görgens and Marais, 
2007). Cullis et al (2007) estimates that South Africa is losing 4.1% of registered water use due to 
invasive alien plants and this could rise to 16.1% if it is not controlled.  
In 1996 ‘Working for Water’ began clearing AIPs in the Upper Kromme Catchment. The invasion of 
AIPs, particularly acacia mearnsii (black wattles), has a damaging impact of the ecological system. 
Apparently, after the 1931, acacia mearnsii appeared in great numbers, particularly in the floodplains. 
They were used for firewood, and around 1945 their bark was stripped and sold to the tanneries in 












The roots of the acacia mearnsii create deep gullies, causing the river banks to weaken and collapse 
during floods, thereby exacerbating erosion. AIPs hinder the cultivation of grazing pastures as they 




1.4.2 Working	  for	  Wetlands	  
‘Working for Wetlands’ began work on the rehabilitation of the wetlands in the Upper Kromme 
Catchment in 2000. The rehabilitation took the form of physical restoration, such as the construction 
of weirs, as illustrated in Figure 21. 
The reason for the concrete and gabion weirs is to prevent further gully erosion and to prevent further 
reduction in the peat basins. The aim is to lift the water table in the existing wetlands and to create silt 
traps (SANBI database: http://sanbi.isoftnet.co.za/scripts/runisa.dll?NBI accessed 5 May 2010). The 
rehabilitation aims at restoring the wetlands’ ecosystem services, which provide both direct and indirect 
use values such as their hydrological buffering effect and water purification services (MEA, 2003:57). 
The rehabilitation began in 2000, with the construction of four gabion weirs to tackle the gullies in the 
Upper Kromme Catchment (K90A-01-001 to 004). Working for Wetlands also embarked upon the 
building of large gabion structures at Kompanjiesdrif (K90A-04-002) and at Hudsonvale (K90A-08-
001) to stabilise headcuts threatening peat basins (Kotze & Ellery 2009:152). The three concrete 
structures were erected in 2001-02 in Krugerskraal to address deep headcuts and prevent erosion 
further destroying the wetlands (Buckle, J, pers. comm. 2010, 31 August). The planning and 
construction of the concrete and gabion structure (K90A-05-001) at Hendrikskraal, below the 
convergence with the Eerstedrif River, began in 2003-04. Two additional weirs were constructed 
Pines 


















Figure 18: The change in alien invasive plants from 1954-2007 in the Upper Kromme Catchment 












further downstream in the following years. The 2007 flood caused damage to many structures, washed 
away collected rocks and silted up excavations which had taken place (SANBI database). In the 





The relative costs of the restoration activities undertaken by ‘Working for Water’ and ‘Working for 
Wetlands’ need to be compared to their associated benefits. Increased water yield and decreased 
erosion are expected due to the removal of alien invasive plants, while improved baseflow and water 
quality, and flood attenuation are anticipated due to the rehabilitation of the wetlands. In comparing 
the costs and benefits, the decision whether to continue investing in restoration can be addressed. 
1.4.3 Biodiversity	  Stewardship	  Strategy	  
The Eastern Cape Parks Board endeavours to execute the National Biodiversity Framework’s policy of 
developing and intensifying provincial biodiversity stewardship programmes and the Kromme River 
Catchment falls within their jurisdiction. According to the Biodiversity Stewardship Strategy document 
(Steyn, 2010); the goal is to “secure biodiversity assets of both immediate and long-term value through 
voluntary agreements with private and communal landowners/users.” Biodiversity extends to “all living 
things and also a series of actions and interactions which sustain living components and enables their 
persistence over time” (Vromans et al, 2010). Biodiversity is essentially a term for nature and it 
underlies all ecosystem functioning and ecosystem goods and services. The degradation of natural 
capital brings about a loss of biodiversity, thereby compromising ecosystem functioning and the 
delivery of ecosystem goods and services.  
The establishment of the Stewardship Programme rests on identifying the Critical Biodiversity Areas as 
these will become stewardship priority areas. Critical Biodiversity Areas is land or water fundamental 
Source: Buckle, J. 2010, pers. comm. 31 August 












for “biodiversity and to the maintenance of ecosystem functioning” (Vromans et al, 2010). Critical 
Biodiversity Areas need to be preserved in their natural or near natural state. Ecological Support Areas 
are “supporting zones” and need to be protected as they support the Critical Biodiversity Areas and 
formal Protected Areas (Vromans et al, 2010). The overarching vision is to establish corridors of intact 
vegetation across terrains to enable species migration and the Stewardship Programme is believed to be 
one of the stepping stones needed to realise this initiative.  
The Stewardship Programme aims to create contractual agreements with landowners to ensure the 
protection of Critical Biodiversity Areas. The intention is to safeguard important biodiversity areas 
which fall within production landscapes, and at the same time, keep the land in agricultural production. 
The intent is for agricultural activities to remain, but for farmers to enter into agreements to preserve 
portions of land not utilised for agricultural production. The success of the Stewardship Programme is 
grounded in building relationships with landowners and land users. 
The Stewardship Programme is another form of restoration and rehabilitation and therefore close 
collaboration is needed between existing involved parties. Partnerships and strategy schemes need to be 
developed between ‘Working for Water’, ‘Working for Wetlands’, ‘Working on Fire’ and the Eastern 
Capes Stewardship Programme to ensure that each does not work independently and haphazardly. 
Resources and knowledge of the area should be shared so that the most efficient outcome of 
restoration can be realised3.  
Figure 22indicates the areas of ecological importance in the southern section of the Kromme River 
Catchment. Even though this map only includes half the study site, it reaffirms the ecological 
importance of the Kromme wetlands as seen by the light and dark shades of green. These colours 
indicate the Ecological Support Areas and Critical Biodiversity Areas respectively. The map illustrates 
the Kromme River’s crucial role as both a supporting zone and an area which contains pockets of 
critical ecological functioning. The Formosa Nature Reserve, a formally protected area, is illustrated in 
dark blue. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 Since our initial meetings with some of the respective organisations, a workshop was held by the 
Living Lands PRESENCE network whereby the interested parties had a chance to interact and discuss 
the developments of the Kromme River. Another workshop is being held with the Kromme 














1.5 Previous	  Kromme	  Studies	  
The most recent study on the Kromme is the Baviaanskloof-Tsitsikamma PES Pilot Study by Mander 
et al (2010), which aimed to quantify the impact of various restoration and management options on the 
delivery of ecosystem goods and services. A Payment for Watershed Services (PWS) scheme was 
investigated where Nelson Mandela Municipality was the buyer of the watershed services and the 
Tsitsikamma, Kouga and Kromme watersheds were the suppliers. The report allowed for different 
management alternatives, such as clearing alien invasive plants only; considering revegetation, and 
adopting land practises, which either maximise baseflow and/or optimise yield.  
It was estimated that by only removing alien invasive plants, an increased streamflow of over 4 million 
m3/annum and a baseflow increase of 2.4 million m3/annum was realised. This translated into 
economic benefits of R344/ha in water sales (Mander et al, 2010:19&38). It was concluded that a 
management option of both clearing alien invasive plants and revegetating is the most economically 
and financially feasible option for the development of a PWS scheme in the entire Baviaanskloof-
Tsitsikamma area. Potential economic benefits calculated from this scheme ranged from carbon 
sequestration, biodiversity and eco-tourism, decreased sediment yields and increased baseflow and yield 
(Mander et al, 2010:27).  
The coarseness of the data, assumptions and results pertaining to the Kromme River Catchment in this 
report was attributed to the fact that they were based on a desktop study. For this reason an in-depth 
analysis of the Kromme River Catchment is being investigated.  
Figure 20: A section of the Critical Biodiversity Areas of the Garden Route, which identifies the Critical 
Biodiversity Areas and Ecological Support Areas in the upper Kromme Catchment 














The Kromme Report compiled by the Institute of Water Research (2005), recognised the river as an 
important source of water for the NMBM and thus recommended either enforcing restricted access or 
buying the intact areas of the Kromme River. The report proposed buying cooperation from the 
farmers in the form of a contract fee as they concluded that black wattles, farming activities and 
rundown farming infrastructure (such as broken dam walls) were to blame for the degradation of the 
river and the decline in ecosystem goods and services. 
The effect of freshwater inflows into the Kromme estuary on recreational value was investigated by 
Sale et al (2009) who found a marginal willingness to pay for incremental freshwater inflow of 
R0.013/m3. The study adopted contingent valuation techniques and respondents were asked the 
maximum amount they would be willing to pay towards a project that could secure freshwater inflow 
into the estuary and thus safeguard fishing and birding activities (Sale et al, 2009:263).  
2 Ecosystem	  Services	  
2.1.1 Identification	  of	  ecosystem	  services	  
“Ecosystem goods and services represent the benefits human populations derive, directly and 
indirectly, from ecosystem functions (Costanza et al, 1997:253).” This definition of ecosystem services 
adopts an anthropocentric viewpoint, emphasising the role played by ecosystem services’ to sustain 
human life (Daly, 1997:3). Functional analysis translates the internal complexities and functions of 
ecosystems, necessary for their self preservation, into a range of ecosystem goods and services (de 
Groot, 2006:175). The services are essentially the result of human construction as the size and scope of 
them depends on how the boundaries are designed (Freeman III, 2003:457).  
The Millennium Ecosystem Assessment (MA) (2003:57) adopts a functional classification of ecosystem 
services, categorising them into four main functions: provisioning, regulating, cultural and supporting. 
Provisioning functions provide the photosynthesizing processes and carbohydrate structures needed to 
supply humans with ecosystem goods (de Groot, Wilson and Boumans, 2002:395). Provisioning 
services are the supply of ecosystem goods, such as edible plants and animals, fresh water and timber 
(MA, 2003:57). Regulating functions only indirectly affect humans, yet they provide invaluable services 
such as the purification of air and water, the regulation of climate and erosion control. Ecosystems’ 
cultural functions encompass nonmaterial services associated with spiritual enrichment, aesthetic 
values, as well as cultural, historical and scientific information and recreational enjoyment (MA, 
2003:58-59). Supporting functions grant the necessary environment for refuge and reproduction of all 
plant and animal species and therefore its services are required for production of all other ecosystem 
services (de Groot et al, 2002:400).  
Human wellbeing depends on the health of the ecosystems and those that are damaged and degraded 












of ecosystems into new collapsed states are usually irreversible and therefore it is critical to invest in 
their rehabilitation and restoration before it is too late (Limburg, O’Neill, Costanza and Farber, 
2002:410). While the deterioration of ecosystems imposes social costs, it is clear that their maintenance 
involves opportunity costs in a country like South Africa where inadequate water supplies often restrain 
economic advancement (Binns, Illgner, and Nel, 2001:342).  It has been shown that restoration does 
improve the delivery of ecosystem goods and services and as a result, investing in the limiting factor 
(natural capital) should be adopted as economic development strategy (Blignaut and Mander, 2009: 3). 
Humans are part of ecosystems and in order to preserve human welfare and biodiversity, the 
restoration of natural capital is the only sustainable approach (Aronson et al, 2006:1).  
2.1.2 Valuation	  of	  Ecosystem	  Services	  
Market failure is often blamed for the degradation and neglect of natural capital (Wertz-Kanounnikoff 
2006:5). Most ecosystems are public goods, implying that people often have a less than optimal 
incentive to conserve or protect ecosystems (Daly et al, 2000:395). Pritchard et al (2000:36) contend that 
without economic valuation, people are unaware of the potential economic benefits that derive from 
ecosystem services and are oblivious of their importance and their crucial link to human welfare. They 
argue that this information failure has potential detrimental effects. However, this proposition can be 
countered because one can be quite aware that ecosystems give direct benefits without having any 
notion of their economic value. Daly et al assert that by awarding a value to ecosystem services an 
efficient allocation and optimal usage is achieved because the value reflects their true and relative 
scarcity, condition and importance (2000:395). This can be disputed as efficient allocation depends on 
whether the ecosystem is valued correctly and whether it is being used as a basis for policy.   
Most mining based economies initially expand at the expense of its natural resources.	   Ecosystem 
degradation is a form of asset depreciation, and as a result it is only with proper accounting for 
ecosystem degradation that national income can be taken to reflect true income net of depreciation. 
Economic valuation gives ecosystems a voice, displaying their health and usage levels and alerting 
humans to their unsustainable consumption patterns (Blignaut and Aronson, 2008:12).   
Since ecosystems are public goods and externalities are present, “stakeholders who benefit from the 
degrading ecosystem are often not the same as those who bear the cost” (Turpie et al, 2009:18). Where 
conflicting interests arise, economic quantification is necessary to measure all possible options so that it 
can assist in guiding rational decision making (Pagiola, Bishop and von Ritter, 2004:18). Economic 
valuation is also fundamental to conducting cost-benefit analyses and ensures that the tradeoffs are 
valued in the same unit of measurement (Pritchard et al, 2000:37). Decisions to invest in restoration and 
rehabilitation are the same as any other economic decisions and capital expenditure needs to be 
justified on grounds of economic efficiency. Public funding needed for conservation projects also 
needs to be justified especially where strong competition for funds exist (van Wilgen, Cowling and 












Economic valuation creates the possibility of establishing incentive and market-based mechanisms 
where restoration is financed in a sustainable way; Payment for Ecosystem Services (PES) is one such 
mechanism. A PES scheme is based on a “willing buyer, willing seller” approach in which ecosystem 
services are traded to fund the longevity of a healthy functioning ecosystem. In this way, conservation 
plans can be incorporated into mainstream economic policies and influence peoples’ habits and 
behaviour (Cowling et al, 2008:9483).   
The theory of economic valuation of ecosystem services is rooted in neoclassical welfare economics 
which assumes that the purpose of economic activity it to increase individuals’ welfare, measured as 
utility (Freeman III, 2003:7). Another underlying assumption is that each individual is the best judge of 
his/her welfare (Young, 2005:28). Welfare is contingent upon individuals’ consumption of goods – 
private goods, goods provided from the government or goods and services flowing from the 
environment. There is a stark anthropocentric standpoint in welfare economics and it would seem that 
there is no interest in the wellbeing of other species. Yet the value of other species’ existence or 
survival is incorporated in our own individual value systems and utility functions (Freeman III, 2003:7). 
These values are represented through willingness to pay (WTP) or willingness to accept compensation 
(WTA), which in turn are based on the theory of substitutability (Freeman III, 2003:9; Young, 
2006:29). 
The Total Economic Value (TEV) framework, which encapsulates use values and non-use values, has 
become entrenched in the field of environmental economics (Young, 2005:40). Use values can be 
further divided into direct-use, indirect-use and option/bequest values. Non-use values are unrelated to 
any actual or potential use of a good and refer to the intrinsic value embodied in the environment, 
alternatively named existence values (Pearce and Turner, 1990). When measuring use-values, revealed 
preference techniques are usually adopted for determining the WTP, either from existing markets or 
from surrogate markets (Garrod and Willis, 1999:6). Stated preference techniques are used for non-use 
value whereby hypothetical markets are constructed (Pearce, Atkinson and Mourato, 2006:88).  
Using the TEV framework, the direct economic impact of restoration - such as increased returns to the 
land or increased job opportunities - can be established along with the indirect benefits of improved 
delivery of ecosystem goods and services. It allows for the true economic costs and benefits to be 
realised and therefore a more accurate economic cost-benefit analysis. 
2.1.3 Payment	  for	  Ecosystem	  Services	  
Innovative schemes that address conservation in a sustainable way are needed. Lobbying for 
government funds is not easy and it has become crucial to muster new support especially from the 
private sector. Payment for Ecosystem Services is such a scheme as it takes the responsibility away 
from the government and gives it to the users and beneficiaries of the ecosystem services – generating 












Wunder (2005:3), PES is a “voluntary transaction where a well defined ecosystem service is bought by 
at least one buyer from a minimum of one environmental service provider if and only if the service 
provider secures its provision.” It requires the conversion of environmental services into tradable 
commodities (Kosoy and Corbera, 2010:1229). Commodities such as watershed services, carbon 
sequestration and energy are usually labelled as ‘umbrella services,” and are the predominant services 
included in PES. The arrangement increases landowners’ involvement and commitment to the 
restoration process and incentivises them to adopt land practises that protect and promote the delivery 
of ecosystem services. Collaboration between conservationists and landowners is required in order for 
their goals to be aligned (Wunder, 2007: 48). According to Engel, Pagiola, and Wunder (2008: 663), 
PES is able to transform the value of environmental externalities into real financial incentives for 
landowners who provide the environmental services. Economic incentives are the heart of PES making 
it a driver that can influences a change in behaviour and therefore land management (Muradian et al, 
2010:1205).  
The notion that PES improves economic efficiency is rooted in the Coase theorem, which states that in 
a competitive market with functioning property rights and no transaction costs, bargaining between 
two parties will ensure an efficient outcome (Kosoy, Martinez-Tuna, Muradian and Martinez-Alier, , 
2007:446). The Coase theorem assumes that under strong assumptions of prefect competition and fully 
allocatable property rights, governments and institutional frameworks are superfluous and that trade 
will achieve a social optimum. However, recent literature suggests that this conceptualisation, which 
assumes full information, cannot be easily generalised and put into practise through PES schemes in 
most situations (Muradian et al, 2010:1204). Uncertainties regarding the supply of the environmental 
service exist due to complexities relat ng to the correlation between land-use and environmental 
services. Transaction costs are pushed up due to expenses of gathering information making PES an 
unattractive option. In other cases estimates are assumed because information is lacking; highlighting 
that the assumption of full information is hardly ever met (Muradian et al, 2010:1204). It is crucial to 
account for the uncertainties when measuring the provision of ecosystem services so that the PES can 
be accurately implemented (Muradian et al, 2010:1204). 
A PES-like system has emerged in South Africa, through the Working for Water (WfW) Programme 
(Turpie, Marais and Blignaut, 2008:789). Working for Water is a government-funded Programme, 
which control the spread of alien invasive plants (AIPs). Not only do alien invasive plants have a 
devastating impact on our nation’s water supply, it also “changes the structural make-up, genetic 
diversity and organisation of biodiversity and effectively eroding the foundations of ecosystems” 
(Turpie, 2004:89). As in other PES schemes, the beneficiaries of the improved ecosystem services, pay 
for their services in the form of water tariffs. The Department of Water Affairs charges consumers an 












2008: 792). WfW is the service provider in this case and they perform restoration work on any land, 












3 Cost-­‐Benefit	  Analysis	  
This section will assess the economic viability of restoration activities in the Upper Kromme River 
Catchment. The restoration interventions are divided into two distinct activities which will be evaluated 
separately. Both private and public benefits accrue as a result of restoration and these will be discussed 
independently.  
The ‘Working for Wetlands’ (WfWet) intervention is analysed first.  Improved water quality, increased 
longevity of the Churchill Dam and flood attenuation are the expected improved ecosystem services. 
The lack of data and inadequate hydrological results means that the economic results pertaining to 
‘Working for Wetlands’ are inconclusive. For this reason, a cost-benefit analysis for this intervention 
cannot be performed, but related information is nevertheless included.  
‘Working for Water,’ (WfW) considered as the predominant intervention, will be analysed thereafter. It 
is expected that the provisioning ecosystem services, additional water yield and improved land 
productivity will accrue in response to AIP clearing. The other expected benefit of water regulation and 
assurance of supply cannot be measured due to still incomplete hydrological results from a concurrent 
study, (Rebelo,A. MSc dissertation in prep). An economic cost-benefit analysis of the ‘Working for 
Water’ intervention is performed over a 25 year time-frame. The intervention is compared to the other 
water supply augmentation schemes investigated by NMBM in order to observe how restoration fares 
as a possible scheme.  
A cost-benefit analysis is used as a decision-aiding tool, reflecting the economic efficiency of a given 
project, displaying the relative scarcity of resources and indicating whether the restoration should be 
implemented in the Kromme in the future. It aims to test the economic soundness of continued 
investment of restoration in the catchment.  
A cost-benefit analysis is a method of choice because it takes into consideration all beneficiaries and 
losers in both ‘spatial and temporal dimensions (Pearce et al, 2006:34). Time is accounted for using 
appropriate discount rates. Once all the impacts have been established and the costs and benefits 
quantified, it discounting is used to convert them into Present Values (PV): 









illustrates the discounted costs and benefits over the period of time t.  If the Net Present Value (NPV) 












represents the benefits in period t, Ct represents the costs in period t, and s is the appropriate discount 
rate, in this case, the social discount rate.  
3.1 Working	  for	  Wetlands	  
3.1.1 Costs	  
The data was sourced from the Working for Wetlands’ implementing agency, GIB from 2001-2011. 
The programme is funded by the South African National Biodiversity Institute (SANBI) and the cost 
data is broken down into the categories portrayed in Appendix B: Table 72. It shows that the contract 
wages and materials and equipment account for the largest expenses. The total cost over the duration 
of the programme thus far is indicated in Appendix B: Table 73. The Present Value of the total costs of 
the scheme over a 25 year timeframe is portrayed at various interest rates. 
Table 12: Present Value of Total Cost over 25 years 
Interest Rate PV Total Cost 
4% R 23 011 721.52 
6% R 20 910 245.97 
8% R 19 132 067.24 
 
Employment is a major cost in Working for Wetlands and needs to be treated as such in a cost-benefit 
analysis. The unit Person Days (PD), calculated as the number of people employed multiplied by the 
number of days worked, is also used in Working for Wetlands’ records. Table 13 displays the number 
of people and Person Days worked over the past 10 years and the total cost per Person Day.   
Table 13: Working for Wetlands’ Person Days in the Kromme Catchment 
Year Person Day (PD) 
Number of 
people Cost/PD 
2001 4 315 215 R 958.09 
2002 8 113 429 R 351.81 
2003 96 12 R 1 001.76 
2004 5 520 40 R 244.38 
2005 5 040 30 R 425.34 
2006 9 230 74 R 280.04 
2007 5 490 47 R 366.08 
2008 8 964 60 R 283.55 
2009 6 883 63 R 278.02 
2010 10 642 49 R 264.02 












3.1.2 Indirect	  Benefits	  
Water	  Quality	  Benefits	  
Water quality is expected to improve due to the filtering capacity of the wetlands, thereby decreasing 
the quantities of silt and pollution in the water. The improved water quality is expected to decrease 
purification and treatment costs as less silt and pollutants are entering the dam. The decreased silt loads 
increase the life expectancy of the dam, prolonging the time for the dam to become silted up and its 
storage capacity compromised. Unfortunately, limited silt surveys have been conducted on the 
Churchill Dam and therefore this anticipated benefit cannot be measured.  
Silt	  Surveys	  
The Department of Water Affairs provided silt surveys of the Churchill Dam (Ferreira, C. pers. comm. 
2010, 27 July) Silt surveys have only taken place four times since the construction of the dam and 
therefore no time series data exists to do this assessment. Table 14 portrays the results of the silt 
surveys taken place at the Churchill Dam. The surface area and gross capacity have increased since the 
initial construction of the dam because of extension works performed on the dam.  
Table 14: Area and Capacity Table of Churchill Dam 
Date 






















10 125.520/ 0.580 
124.940/ 






10 125.520/ 0.000 
125.520/ 




10 125.520/ 0.000 
125.520/ 
0.000 242.63 35.24 35.4 Basin survey 
 
 
If healthier wetlands reduce the turbidity in dams, the treatment costs of raw water may decline. Such 
avoided treatment costs are used as a proxy for municipal benefits. It is hypothesized that the 
municipality’s producer surplus will increase because of the decreased treatment costs needed to make 
water potable. Thus, the benefits of the wetland restoration are portrayed through the municipality’s 
reduced need to pay for treatment costs.  
3.1.2.1 Water	  Quality	  Determinants	  
The pH measures the acidity and alkalinity of the water and the South African standards (SANS241) 
advocate that the water must be between 5.0 - 9.5 pH units. Turbidity relates the particles suspended in 
the water and electrical conductivity is also dependent on the amount of dissolved solids in the water. 
These indicators are analysed because they are influenced by the condition of the catchment. High 


























Linear (electrical conductivity) 
levels of erosion are typical of a degraded catchment, increasing both the turbidity and electrical 
conductivity of the water flowing into the dam.  
Data pertaining to water quality determinants of the Churchill Dam was sourced from the NMBM 
Scientific Service’s Laboratory (Morakabi, M pers. comm. 2011, 8 April). The data represents weekly 
raw water flow at the Churchill dam relating to the period from 2001-2011.  
Coarse annual rainfall estimates from 2001-2009 underlie the quality determinants in Figure 23. The 
strong spikes in 2006/7 relate to the last Kromme River Catchment floods. It would appear that the 
turbidity and electrical conductivity are positively correlated to rainfall, with a correlation coefficient of 
0.597 and 0.119 respectively. An increasing positive trend line for the turbidity is visible over the past 
10 years. Electrical conductivity, on the other hand is remains constant throughout the past 10 years  
 
 
The restoration activities of the past 10 years underlie the quality determinants in Figure 24. The past 
10 years have been spent building the weirs and investing in maintenance. Although the hypothesis 
postulates that the restoration of the wetlands will improve water quality, the results show that there is 
a water quality marker, indicating a decrease in water quality. Before the hypothesis is rejected, it should 
be noted that a time-lag between the restoration of the wetlands and the delivery of services is 


































Previous studies have shown that there is a direct connection between the health of the catchment and 
water treatment costs (Forster and Murray, 2007; Forster et al, 1987; Dearmont et al, 1988 in Forster 
and Murray, 2007). Studies have also focussed specifically on farm management practises and water 
treatment costs, thereby showing the positive relationship between the use of pesticides and tillage 
practises and water quality (Forster and Murray, 2007).  
Foster and Murray (2007) investigated the relationship between water quality and water treatment costs. 
Turbidity was assumed an appropriate measure for water quality and a function of upstream farming 
and land-use practices. Due to the short study period, fixed costs were ignored and average variable 
costs (AVC) were divided into average chemical costs (ACC) and non-chemical costs, accounting for 
energy and labour costs (Forster and Murray, 2007:116-119). 
A Cobb-Douglas function was used to measure the relationships between variables. A negative and 
significant relationship was found between average non-chemical costs and volume treated. This can be 
attributed to economies of scale. Pesticide usage and turbidity had a positive and significant 
relationship with average chemical costs (Foster and Murray, 2007:124). 
Churchill	  Dam	  Chemical	  Data	  
Hardcopies of the Monthly Treatment Works Reports dating back to 1987 were collected from the 
Churchill Dam and used to assess the change in purification costs and treatment chemicals used over 












the period of 1987-2010 (Roux, E., pers. comm. 2010, 27 July). The change in variable costs, namely, 
the change in chemical costs, has been used to indicate the changes in total treatment costs.   
The percentages of different chemicals used per Ml of water are also analysed, so that any changes in 
the treatment chemicals can be identified. There was substantial amount of data missing from these 
records and the validity of some data entries is contentious. Illegible handwriting also created problems 
in collating the data. In 2002, PAC replaced the use of Floc Aid and Alum4 chemicals and thus there is 
difficulty in assessing the historical trends.  
These chemicals are used to clarify and balance the pH of the water so that the water is potable upon 
delivery in NMBM. This means that the chemicals used take into consideration the storage, the time-lag 
and the conveyance of the water from the dam to the municipality. Chemical treatment depends on the 
standards and the minimum requirements imposed, and thus the treatment is often unrelated to small 
variations in water quality. Water treatment chemicals are therefore not only a function of upstream 
activities, but also a function of downstream activities and demands.  
The graphs in Appendix B: Figure 50 to Figure 54 indicate the percentages of chemicals used per unit 
of water flow. The changes in chemical consumption are evident in these figures.  
There is an increasing trend in the % use of lime and chlorine over the 23 years of data. This is not 
surprising since the water quality markers indicated declining water quality over the years. One can 
deduce that restoration of the wetlands by ‘Working for Wetlands’ has not yet made an impact on the 
water quality. The past ten years indicate that the water quality has not improved since restoration 
began, however the strong flooding in 2006 gave rise to the spike in turbidity levels and has thus 
negatively skewed the water quality indicators.     
Chemical	  Costs	  	  
The chemical cost data has been adjusted for inflation and represents the total cost of chemicals per 
year (using 2009 prices). The trend in total chemical costs per mega litre of water from 1987 to 2010 is 
displayed in the Figure 25. Holding the amount of raw water treated constant, the change in the unit 
cost can be examined. Contrary to the hypothesis, the treatment costs are increasing over time.  
However, without the restoration of the wetlands, the turbidity levels during the flooding might have 
been more severe.  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4	  PAC: Poly Aluminium Chloride; Alum: hydrated potassium aluminium sulphate (potassium alum); 













It is important to examine the relationship between turbidity and the treatment cost of water. If, for 
example, the spike in 2006 is accompanied by a rise in treatment costs it would suggest that water 
quality does affect cost. The unit cost of water is compared to the turbidity determinants from 2001-
2010 and displayed in Figure 26. Looking at the change in these variables over time, it appears that 




The scatter diagram in Figure 27 shows the distribution of the treatment cost per mega litre of water 
and the turbidity levels. The strength of the linear association is analysed using correlation analysis. A 
positive correlation coefficient of 0.62 is found between these variables. Using two-variable regression 
analysis, the stochastic variables were analysed. It was found that the coefficients were significant at the 
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Figure 23: Trends in real annual chemical costs 1987-2010 (base year 2009) 












Based on the ANOVA table, it is concluded that the relationship between turbidity and treatment costs 
are significant. It can therefore be deduced that the change in water quality impacts the water treatment 
costs. However, there were only nine observations and the adjusted R2 coefficient, or the overall 







It is important to assess whether the increase in treatment costs is linked to an increase in water being 
treated. Figure 28 is a scatter diagram showing the distribution of the cost of treatment variable and the 
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Figure 25: Scatter diagram illustrating the distribution of treatment costs and turbidity (n = 10) 












amount of water being treated. There is a positive correlation coefficient of 0.861 and an adjusted R2 of 
0.742. It is evident there is a strong linear association between the chemical treatment costs and the 
amount of water being treated. If the flood event of 2006 is removed, the correlation coefficient 
remains a positive 0.863.   
3.1.3 Conclusion	  and	  Limitations	  
A major shortcoming of this section is that there is no link between the change in the size of the 
wetlands and water quality. There is only 10 years of available data relating to the water quality 
indicators and only four measurements of wetland integrity (Rebelo, A. dissertation in prep) (Figure 
16). The uneven scale of the analyses makes it difficult to draw any significant conclusions.  
One can conclude that the water quality in the Upper Kromme Catchment has decreased from 1987 to 
2010; nevertheless one can link it to a change in the wetland size or land practises. One would have 
expected the water quality to improve after 2000, when WfWet began in the catchment.  
It was hypothesized that there would be a strong negative relationship between water quality and 
treatment chemicals, and the cost thereof. Using turbidity as a proxy for water quality, it was found that 
there was a positive and statistically significant relationship between turbidity and chemical costs.  
It is noticed that the cost of treating water over time is increasing and one can link this to a decrease in 
water quality. The timeframe for the study is too limited as one expected to see the benefits of 
rehabilitation in future years. One cannot draw any conclusions pertaining to the economic benefits of 
restoring the wetlands from this study. 
3.2 Working	  for	  Water	  
3.2.1 Costs	  	  
The direct costs are analysed in this section. The WfW Programme is predominantly funded as a 
poverty relief programme by the Expanded Public Works Programme. The WfW Programme falls 
under the Environment and Social Cluster and this funding provides 72% of the WfW Programme’s 
expenditure. The Department of Water Affairs is allocated budgets by the National Treasury in the 3-
















Table 15: Sources of funding for the WfW Programme (1996-2006) 
Source of Funding % contribution 
Poverty Relief programmes 72 
DWA core funding 16 
Water tariffs through DWA 5 
Water tariffs through other water management authorities 2 
Local authorities and Trans Caledon Tunnel Authority 2 
Foreign funding 1 
Private sector 1 
Total 100% 
 
Although the majority of clearing takes place on private land, it is evident that public funds are 
primarily used to finance these activities.  
3.2.1.1 Analysis	  of	  Costs	  
The cost data was sourced from the implementing agency, the Gamtoos Irrigation Board (GIB) and the 
Department of Water Affairs (DWA). The Working for Water Information Management System 
(WIMS) database, compiled by the DWA, is used to record the treatment of different alien invasive 
species and records the densities, costs of treatments and person days planned and implemented on a 
specific site. Since the system was only fully functional in 2002/2003, there are no records relating to 
the any treatments before 2002 (Marais & Wannenburgh, 2008). The GIB records only commence in 
2004, and therefore 2002-2003 cost data has been extrapolated from the cost trends.  
There is substantial variation between the two data sets, as seen in Figure 29 and Table 16. The DWA 
annual costs are on average R1.5 million less than the GIB records. The reason for this large 
discrepancy is that DWA archives only include contract costs, and exclude the management and 

























Table 16: Total cost of WfW activities in the Kromme (2009 Rand) 
Year 
Total Cost (Rand) 
Gamtoos Irrigation Board Department of Water Affairs 
2002 2 203 380.99 969 331.73 
2003 1 924 140.63 592 101.03 
2004 2 827 312.03 799 289.16 
2005 3 735 092.47 1 613 297.89 
2006 3 489 398.14 1 488 040.00 
2007 3 946 448.59 1 545 462.25 
2008 2 781 995.08 1 523 101.77 
2009 2 968 666.00 1 572 884.20 
2010 5 633 617.01 2 789 673.97 
 
 
Most literature pertaining to WfW uses the Department’s of Water Affairs WIMS database (Marais and 
Wannenburgh, 2008; Currie, Milton, and Steenkamp, 2009). The Gamtoos Irrigation Board is funded 
by the DWA and therefore the data should correspond. For these reasons, the DWA data will be used, 
although one must bear in mind that these figures present the lower-limit of total costs. 
3.2.1.2 Analysis	  of	  Treatment	  Sites 
Clarity is needed when discussing the volume of alien invasive vegetation cleared in the Kromme 
Catchment. The GIB and DWA records refer to the size of the treatment site, but do not refer to the 
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Comparison of WfW costs 
GAMTOOS IRRIGATION BOARD DEPARTMENT OF WATER AFFAIRS 
Figure 27: Cost Comparison of WfW intervention 2002-2010 
Source: Source: GIB unpublished raw data (pers. comm. 2010, Colesky, R., 29 July) and DWA unpublished 
raw data (pers. comm. 2011, McGear, J., 7 March) 
 
Source: GIB unpublished raw data (pers. comm. 2010, Colesky, R., 29 July) and DWA 












density of the alien invasive plants, or the percentage cover of alien plants. Table 17 denotes the 
differences in reported treatment sites according to different sources.  
Table 17: Comparison of the size of WfW treatment sites in the Kromme 
Year 
Total ha of treatment sites 
GIB DWA McConnachie 
2002 / 420 438 
2003 / 726 1 168 
2004 7 414 4 333 2 209 
2005 5 518 4 645 895 
2006 4 256 3 796 1 340 
2007 2 676 3 105 1 276 
2008 2 148 1 982 155 
2009 2 427 2 426 273 
2010 5 183 3 424  / 
total 29 622 24 856 7 753 
 
 
McConnachie (doctoral dissertation in preparation, University of Rhodes) researched the cost-
effectiveness of the Working for Water programmes in the Kromme and Kouga catchments. 
McConnachie based the treatment sites on the spatial data from WIMS and used helicopter aerial 
surveys to verify the data. The recorded treated hectares were then calibrated by a mapping consultant 
and cross-checked by WfW managers. McConnachie’s alien clearing dataset has been used in this study 
as it provides both the most reliable data and consistency across all sites, as the hectares have been 
converted to condensed hectares. Condensed alien infestation hectares can be interpreted as an “area 
with a canopy cover of 100%” (Le Maitre, Versfeld and Chapman, 2000). The percentage of alien cover 
is multiplied by the treatment area to provide the condensed hectare of alien invasive vegetation. 
The first recorded treatment was taken as the baseline year, and the alien invasive plant cover prior to 
any treatment (baseline year) was compared to the current alien invasive plant cover. The surveys were 
conducted at the end of 2008 and beginning of 2009 and therefore the analysis is projected over an 8 
year period.  
Table 18: Change in percentage cover of alien invasive plants as a result of WfW 
Baseline % cover 2009 % cover % change 
30.97 9.99 20.98 
      Source: McConnachie in prep 
Source: GIB (pers. comm. 2010, Colesky, R., 29 July), DWA (pers. comm. 2011, 
McGear, J., 7 March) and McConnachie in prep (pers. comm. 2011. 












According to McConnachie (doctoral dissertation in prep), a 21% decrease in alien invasive plant 
canopy cover was recorded over 8 years. These changes only pertain to the selected WfW treatment 
sites, and not the entire Kromme Catchment. 
Table 19: Change in condensed hectares of alien invasive plants as a result of WfW 
Baseline condensed ha 2009 condensed ha Change in condensed ha 
1 124.7 300.92 823.78 
     Source: McConnachie in prep 
It is estimated that within the WfW treatment sites, there were 1 125 condensed hectares of alien 
invasive plants in 2002. Nevertheless, over the entire Upper Kromme Catchment, the number of AIPs 
was substantially more as 3 659 condensed hectares remain in the catchment in 2010. The WfW 
Programme is responsible for clearing 823.78 condensed hectares of alien invasive plants from 2002-
2008. In 2009, 301 remaining condensed hectares of alien invasive plants were recorded at these sites 
by McConnachie (doctoral dissertation in prep).  
Assuming a constant real cost per hectare, the condensed hectares cleared in 2009 and 2010 can be 
extrapolated from WfW’s expenditure data. Using the DWA cost data, it is deduced that 421.28 
condensed hectares were cleared over these years, which brings the total change in alien infestation to 1 
245.06 condensed hectares. The cost of the WfW programme doubled in 2010, and as a result, 
substantially more hectares were cleared that year. 
Table 20: Estimated annual alien rate of clearing based on constant cost per hectare 












Using historical trends as a basis, it is assumed that 138.34 condensed hectares of AIPs are removed 
per year over the next 25 years. WIMS database shows that 66% of WfW’s efforts are dedicated to 
clearing black wattle in the Upper Kromme Catchment. This means that WfW’s rate of clearing black 












Table 21: WfW distribution of clearing of different AIP species 
Species % clearing 




	   	   	  	  	  Source: WIMS database (pers. comm. 2011, McConnachie 29 June) 
3.2.1.3 Rate	  of	  Spread	  
Rebelo, A (dissertation in prep) analysed the change in the Upper Kromme land-use from 1954-2007. 
The invasion of changes in land-use were modelled in a GIS system (ArcMap) using 1:20 000 aerial 
photographs. The change in invasion of the acacia mearnsii was modelled and the results shown in Table 
22. 
Table 22: Rate of Spread 
acacia mearnsii  1954 1969 1983 2007 
total hectares 1 440 2 886 3 097 4 134 
ha/annum 27 96 15 43 
	           Source: Rebelo, A dissertation in prep 
The mean rate of spread for acacia mearnsii is 45.35 (Rebelo, unpublished) and 36.28 condensed 
hectares per annum. This shows that WfW clears more than three times the rate of the spread of black 
wattles. This does not include the labour time spent in ‘follow-up’, which is crucial to the success of 
WfW.  
3.2.1.4 Employment	  
Although it is a social benefit, employment is a major cost in Working for Water and needs to be 
treated as such in a cost-benefit analysis. The unit, Person Days (PD) is calculated as the number of 
people employed multiplied by the number of days worked and is used in the WIMS system. 
It is estimated that 80 Person Days are needed to clear one condensed hectare of alien invasive 
vegetation, as depicted in Table 23. The total cost per Person Day is R196.32. 
Table 23: Person Days  per hectare cleared 2002-2008 (2009 Rand) 
Total PD PD/ha 
65 673 80 
 
Since the costs per PD form part of the stream of costs, the total cost need to be discounted to a 












Table 24: Total Cost per Person Day (2009 Rand) 





Seeing that the WfW falls under the Extended Public Works Programme, it is important to observe the 
actual employment data and quantify the impact it has on social development. This study takes a 
narrow interpretation of social development and merely considers the income benefits of the WfW 
programme. 
Yet again, there is a discrepancy between the sources’ data. DWA only deals with contractors’ 
information and is therefore more relevant when analysing the impact the programme has on 
employment and job creation.  
Table 25 contains the annual employment data. Although the Programme provides employment 
opportunities for a reasonable number of people, it is evident that the WfW Programme only provides 
them with jobs of one month out of the year; it does not, and was not intended to, provide sustainable 
income and long-term job security.  
Table 25: Working for Water Person Days in the Kromme 
Year Person Day  No. people No. Days 
2002 7 101 306 23 
2003 6 421 309 21 
2004 5 334 219 24 
2005 15 546 709 22 
2006 10 450 537 19 
2007 10 596 496 21 
2008 10 225 484 21 
2009 11 723 568 21 
2010 17 745 997 18 
  Source: DWA (pers. comm. 2011, McGear, J., 7 March) 
Assuming that all workers earn the same minimum wage rate, the total Present Value of employment 
expenditure by WfW are summarised in Table 26. The benefits per cleared hectare have only been 
taken for 2002-2008. These income benefits underestimate the total income benefits, because the 




















4% 4 597 633.57 3 994.18 
6% 4 232 799.67 3 765.61 
8% 3 912 416.01 3 558.73 
 
It is shown that an estimate of R4.6 million was spent on wages and for every condensed hectare 
cleared, around R3 994 was spent on wages. 
3.2.1.5 Limitation	  of	  Cost	  Data	  
Working for Water is governed by available funds, for which they reapply every three years. For this 
reason, there is no continuity between the years and as such, it is problematic when projecting trends 
into the future. Since there is no available data before 2002, the trends are based on a very limited 
timeframe. It is assumed that the government will continue to invest funds into the Programme and it 
is assumed WfW will continue in its same capacity in the Upper Kromme Catchment.  
It is assumed that the average cost of clearing a condensed hectare of AIPs is constant. There is no data 
substantiating this claim. The hectares cleared on an annual basis, have been deduced based on this 
assumption. If the assumption is false, the annually reported cleared hectares will be incorrect. It is 
therefore necessary to treat the annual hectares as estimates. 
The large discrepancy between cost data sources is of concern. The Gamtoos Irrigation Board submits 
their reports to the Department of Water Affairs and therefore both sources should show consistency. 
The legitimacy of the data is therefore questionable. It should be remembered that the GIB reported 
costs are more than double the reported DWA costs. This analysis describes the lower limit of costs 
and thus the ‘better’ case scenario. 	  
3.2.2 Direct	  Private	  Benefits	  
Agricultural	  benefits	  
The removal of alien invasive plants is expected to increase the land productivity in the Upper 
Kromme Catchment. The quantitative agricultural benefits of the WfW programme is the additional 
land freed up due to the removal of aliens. Land that becomes available can be utilised and 
incorporated into the farming business, thereby increasing farmers’ net revenue. Other expected 
positive spillovers include reliable water flow and reduced erosion. Although expected to improve the 
land’s productivity, they will not be quantified in this paper, due to insufficient hydrological and 












In order to evaluate the agricultural benefits, the current land-use and the agricultural potential of the 
Kromme Catchment needs to be understood. This paper assumes that the additional land made 
available from the alien invasive clearing, will be used in the same proportion as the current land-use in 
the Kromme. An important caveat needs to be added here: this assumption leads to an overestimate of 
the economic benefits, because not all the alien infested land can be reached or utilised for agricultural 
purposes.  
This section begins with an overview of the current land-use in the Kromme Catchment. The 
economic returns to the land are then analysed using gross margin analysis. The agricultural benefits of 
alien invasive clearing in the Kromme are evaluated, after which correlations between alien infestations 
and current income is analysed.  
The information is based on informal interviews5 with the landowners in the Kromme, meetings with 
experts in the field and talking to people with local knowledge. The local Agriculture extension office 
provided farm-level information and enterprise budgets were sourced from the Eastern Cape 
Department of Agriculture. Aerial photography, taken while in a helicopter flight over the catchment, 
has been used in verifying certain information. 
Mapping of the Upper Kromme Catchment was done by Rebelo (dissertation in prep), using ArcGIS 
methodology. The maps displayed in this section have been adapted and adjusted to reflect economic 
and agricultural information collated. ArcReader and Microsoft paint were used to create the maps in 
this section. 
3.2.2.1 Overview	  of	  the	  Catchment	  
The Kromme Catchment, approximately 36 000ha in area, consists of 49 private farms, a commonage, 







	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 A copy of the interview questionnaire is in Appendix B: Source 1: Kromme Interview 












Source: Rebelo (dissertation in prep); local Agricultural extension office 
	  
 
Figure 30 depicts the current land-use in the Kromme Catchment. ‘The Formosa Nature Reserve’ hugs 
the Tsitsikamma Mountains and is owned by the Eastern Cape Parks Board. ‘State land’ incorporates 
the commonage and the NMBM owned land on which the Churchill Dam is situated. The bright green 
highlights the areas which are ‘agriculturally active’. Agriculturally active land is defined as land which is 
currently employed in agricultural activities to generate income. The purple indicates farmland that has 
been converted into tourism enterprises. Land which is not used for agricultural purposes or to 
generate any income is classified in blue. Landowners who have retired, or who work in the town of 
Kareedouw or further afield, fall into this category.  
There was no available information for 25% of the farms and these farms have been classified as 
inactive. This assumption is justified on the basis that there are no agricultural records at the 
Agriculture extension office in Joubertina. Conversations and information gathered while interviewing 
neighbouring landowners substantiate this assumption. Nevertheless, this assumption may 
underestimate the agricultural benefits of WfW in the Kromme and will therefore be reviewed in the 
sensitivity analysis. Table 27 provides the size of the land occupied under the various land-uses.  
Table 27: Area of land involved in various land-uses in the upper Kromme Catchment  
 
	  
It is apparent that only 16 141 hectares, less than half the total area in the Kromme, are devoted to 
agriculture. This low agricultural productivity could be attributed to the geographical layout of the 
catchment. The higher lying areas tend to be steeply sloped and to have poor and sandy soils. This 
means that only the floodplains are suitable for cultivation; which subsequently place the fields and 


















Overall land-use in the upper Kromme 













Interviews with the landowners provided insight as to the dependency of landowners on their farms as 
a primary source of income. Table 28 provides information on the landowners’ economic reliance on 
the land. This is important because it provides an indication as to how willing landowners may be to 
invest in alien clearing. One would expect landowners who derive their main source of income from 
the land to be more willing to invest in restoration activities to ensure the longevity of their farming 
success.  
Less than half the landowners rely on agriculture in the Kromme as their main source of income. The 
‘other’ category depicts landowners who have other jobs to support them, or landowners who rely on 
farms in other areas to generate their main source of income. Tourism is not relied upon as the main 
source of income and merely supplements landowners’ revenues. It can therefore be deduced that for 
many, the landownership in the Kromme is a life-style choice, rather than an economic necessity. 
Table 28: Description of Kromme landowners' main source of income (sample size 34)  
Income source % of farms 
Kromme agriculture 47 
Retired 15 
Other source 38 
	  
3.2.2.2 Identifying	  typical	  farms	  
Livestock and dairy farming are the prominent farming activities in the catchment. Although almost all 
the farms are mixed, they have been grouped into typical farm categories, based on the highest earning 
enterprise. 
The first classification is the ‘sheep’ farms, where dohne merinos are the species of choice. Other than 
20 hectares of irrigated kikuyu pastures and 100-200 hectares of dryland pastures, the livestock graze 
extensively on the mixed fynbos and grassland vegetation.  
The second classification is ‘cattle’ farms on which cattle graze extensively. Each farming unit farms 
between 120-150 heads of cattle. 
‘Dairy’ farms are the third category and the farms’ capacities range from 70 dairy cows to 600.  Most of 
the dairy farms rely predominantly on the irrigated kikuyu pastures, which average 60 hectares. The 
larger dairies also take advantage of the riverbeds and cultivate the dryland pastures in the floodplains. 
The honeybush plant, Cyclopia Intermedia, is found naturally in some parts of the catchment. Due to a 
shortage of information about the naturally harvested honeybush, only the farms that intensively 
propagate honeybush plant are incorporated into this study.  












The fifth category is ‘vegetable’ farms; tomatoes being the predominant vegetable grown in the 
catchment. The land under cultivation is limited, and typically livestock utilise the rest of the farm. 
 The final group is ‘fruit’ farms, where apples, pears and plums are grown. Historically, apple farms 
occupied more of the catchment, but due to a change in temperature in the flood plains, export market 
volatility, and increases in input costs, there are only three remaining fruit farms in the catchment.  
The commonage has not been incorporated into this section. The section deals with private agricultural 
benefits generated by WfW, and thus does not apply to state-owned land.  
The map in Figure 31 illustrates the different farm types in the Kromme and Figure 32 depicts the total 
area dedicated to each farm type. Table 29 and Table 30 provide further information on the typical 





















Total area in use by agriculturally active farms 
Figure 29: Map depicting the typical farms in the upper Kromme Catchment    
Figure 30: Total area of each classified farm type 













Table 29: Typical farms in the upper Kromme Catchment    
Farm type Average size veld  (ha) 
Average size irrigation  
(ha) 
Average area crops 
(ha) 
sheep 1 210.46 19.04 - 
cattle 703.53 7.26 - 
dairy 1 098.16 68.04 - 
honeybush 1 037.4 40 - 
vegetable 934.92 - 2 
fruit 1 101.09 - 24 
 
	  
Table 30: Typical farms percentage gross income per enterprise    
Farm type 
Contribution to Gross Income of Selected Enterprises (% of income) 
sheep cattle dairy honeybush tomatoes fruit 
sheep 81% 19% - -  -  - 
cattle 17% 83% - -  -  - 
dairy 12% 1% 87% -  -  - 
honeybush - - - 100%  - -  
vegetable 17% 12% - - 71% - 
fruit - 20% - - 12% 68% 
	  
3.2.2.3 Alien	  Invasive	  Plant	  Infestations	  
The alien infestation cover in the Kromme, quantified by Rebelo (unpublished dissertation), is overlaid 
on the current land-use map. An 80% density for the alien invasive plants was assumed and this density 
is multiplied by the modelled canopy cover of infestation to obtain condensed hectares.    
The high density and the characteristics of acacia mearnsii, the dominant alien invasive plant, mean that 
no agricultural activities are possible in the infested areas. The map in Figure 33 illustrates the 
distribution of the alien infestation in the Upper Catchment. It indicates that 56% of alien infestation 
occurs on agriculturally active land, whereas a mere 4% of infestation occurs in the Formosa Nature 
Reserve. State land contains 13% of all infestation levels in the Kromme and land with no agricultural 
activities comprises of 26% of all alien infestation. 
The acacia mearnsii is the dominant alien invasive species, invading 3 307 condensed hectares, exclusively 
in the riparian zones (Rebelo, unpublished). Pines occupy 336 condensed hectares and other alien trees 
invade an estimated 69 condensed hectares. Although the WfW team clear hakea species, this alien 
Source: adapted from Rebelo, A (unpublished master’s dissertation); interviews with farmers 












invasive tree was not modelled because it was impossible to identify it from aerial photography, due to 




Focussing on agriculturally active land only, the condensed hectareage of alien invasive plants per farm 
type is indicated in Table 31 and displayed visibly on the map in Figure 34. The alien infested land has 
been interpreted as a loss of agricultural potential.  
Table 31: Total condensed hectares of Alien Invasive Plants per farm type 
Farm type % of farm land “lost” to AIPs (%) 
loss of agricultural land 
due AIPs (condensed ha) 
vegetables 14 347 
fruit 5 127 
sheep 9 273 
honeybush 22 232 
dairy 16 902 
cattle 16 228 





Figure 31: The distribution of all Alien Invasive Plants in the Upper Catchment overlaid on the land-use map 
















3.2.2.4 Gross	  Margin	  Analysis	  
Individual farm budgets were put together for 14 agriculturally active farms. Data was collected from 
face-to-face interviews, which took place from 7th-10th February 2011, and from local enterprise 
budgets, supplied by the Eastern Cape Department of Agriculture (pers. comm. 2011, Ntwanambi, Z., 
21 April). Seeing that no enterprise budgets exist for the Kromme Catchment, enterprise budgets from 
similar areas were used and adjusted to suit the Kromme.  Budgets were individually verified by the 
Agricultural extension officer, Mr van der Merwe (pers. comm. 2011, 24 August) and prices were 
adjusted to represent the 2009 Rand.  
Gross margin analysis was chosen to denote the profitability of the farms. The gross margin is the 
difference between the gross production value and the directly allocatable variable costs (Gittinger, 
1982). Fixed costs and payments to land are excluded from the analysis as they are deemed sunk costs 
and these costs would not change when additional land was made available to farm. This paper also 
assumes that the existing farmers will continue to farm after the clearing of alien invasive plants.  The 
gross margins must not be mistaken for net farm profits, but are merely a representative for net 
income.  
Gross margin analysis is dependent on numerous assumptions and is subject to many variables. 
Fluctuating market prices, the volatility of the export market and the impact of seasons on yields, 
means that the gross margins vary from year to year. Gross margin analyses are used to give indications 
of the returns to the agricultural land and should be treated as estimates. 
The average gross margins per enterprise are portrayed in the tables below. Details of the individual 
farms and summarized budgets are attached in the Appendix B: Table 65 and Table 66.  
Figure 32: Alien invasive distribution overlaid onto different farm types 












Table 32: Gross margin above allocatable variable and fixed costs for each crop (R/ha) 
enterprise R/ha 
fruit 59 627.45 
honeybush 22 220.00 
vegetables 66 961.40 
    
Fruit orchards were modelled over a 20 year timeframe, assuming 5% depreciation per annum.  The 
gross margin analysis took both the allocatable variable and fixed costs into account. This is because in 
order for a fruit farm to expand, new trees need to be planted and therefore are deemed as variable 
rather than sunk costs in terms of the analysis.  
Langkloof Valley 2008 apple and plum enterprise budgets were used and adjusted to 2009 prices. Fruit 
prices increased 4%, fertiliser decreased 23% and pesticides and herbicides increased 12% since 2008 
(Directorate Agricultural Statistics, 2010). In the Kromme Catchment 80% of plum production and 
50% of apple production are exported (pers. comm. 2011 van der Merwe, S. 24 August).  
The demand for honeybush tea has expanded in the recent past, with prices almost tripling since 2009 
(pers. comm. Mr van der Merwe). It was assumed that the honeybush plant takes 3 years before it 
reaches 100% production. The gross margin analysis deducted both variable and fixed costs from gross 
income and was modelled over a 20 year timeframe. 
Tomato production in the Kromme Catchment supplies the local market only. The area under 
production is small, totalling a mere 8.75hectares. Enterprise budgets were sourced from the Eastern 
Cape Agricultural Department in Port Elizabeth and adjusted to the 2009 Rand. Gross margin above 
allocatable and fixed costs were calculated for tomato production for the same reason as above. 
Table 33: Livestock gross margin above variable costs (R/LSU) 
enterprise R/LSU 
sheep 2 912.18 
cattle 1 524.01 
 
The gross margin above allocatable variable costs was analysed for livestock farming.  In livestock 
farming, fixed costs are considered sunk, because they will not change when an additional hectares of 
veld is used for livestock farming. For the purposes of this study, 1 Small Stock Unit (SSU) = 0.15 
Large Stock Unit (LSU); 1ewe = 1.56 SSU; 1 boergoat ewe = 2.06 SSU and 1cow = 1.57 LSU. The 
lambing percentage is assumed at 110% and 90% weaning rate and a 95% calving rate and 90% 
weaning rate.  
Source: farm interviews & Joubertina Agricultural Extension office; Eastern Cape enterprise budgets 
 
 













Table 34: Dairy gross margin above variable costs (R/cow) 
enterprise R/cow 
dairy 3 310.54 
 
Dairy enterprise budgets for Humansdorp were sourced and adjusted to the 2009 Rand. Gross income 
consisted of milk income only and it was assumed that the price of milk decreased by 2% in 2009 
(Directorate Agricultural Statistics, 2010).    
3.2.2.5 Economic	  Value	  of	  Agriculture	  in	  the	  Upper	  Kromme	  
Figure 35 illustrates the distribution of the gross margins per hectare for all the individual agriculturally 
active farms. The analysis has been performed on a per hectare basis because it is directly comparable 
to the costs of clearing a hectare of alien invasive vegetation. In order to achieve an accurate per 
hectare average, the total gross margin per enterprise per farm was divided by the number of hectares 
employed in that enterprise and then weighted accordingly. It must be stressed that these gross margins 
should be treated as estimates and are used to provide a ballpark figure for the economic returns of a 
hectare of land in the Kromme.  
This section measures the marginal agricultural returns that can be accrued on the freed up land, and 
thus presumes that the net returns on non-active farms is zero. Although the Formosa Nature Reserve 
and tourism enterprises generate income in the catchment, an additional hectare of cleared alien 











Figure 33: Distribution of average gross margin above allocatable costs per hectare of land in the Kromme Catchment 













Using the individual farms’ gross margins, the average annual gross margin per farm type is identified 
and displayed in Table 35.  
Table 35: Gross margin per ha per annum according to farm type (2009 Rand) 





dairy 1 021.77 
fruit 1 807.18 
 
Table 35 represents the economic benefits that can be accrued from clearing alien invasive plants on 
agriculturally active farms. ‘Vegetable’ farms realise the least income per hectare of cleared land, 
whereas fruit farms generate the highest per hectare turnover in this Catchment. Dairy farms also attain 
high returns per hectare and therefore have more incentive to clear alien invasive plants on their land, 
for example, than the livestock farms. These figures may appear low, but it should be reiterated that 
they represent the average hectare income over the whole farm. As shown, the majority of each farm is 
used for extensive grazing, and the intensive production of crops only occurs on a small percentage of 
the farm land.  
The stepped curve in Figure 36 shows the marginal value product of agriculture land in the Kromme 
Catchment by different farm types. The area beneath the graph represents the total value product of 
land per farm type and the total gross margins per farm type are quantified in Appendix B: Table 67. 
The stepped graph illustrates how the agricultural benefits vary according to the farm type.  
The graph illustrates that ‘dairy’ generates the highest economic returns in the Catchment, and they 
occupy the largest area. Dairy generates an estimated R5.85million per annum in the Upper Catchment. 
The graph demonstrates that vegetable farms generate the lowest return per hectare and produce the 
least economic returns in Catchment. Fruit farms have the highest marginal returns and thus are 
encouraged to expand further. ‘Fruit’ farms turnover an estimated R4.66 million per annum, but have 
the potential to enlarge. Honeybush tea is expected to become a major contributing factor in the valley 


















The Total Value Product of agricultural land in the Kromme, which can be calculated by summing the 
area beneath the Marginal Value Product stepped curve, is R14.7 million per annum. The weighted 
average economic benefit of agriculturally active land in the Kromme Catchment is R910.91/ha. This is 
based on the assumption that the gross margin above allocatable costs is representative of economic 
benefits.  
WfW does not only clear on agriculturally active farms, and therefore the average economic value of all 
the land in Upper Kromme Catchment needs to be investigated. Figure 37  illustrates the Marginal 
Value Product of all land in the Upper Kromme Catchment.  
The shape of the graph changes when the 20 000 hectares of land, with no economic value, is included. 
The average economic agricultural benefits are reduced substantially to R50.63/ha when the whole 
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3.2.2.6 Sensitivity	  Analysis/	  Adjusting	  assumptions	  
The agricultural benefits of WfW are directly dependent on the modelled agricultural productivity. It is 
necessary to test the foundations of the analysis to determine the robustness of the results.  
25% of farms are unaccounted for due to missing data; this is a point of concern. It is likely that this 
unaccounted for land is farmed in an extensive manner. Aerial photography shows that the veld is 
ecologically disturbed and that the veld has been cultivated at a point in time. The mapping of the 
landscape performed by Rebelo (unpublished) confirms that some of this land could be currently used 
for agricultural purposes.  
25% of the categorised ‘i active’ land will thus be assumed and classified as ‘livestock’ farms. The gross 
margin is the mean value of the ‘sheep’ and ‘cattle’ farms.  
Seeing that the commonage is productive land and income is agriculturally generated, it will be assumed 
that this land is private land.  Using the enterprise average gross margin for cattle R 1 524.01/LSU, the 
gross margin above allocatable costs is estimated for the 300 heads of cattle farmed on this land.  
Table 36: Additional farm type classification 
Farm type Gross margin (R) 
Size 
(hectare) 
livestock 622.26 2615.12 
commonage 612.91 1171.16 
 














The new distribution of income in the Kromme Catchment is shown in Figure 38. Although 45% of 
the land still produces no income, it is presumed that the average agricultural benefit as a result of 
additional freed up land by WfW rises to R469.60.  The total gross margin for each land type in the 
Kromme using the new assumptions is in Appendix B: Table 68.  
3.2.2.7 Agricultural	  Benefits	  of	  WfW	  in	  the	  Upper	  Kromme	  Catchment	  
The economic benefits of clearing AIPs in the Upper Kromme are based on the current land-use. It is 
assumed that additional land cleared by WfW is used in the same manner and proportions as the 
current land use. The current distribution of AIPs is used to assess the economic agricultural potential 
of WfW clearing.  
The analysis takes place over the next 25 years and thus the potential agricultural benefits need to be 
established. It is thus justified to look to see where the current distributions of AIPs are invading and 
determine the potential economic benefits of that land.  The current distribution of alien invasive 


















Table 37: Distribution of Alien Invasive Plants on the different Land Types in Upper Kromme Catchment 
Land Type AIP condensed hectares 
% total area 
invaded 
commonage 118 3 
fruit 127 3 
Formosa Nature Reserve 132 4 
sheep 183 5 
cattle 228 6 
honeybush 232 6 
vegetables 347 9 
state 371 10 
livestock 392 11 
nothing 628 17 
dairy 902 25 
 
The potential mean gross margin per hectare of removing alien invasive plants ranges from R465.79/ha 
under the strict assumptions to R552.69/ha under the adjusted assumptions. The total agricultural 
benefits that can accrue from removing all the alien invasive plants range from R1.7 million/annum to 
R2 million/annum.  
3.2.2.8 Alien	  infestation	  and	  Income	  distribution	  
The hypothesis that alien infestation decreases the agricultural productivity of the land suggests a 
negative correlation between income (gross margin) and infestation levels (ceteris paribus). Correlation 
analysis measures the strength of linear association between the two variables. Both variables are 









Figure 37:  Income and alien infestation distribution in the upper Kromme 
Source: adapted from Rebelo (dissertation in prep) 
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The scatter diagram shows the distribution of the average gross margins per agriculturally active farm 
and the percentage of condensed alien infestation per farm. The scatter diagram includes a sample of 
14 individual farms. 
 
 
The trend line indicates that there is a negative correlation between level of infestation and total 
income.  Although the correlation coefficient is -2.01, it is not statistically significant as the goodness of 
fit (R2) is 0.0403.  
If one includes all the land in the Upper Kromme Catchment, the analysis becomes distorted because 
of the number of farms yielding no income. The proportion of flat fertile land also varies from farm to 
farm, influencing farm income. The correlation coefficient, -0.115, is not statistically significant. 
Figure 39: Scatter diagram illustrating the distribution of total gross margin and the % of alien infestation per 
agriculturally active farm (sample 38) 
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Figure 38: Scatter diagram illustrating the distribution of total gross margin and the % of alien infestation per 












3.2.2.9 Discussion	  on	  Expected	  Private	  Benefits	  	  
Correlation	  analysis	  
The correlation analysis shows no statistically significant relationship between income levels and alien 
plant infestation. However, the sample size restricts the usefulness of the analysis and the large number 
of inactive farms distorts the study. This correlation analysis is based on future projections and many 
farmers have already exploited the most productive areas on their farms and AIPs are invading steep 
slopes and agriculturally low-yielding areas. 
If accurate data pertaining to historically cleared sites were available, it would be useful to correlate the 
infestation levels and incomes on a time series for a given farm only such an approach could provide a 
reasonable counter-factual. Another approach is to look at the impacts of historic clearing on present 
land productivity. One would expect to see a positive correlation between these variables. Figure 42 
depicts past treatment sites overlaid on current income distribution. 
 
 
Low	  private	  benefits	  
Gross margin analysis is commonly used in agricultural economics and calculates the income above 
variable costs. The expected agricultural benefits from clearing AIPs in the Upper Kromme are low and 
averages R500/ha. If the analysis only considered gross income, the average agricultural benefits of 
clearing a condensed hectare of AIPs is around R1 990. Nevertheless, this figure overestimates the true 
value of clearing because the allocatable costs are ignored.  
Private	  benefits	  at	  the	  expense	  of	  public	  costs	  	  
The WfW is a public organisation using public funds, and therefore the alien clearing is not done at the 
expense of the private Kromme landowners. Although the expected agricultural benefits are low in the 












Kromme, these are private gains and these benefits need to be compared to the cost of maintaining the 
clearing, rather than the total clearing costs itself. 
Before WfW clears on private land, the landowner is expected to sign a contract with WfW. This 
contract asserts that the private landowner is responsible and liable to continue the follow-up 
maintenance needed to keep the alien invasive plants from returning. The results of the interviews 
conducted in the Kromme suggest that there is miscommunication and misunderstanding as to when 
the responsibility shifts from WfW to landowner. Nevertheless, is it sensible to assume that a 
proportion of the total cost is privately endured, assuming the private landowners are fulfilling their 
side of the contract and continuing the follow-ups. 
Private	  benefits	  dependent	  on	  land-­‐use	  and	  land	  potential	  
It is clear that the economic benefits vary according to the current land-use. It is also clear that there is 
a larger private incentive to maintain restoration or clear alien invasive plants on farms which 
experience higher economic returns. For example, dairy and fruit farmers have the highest incentive to 
sign contracts with WfW and continue with the follow-ups needed to prevent the re-growth as they can 
expect to receive average incomes of R1 000-R1 800/ha respectively.  
Ecological	  versus	  economic	  incentives	  
Ecological and economic desires differ regarding newly cleared land. Ecologists would prefer to 
transform land into pristine state, therefore maximising the hydrological benefits and preserving the 
catchment’s biodiversity. Alternatively, economic incentives rest upon the expected returns that can be 
generated from the newly cleared land. The analysis shows that greater returns can be expected by 
transforming new land into fields for dairy or orchards or fruit. These motives are contradictory and 
therefore a way of aligning the respective incentives needs to be found. 
That said, although a substantial amount of cleared land in the flood plains has already been cultivated 
and utilised in an agriculturally productive manner; much of the remaining AIPs are situated in the 
steep ravines and up the mountains, where the only agricultural potential is as extensive grazing. The 
low carrying capacity means that farmers will not be able to increase stock numbers significantly, so it 
could be concluded that study in fact overestimates the future returns. AIPs which invade unproductive 
areas would bias the returns down even further. 
Infestation	  Levels	  
The current infestation levels mapped by Rebelo (dissertation in prep) are depicted in Figure 39. 
Nevertheless, if AIPs are not maintained and consistently controlled they will spread very quickly. 
However, landowners are more likely to control and manage the spread of AIPs if the land is 













There are 3 659 condensed hectares of alien invasive vegetation still remaining in the Upper 
Catchment. The total expected average agricultural benefits that can be accrued over 25 years are R1.7–
R2 million. This figure is based on current agricultural activities and does not account for the 
agricultural potential for the area. If landowners converted to economically higher yielding activities, 
the benefits of WfW would be significantly greater. If the Upper Kromme Catchment was a high-
yielding agricultural hub, the outcome would be very different. 
3.2.3 Indirect	  Social	  Benefits	  
Water	  Yield	  	  
The hydrological benefits (additional water yield) are expected to be the major benefits of the Kromme 
restoration. Since the NMBM is the beneficiary of these benefits, the additional water will be valued at 
the price the municipality is willing to pay.  
The hydrological modelling performed by Rebelo (dissertation in prep) and its associated shortfalls will 
be discussed first. The economic analysis involves a discussion around techniques to value water, but 
this paper used the opportunity cost, or the cost of the ‘best alternative sacrificed’ to value the 
additional yield. The incremental cost curve in Chapter 1 is referred to, as they indicate the bundle of all 
NMBM’s water-supply options.  
3.2.3.1 The	  additional	  water	  yield	  in	  the	  Kromme	  
The hydrological affect of alien clearing in the Kromme was modelled by Rebelo (master’s dissertation 
in prep). The Agricultural Catchments Research Unit (ACRU4) Model was used to observe the impact 
of land-use changes on the hydrology of the catchment. According to Rebelo (dissertation in prep), the 
model is based on “multi-layer soil water budgeting” and is “sensitive to land-use changes, irrigation 
demands and onset degrees of water stress.” It models evaporation as both soil evaporation and 
transpiration and thus used the different vegetations’ water use coefficients (Rebelo, dissertation in 
prep).  
The model has major constraints because ACRU4 is unable to model wetlands and riparian zones. Since 
the analysis is of a riparian zone, where wetlands are the main feature, this limitation had fundamental 
consequences on this study.  As a means of overcoming the modelling constraint, Rebelo modelled the 
palmiet wetlands as dams, but substituted the palmiet’s water-use coefficient.  Black wattles, the 
predominant AIP in the site, invade riparian zones almost exclusively. ACRU4 modelled black wattles as 
water-stressed because there is not enough water in the system for them to use. It is likely that black 
wattles tap into ground water, and the model is unable to simulate this accurately. The ACRU4 reported 
an unrealistically low evapotranspiration rate for black wattles, which could not be accepted or used in 












It was accepted that the model could not be used to assess the impact of AIP’s on the hydrology of the 
Upper Kromme Catchment. Expert advice, along with literature (Le Maitre, pers. comm. 2011; Rebelo, 
dissertation in prep) was consulted and it was assumed that the evapotranspiration rate for black wattle 
is 1380mm/annum. Table 38 shows the associated evapotranspiration rates for all the prevalent 
vegetation in the Upper Kromme Catchment.  
These figures are used to evaluate the additional water yield released once the AIP vegetation is 
removed. The change in the vegetation’s evapotranspiration rates ‘before’ and ‘after’ conveys the 
additional runoff that is made available.  
Table 38: Vegetation prevalent in the Upper Kromme and associated evapotranspiration rates (mm/annum) 
Vegetation Source Et (mm/annum) 
Black Wattle Literature (Dye et al. 2001, Dye & Jarmain 2004, Everson et al. 2007 in Rebelo dissertation in prep) 1380 
Palmiet Wetlands field work & remote-sensing (Rebelo, dissertation in prep) 1060 
Kromme Irrigated Fields ACRU (Rebelo, dissertation in prep) 649 
Kromme Orchards ACRU (Rebelo, dissertation in prep) 912 
Pine Le Maitre (pers. comm. 2011, 21 October) 650.75 
Hakea Le Maitre (pers. comm. 2011, 21 October) 630 
Fynbos Le Maitre (pers. comm. 2011, 21 October) 600 
Other riparian Le Maitre (pers. comm. 2011, 21 October) 1300 
	  
The following formula is used to determine the runoff of a catchment (Le Maitre, pers. comm. 2011).  





It is assumed that ‘storage’ is equal to zero because it averages out over the long term and therefore is 
considered insignificant. In order to assess the beneficiary’s additional yield, the yield factor is needed 
(Le Maitre, D, 2011, pers. comm., 17 October). The yield factor describes the reliability of the yield and 
guides the dam manager as to how much can be safely abstracted. Every dam has a ‘dam equation’ 
which is used to determine this yield factor. A 98% assurance of supply is used for the Churchill Dam 
(Raymer, D, 2011, pers. comm., 20 October).   
Keeping in line with the agricultural assumptions, it is assumed that the current proportion of land-use 












change in their associated Et’s can be calculated. The land-areas are divided into two main categories: 
non-riparian and riparian. It is assumed that black wattles invade the riparian areas 90% of the time. 
Table 39: Proportion of Vegetation land cover in riparian and non-riparian areas 
Non-riparian 
Fynbos 42.4% 
Disturbed Fynbos 45.7% 
Dryland Agriculture 8.4% 
Irrigation Agriculture 3.1% 
Orchards 0.4% 
Riparian 
Riparian Vegetation 34% 
Wetlands 4% 
Dryland Agriculture 16% 
Irrigation Agriculture 44% 
Orchards 2% 
   Source: adapted from Rebelo (dissertation in prep) 
Using weighted averages and the WfW clearing distribution (Table 21), the change in runoff due to the 
removal of one condensed hectare of AIP is calculated. The figures in Table 40 have been converted to 
represent an additional cubic metre of water per hectare per annum. The difference between the 
additional runoff and yield is that the yield takes into account the yield factor.  
Table 40: Additional Yield per cubic metre per hectare per annum 
Unit m3/ha/annum 
Additional runoff 3 272.33 
Additional yield 3 206.88 
	  
Economic	  Value	  of	  Additional	  Yield	  
3.2.3.2 DWA	  raw	  water	  tariffs	  	  
Literature reveals that studies often use the raw water tariff to value the additional water yields made 
available from WfW clearing (Currie et al 2009; Marais and Wannenburgh, 2008). Raw water tariffs 
reveal the price at which the DWA sells the water and therefore indicates the additional revenue 
generated from selling water. It is often misinterpreted as the market price of water. Since the tariff is 
set by DWA and not by demand and supply, the tariff is generally underestimates the economic value 
of water.  
The raw tariff does not represent the economic value of water, as it does not reflect the true scarcity of 
water. It is expressed in this paper for the purposes of comparison and to demonstrate the potential 












Raw	  Water	  Tariffs	  for	  Kromme	  
The Churchill Dam is owned by the NMBM and therefore the municipality does not pay a 
consumptive water charge to the DWA. Instead, the NMBM only pays a Water Resource Management 
(WRM) fee, based on the registered volume of water, and a Water Research Levy (WRL), based on 
actual water consumption to the DWA.  
The NMBM pays a flat monthly fee of R29 225 for the fixed monthly registered water of 1.67million 
m3 (NMBM, 2010). The annual WRL fee, which is dependent on consumption levels, is R0.039/m3 
(2009 prices). Since this fee is based on consumption levels, it will be used to represent the raw water 
tariffs for the Churchill Dam.  
	  
	  
Full	  supply	  cost	  	  
The full supply cost incorporates the operations and maintenance (O & M) costs, capital charges and 
raw water tariffs paid to secure the supply of water (Rogers, de Silva and Bhatia , 1998). Most raw water 
tariffs aim to recover the cost of supplying water, but since the DWA does not own the dam, these 
costs are not reflected in their raw water tariffs. The full supply cost is a better indication of the cost of 
water; however it does not incorporate the total economic cost because the opportunity cost of the 
water is not captured. The full supply cost of the Churchill water therefore understates its economic 
value.  
Full	  Supply	  Cost	  of	  Kromme	  water	  
The NMBM is responsible for the upkeep of the dam and the operations and management costs. The 
NMBM water tariffs aim to recover the cost of supplying the water. Not only does the NMBM account 
for the supply costs, but also takes into consideration the supply loss volume from the treatment works 
as well as the distribution losses and unmetered water consumption. It is estimated that more than a 
third of all water supplied is not billed and thus 36% of all water ‘used’ yields no revenue. Water is an 
economic and social good and the entitlement to clean safe water a constitutional right, and thus the 
cost of supplying water to indigent households is also incorporated into this cost. 
	  
The average cost of water from the Churchill Dam has been analysed because it was not possible to 
determine the marginal cost of water. The Churchill water treatment costs, extrapolated from Chapter 
1, are adjusted to represent the cost of treating raw water (R0.47/m3).  The dam maintenance and 
capital depreciation costs are R0.01/m3 (NMBM raw data, 2011). The fees paid to the DWA are also 
included to represent the average cost of water supplied from the Churchill Dam.  
	  
Tariff Type Fee 


































Cumulative Volume m3 
Average Incremental Cost Curve 
Table 41: Average Full Supply Cost of Water 
Costs Fee 
Raw water tariff R 0.462/m3 
O & M cost R 0.468/m3 
Capital cost R 0.014/m3 
total R 0.944/m3 
  
3.2.3.3 Opportunity	  Cost	  of	  Water	  
The methods discussed do not represent the total economic value of additional water. Using the 
‘opportunity cost valuation approach,’ the true economic value is measured. The opportunity cost can 
be described as the “best alternative sacrificed” and is the willingness people would pay in a perfectly 
competitive world (Blignaut and de Wit, 2004).  
NMBM’s	  Willingness	  to	  Pay	  
The NMBM’s willingness to pay for the water from any source is determined by the cost of the ‘next 
best’ water supply option, i.e. the opportunity cost of the water. The NMBM has a choice as to where 
to source additional water, and is looking for the cheapest option. It is assumed that the NMBM will be 
willing to pay this price for the additional water in the Kromme River.  
The price of the additional water is the cost of the ‘next best’ new water source calculated in the 
Incremental Cost Curves, described in Chapter 1, Figure 14. As concluded in Chapter 1, Levelised 
Costing is used as it is a more conservative approach. The expected yield from the Kromme restoration 
is discounted over 25 years and it is found that an additional 0.288 million m3/annum can be abstracted 
as a result of the restoration. The Incremental Cost Curve (Figure 43) shows the Baviaanskloof Water 



















The restoration provides an estimated 7.21 million m3/annum over a 25 year timeframe, which is less 
that the Baviaanskloof Trading scheme which provides 14.62 million m3/annum. This gives a value of 
R1.21/m3 for any additional water in the Upper Kromme and an indirect economic value of R3 880/ha 
for clearing a condensed hectare of AIPs. 
Table 42: Opportunity cost of water in the Kromme 
 
 
3.2.4 Is	  WfW	  Economically	  Viable?	  	  
The economical viability of the restoration in the Upper Kromme Catchment is measured through a 
cost-benefit analysis: 






The cost benefit analysis is used to test the future viability of investing in the WfW Programme. A 25 
year timeframe is selected and since the WfW Programme is a governmental run project it is 
appropriate to use a social discount rate of 4%. A 4% interest rate is roughly 10% nominal, which is 
well above the risk-free rate at which the State borrows long term money, and thus is a conservative 
view. The analysis is performed at different interest rates, displayed in Table 70.   
Using historical trends as a guideline, it is assumed that an average of 138 condensed hectares will be 
cleared per annum. It is estimated that 3 459condensed hectares will be cleared over 25 years, out of 
the current 3 660 condensed hectares of AIPs. The additional expected yield as a result of restoration 
comes to 443 640 m3/annum assuming 138 condensed is cleared each year. Table 43 portrays the net 
present value of the costs of the programme at 4% discount rate. Further data and analysis is portrayed 
in the Appendix B: Table 69 and Table 70. 
Table 43: Net Present Value of Total Costs over 25 years (2009 Rand) 
Interest rate Present Value of Total Cost (R) 
Cost per condensed 
ha (R/ha) 
4% 22 716 127 6 568.20 
 
The net present values of the indirect and direct benefits are portrayed in Table 44. The adjusted 
agricultural assumptions, and thus the economic value of agricultural benefits represent the ‘best-case’ 
scenario.  NMBM’s willingness to pay for water is used to evaluate the hydrological benefits of the 
WfW Programme. It is clear that the hydrological benefits of WfW are substantially greater than the 
potential agricultural benefits.  
	  
Opportunity Cost R 1.21/m3 












Table 44: Present Value of Hydrological Benefits over 25 years 
Benefits Present Value of Total  Benefits (R) 
Present Value Benefits 
per ha (R/ha) 
Agricultural Gross Margin 1 212 392 351 
 Hydrological Yield 8 512 031 2 461 
 
Table 45: Cost-Benefit Analysis 
 Private benefits Social benefits Total Benefits WfW Costs Benefits-Costs BCR 
per 
hectare R 351 R 2 461 R 2 812 R 6 568 -R 3 756 0.43 
total R 1 212 392 R 8 685 745 R 9 898 137 R 22 329 867 -R 12 431 730 0.44 
 
Table 45 reveals the best case scenario for ‘Working for Water’ over 25 years. Nevertheless, the Net-
Present Value of the WfW Programme is negative and the Benefit-Cost Ratio is below 1. The results of 
the cost-benefit analysis reveal that the restoration in the Upper Kromme Catchment is not 
economically viable over 25 years.  
3.2.5 Discussion	  and	  Limitations	  
The analysis reveals that investment in the programme is not economically viable even though the cost-
benefit analysis reveals the best-case scenario. Under tighter assumptions, the Benefit-Cost Ratio 
becomes 0.13 (See Appendix B: Table 71). These tighter assumptions presume an agricultural benefit 
of R465.79/ha while using an Average Incremental Cost of R0.79/m3 and the WfW costs reported by 
GIB .  
If the time horizon is changed to 50 years and it is assumed that after 25 years, the private follow-up 
maintenance costs are 10% of the annual WfW costs, ceteris paribus, the Benefit-Cost Ratio becomes 
0.56. The economic benefits of the restoration still do not outweigh the costs even under these revised 
conditions. If the cost of clearing is cut completely after 25 years, the Benefit-Cost Ratio only improves 
marginally to 0.59. 
The poor economic performance of WfW in the Upper Kromme can be explained as follows: 
1. Additional yield is the only hydrological benefit evaluated. The bundle of ecosystem services 
expected as a result of restoring the Kromme Catchment includes flow regulation and 
assurance of supply. However, due to the failure of the ACRU4 model and the inability to 
accurately assess the other hydrological changes in the catchment, these could not be 
evaluated. This is a major shortcoming of the study and it is suggested that future research 













2. Although WfW do not experience high capital start-up costs, the programme entails very high 
annual running costs. The programme is labour intensive and for every condensed hectare 
cleared, a minimum of R3 994 is being spent on wages. This means that at least 60% of the 
cost being spent on labour. These costs also generate socio-economic benefits for the local 
poor, and these have been omitted from the analysis. 
 
3. The agricultural potential in the Upper Kromme Catchment is low and thus the agricultural 
benefits of Working for Water are low. The grazing capacity of the fynbos dominated 
landscape is low and because of the steep valley slopes, the floodplains have the highest 
agricultural productivity. Agricultural profit margins are squeezed as input costs are increasing 
and profits are exposed to risk because of the volatility of the export market.  
Although it is judged that WfW is not economically viable, the risk and subsequent cost of not 
removing AIPs is severe. Black wattles spread at the rate of 36 condensed hectares per annum (Rebelo 
A, dissertation in prep). This means that the NMBM could lose an estimated 0.115 million m3/annum 
if no action is taken, worth an estimated R139 690/annum. This assumes that black wattles spread at a 
linear rate. The agricultural cost of taking action is an estimated R19 900/annum. This cost refers to the 
cost of losing further land to wattle infestations.  
3.2.5.1 Yield	  vs.	  Baseflow	  
It is assumed that that the proportion of current land-use will be maintained after the WfW clearing 
activities. However, due to the ecological significance and fragility of the Kromme ecosystem and the 
importance it plays in securing the NMBM’s water supply, it is necessary to evaluate the impact of a 
different land-use on the yield.    
Using Rebelo’s (dissertation in prep) mapping results, the ‘ideal’ state of the catchment is ascertained. 
The conditions of this ‘ideal’ state are indicated in Table 46. 
Table 46: Distribution of vegetation in the ‘Ideal’ State 
Riparian – 90% invasions 
Riparian vegetation 69% 
Wetland 31% 
Non-riparian – 10% invasions 
Fynbos 100% 
 














Table 47: Additional Hydrological Yield expected from natural "ideal" state 
Unit m3/ha/annum 
Additional runoff 1 449.534 
Additional Yield 1 420.543 
 
The calculations show that less than half the yield is expected if the land is transformed back into its 
natural state, rather than the present land use patterns. These counterintuitive results are indicative of 
the trade-off between yield and baseflow.  
A functioning catchment increases the baseflow of the river. In good seasons, the catchment absorbs 
and holds the water back, and then slowly and consistently releases it throughout the year. This increase 
in baseflow helps sustain the catchment through the dry seasons; however the catchment management 
reduces the amplitude of flows and decreases the runoff of the catchment.  
An increase in baseflow is often deemed more important to municipalities and Nieuwoudt et al 
(2004:177) reveals that municipalities‟ generally place a higher value on assurance and reduced risk, 
rather than incremental units of water.” It is during times of drought when the additional water is most 
needed.  
The literature stresses the importance of a catchment’s ability to store and hold water (Mander et al, 
2010). Wetlands, act as sinks, and ensure the flow regulation. This smoothes the volatility in water 
supply and reduces the damages done by high energy flooding and silting. Catchment management 
cannot focus only on maximising the yield of the catchment, as this will lead to perverse management 
and will have damaging consequences for the catchment and future security of water supply. The 
catchment will slowly become more degraded if the wetlands are stripped and more fields are planted, 
leading to higher erosion rates. The impact of floods will be more severe, washing more silt and 
sediment into the dam.  
3.2.5.2 Should	  the	  restoration	  of	  the	  Upper	  Kromme	  Catchment	  be	  considered	  a	  possible	  
augmentation	  scheme	  for	  NMBM?	  
It is important to observe how the WfW restoration in the Kromme fares in comparison to NMBM’s 
other proposed schemes. It needs to be considered whether the NMBM should invest in proper 
catchment management in the form of WfW as a means of securing future water.  
Using the levelised cost approach from Chapter 1, the Kromme restoration is included in the 













































cumulative volume million m³ 














The cost of WfW Kromme restoration is R3.23/m3. Although it falls within the cheaper end of the 
scale, the major concern is that it only supplies a mere 7.21 million m3 over the 25 year time frames. 
The Nooitgedagt Low-Level Scheme, for example costs R3.52/m3, and yet it provides an additional 
470 million m3. When the schemes are examined on an annual basis, additional water from the 
Kromme becomes the third most expensive at R3.23/m3 and supplies the least yield (0.44 million 
m3/annum).  
Nevertheless, one should not discard the importance of restoration as a means of catchment 
management. The delivery of the existing yield from the river will be threatened if no action is taken 
and it is important to look after the resources that are in place. However, it is not economically viable 
for NMBM to invest in this scheme for the purpose of increasing water yield and decreasing risk of 
water shortages in the future. Although restoration brings longevity to the dams and is important for 
the sustainability of the catchments, it does not diversify NMBM’s current water supply bundle and 
does not act as insurance against drought. 
Trading	  water	  with	  the	  Kromme	  farmers	  
This chapter has recognised that the agriculture in the Upper Kromme Catchment is limited and that 
farmers yield low agricultural returns. It needs to be questioned whether the NMBM values the water 












more than the farmers and if so, if possible water trading could occur. Chapter 3 investigates the 
economic value of water to the farmers in the light of the possibility of water trading.  













OPPORTUNITY	  COST	  OF	  WATER	  
Increasing industrial activities and economic growth, an expected rise in living standards, expanding 
irrigation-intensive agriculture, food-security concerns and compliance with the ecological reserve 
requirements and environmental interests indicate that conflict among  these water-thirsty sectors are 
only likely to increase in the future. Ward and Michelson (2002:425) recognise that when the supply of 
a resource is scarce relative to its demand, the scarce resource takes on an economic value, because 
many users compete for it. Under such circumstances, there is a need for a rational allocation of scarce 
water among competing users and in the analysis of economic trade-offs, the economic value of water 
and the contribution that water makes in each sector needs to be studied. Economic efficiency 
becomes an important social objective and efficiency levels provide a practical way in resolving 
conflicts (Young, 2005:25). The economic value of water is reflected by the amount a rational user is 
willing to pay for it and this willingness to pay is measured by his or her respective demand function.  
Nevertheless, the individual’s willingness to pay shows the personal marginal benefit and this value 
does not incorporate the indirect benefits accrued.   
This conflict is prevalent between the irrigation-intensive agricultural areas surrounding the NMBM 
and the ever-growing municipality of Nelson Mandela Bay. In particular the Gamtoos Valley, the 
Lower Sundays River Valley and the Upper Kromme Catchment are in direct competition with the 
NMBM for raw water. This chapter seeks to calculate the economic trade-off by determining the 
opportunity cost of this water. The opportunity cost of water, in this case, is the foregone potential of 
agricultural production. It is the price people would pay in a perfectly competitive world, where the 
water price is its marginal value product. In order to calculate the price of this water, it is assumed that 
water rights are fully tradable and that perfect competition exists.  
It must be noted from the onset that this is a conservative opportunity cost of water because it ignores 
the linkages between agriculture and other rural economic activities. In farming areas, most non-
agricultural jobs depend on agriculture and thus, indirectly depend on farmers’ irrigation water. This 
study acknowledges that the farmers’ willingness to pay for water excludes these benefits and therefore 
underestimates its true value.  
A study of the Lower Sundays and Gamtoos Valley sites illustrates the agricultural dynamics and water 
demand involved. The necessary information on the upper Kromme Catchment has already been 
explored in Chapter 2 Section 2, which reviewed the literature on the economic value of water in 
agriculture. Howe’s (1985) methodology is used to value the opportunity cost of irrigation water.  












1. What is the opportunity cost of obtaining water from the Upper Kromme Catchment, the 
Gamtoos Valley, and the Lower Sundays River Valley? How much water is associated at this 
price? 
2. Does the current allocation of water rights meet the Pareto efficiency conditions? If not, in 
which direction should water transfers be considered?  
3. How do these prices compare to the cost of water in the NMBM’s proposed plans? Should 
water markets and trading be considered as a viable option in augmenting PE’s water supply? 
1 The	  Agricultural	  Locations	  
The	  Gamtoos	  Valley	  
The Kouga Dam, built in 1968, forms part of the NMBM Western Supply System and is a vital source 
of water for both agriculture in the Gamtoos Valley and the urban consumption of NMBM. It supplies 
the NMBM with 28% of its water demand (21M m3/annum) and is the sole source of water for the 
Gamtoos Irrigation Board (GIB), which supplies the farms with the required 59.36M m3/annum. The 
towns of Hankey and Patensie, in the Gamtoos Valley, are also reliant on the dam for their 0.441M 
m3/annum.  
There is direct competition for water between the farmers and NMBM. The municipality has the first 
right to the water and thus it can be viewed that agriculture in the Gamtoos Valley acts as a buffer for 
water. When there is excess water, it is sold to the farmers; however when there is a shortage, the 
Gamtoos Valley farmers give it up to supply the NMBM. In times of drought, the Gamtoos Valley 
farmers face severe water restrictions, and in 2010, the famers faced a 60% water quota reduction.  
The economic impact of water restrictions is severe and farmers resort to private water trading among 
themselves during droughts. The price of water in 2010 was bid up from R0.155/m3 to R2.49/m3 to 
save their crops (Joubert, P. 2010 pers. comm. 29 July).  
An	  Overview	  of	  Agriculture	  and	  Water	  Use	  in	  the	  Gamtoos	  Valley	  
The Gamtoos Valley comprises 10 000 hectares of farmland and is divided into three sub-districts, 
namely Patensie; Hankey; and Loerie and Mondplaas. The area is an agricultural hub, known for its 
production of citrus and cash crops. According to the 2002 Agricultural Census, the area generated 
output worth R382 million, with citrus and potatoes constituting 36% and 18% respectively of the total 
revenue. The Gamtoos Valley makes up 20% of the Eastern Cape’s total vegetable revenue and 23% of 
the province’s citrus income (StatsSA, 2006). The Valley not only contributes directly to the Province’s 
agricultural revenue, but also generates employment opportunities, employing 5 000 full-time 












and 10 seasonal employees per farming unit and excludes the spillover effects of the packhouses and 
supporting industries.  
The Gamtoos Irrigation Board (GIB) distributes water from the Kouga dam via concrete lined canals 
and pipelines to the farms. The system only loses 7.5%, as opposed to the NMBM’s 38% distribution 
losses (NMBM, 2010). The DWA owns the dam and thus the GIB’s core business involves the 
maintenance and operation of the Kouga Dam and the canal system and they have between 800-850 
water meters to monitor water usage. The high salinity of the water in the Gamtoos River downstream 
of the Kouga Dam means that irrigation directly from the river is not feasible.  
There are approximately 7 500 hectares scheduled for irrigation. The normal allocation of water to 
farmers is 8 000m3/ha/annum. The water tariffs imposed by GIB cover the operational and 
maintenance costs, and are in place regardless of restrictions.  
Due to a lack of data pertaining to some of the cash crops in the area, 900 hectares of the scheduled 
area have been excluded from this study. Crops such as tobacco, chicory, beans and beetroot are the 
main cash crops omitted from the analysis. 
The	  Lower	  Sundays	  River	  Valley	  
The Lower Sundays River Valley, a centre of citrus production, relies on the Sundays River and 
augmented flows from the Orange-Fish-Sundays Transfer Scheme for irrigation water. The Orange 
River (Senqu River) originates in the Lesotho Highlands, from where it flows into the Gariep Dam, the 
largest dam in South Africa. Water from the Gariep Dam is either released downstream to the van der 
Kloof Dam or into the 82.8km Orange-Fish tunnel, through which it enters the Eastern Cape (DWAF, 
2004). The Orange-Fish transfer scheme is a vital source of water to the Fish-Sundays River. Not only 
does it augment the rivers’ flow by an estimated 575 million m3/annum, but it also plays a crucial role 
in diluting the saline river flows. Additional volumes of water are needed each year solely to flush the 
river water and keep the river water quality at an acceptable level. The Sundays River receives an 
estimated 123 million m3/annum from the transfer scheme (DWAF, 2005).  
The main objective for the building of the transfer scheme in the 1960s was to ‘store and divert water 
to promote irrigation and increase agricultural production along the Orange River and in the Eastern 
Cape regions’ (WCD, 2000). The transfer of Orange River water supports 51 000 hectares of irrigated 
lands in the Fish and Lower Sundays River basins and an additional 4 000 hectares (155Mm3/annum) 
has been reserved for future development (DWAF, 2005). It specifically supports 13 300 hectares in 
the Lower Sundays River Valley. 
The Fish-Sundays transfer scheme is of critical importance to the Nelson Mandela Bay Municipality. 
The commissioning of the Orange River system in 1992 helped relieve the pressures on the Loerie 












Orange River water (DWAF, 2008).  The legal registered water allocation for the NMBM is 17M 
m3/annum; however actual water consumption is 25M m3/annum, the infrastructure’s limit. The 
Orange River water is increasing in importance as NMBM faces water shortages and the municipality’s 
allocation will increase to 58.3M m3/annum once the expansion of Nooitgedagt is complete. The 
additional water will come from the surplus supplies in the Gariep Dam, which otherwise would 
ultimately flow out into the Atlantic Ocean, near Alexander Bay. The system operates so that the DWA 
only releases water from the Gariep Dam when required. Currently, 7 million m3/annum of Sundays 
River water flows out to the sea (DWAF, 2005).  
The Sundays River Estuary has a recreational value and it now falls within the Greater Addo National 
Park. A decrease in river flows could have an ecological impact on this estuary and may impact the 
tourism in the area in the long run. The Water Act stipulates that the river’s instream flow requirement 
must be recognised and should be seen as another user who competes for this water.  
The surplus water from the Gariep and van der Kloof dams is used to generate hydropower for 
Eskom. Available surplus is released through hydropower turbines which results in a significant 
variation in releases as the operating rules are set to benefit hydropower generation. As the surplus 
declines, due to increased water demand, the rules will need to change to favour the existing users 
instead of hydropower generation. Thus, the opportunity cost of water for NMBM also should include 
reduced electricity supply. The energy production varies considerably across seasons, however Gariep 
Dam averages 320MW and Van der Kloof averages 220MW. (WCD, 2000) 
There is no direct competition for Orange River water at this stage as the farmers in the Lower 
Sundays River Valley will not be affected by the increase in NMBM’s allocation. Nevertheless, the 
Orange River water is not an unlimited source of supply, and thus, as the NMBM becomes more 
reliant on the Orange River water and the intensive agricultural unit looks to expand operations, 


















Table 48: Orange/Fish/Sundays River demand 2011 
	  
An	  Overview	  of	  Agriculture	  and	  Water	  Use	  in	  the	  Lower	  Sundays	  River	  Valley	  
The Lower Sundays River Valley, administered by the Kirkwood District is predominantly a citrus 
producing area, followed by vegetables. 88% of the district’s R417 million annual gross income is 
generated from horticulture, with citrus producing R352 million/annum. The area generates 57% of 
the Eastern Cape’s citrus revenue and 28% of the province’s vegetable income (StatsSA, 2006). 
Agriculture in the Valley provides around direct 3 500 full-time jobs and 7 200 seasonal employment 
opportunities per annum. This figure excludes the impact of packhouses and secondary industries.  
Conradie (2002) calculated the marginal value product of irrigation water in the Fish- Sundays River. 
Her results showed that agriculture in the Sundays River Valley contributed 71% to the total value of 
water in the region, highlighting the high returns experienced in citrus production. It is for this reason 
that the Lower Sundays River has been selected as a site for this study. This analysis will delve more 
deeply into the crop water relationships and production in the area. 
Summary	  
What all three sites share is that the water being consumed for agricultural purposes is water 
consequently denied to the NMBM. The Upper Kromme Catchment’s agricultural activities, albeit less 
irrigation-intensive, are situated above the Churchill Dam, therefore reducing the total river flow made 
available to the NMBM. The Gamtoos Valley farmers share the Kouga Dam’s water with the 
municipality, resulting in conflict around water allocations. The Lower Sundays River farmers are the 









Teebus Great Fish WUA  57.95 9.1 
Grassridge 
Great Fish WUA  187.05 29.4 
Cradock 2.9  0.5 
Elandsdrift & Canal system 
Great Fish WUA  141.04 22.2 
Cookhouse 0.49  0.08 
Somerset East 0.87  0.14 
Bedford/Adelaide 0.7  0.11 
De Mistkraal Dam & Canal system Great Fish WUA  31.75 5.0 




Lower Sundays Canal System & 
Scheepersvlakte Dam 
Sundays River WUA  155.15 24.4 
Kirkwood 3  0.47 
Addo-Sunland-Paterson 6  0.94 
NMBM (will increase to 58.3) 25                                    6.3 
Lower Fish 
River 
Glen Melville Dam & 
Canal/pipeline system 
Lower Fish River Irrigators  4.7 0.74 
Grahamstown 4.1  0.64 
total (Mm3)   43.06 578.13 621.19 
%   6.93 93.07 100 













largest water consumers and competition for this water is increasing as the NMBM becomes more 
reliant on this Orange River water. 
In a competitive water market, if farmers are offered “prices in excess of the net returns experienced 
per cubic metre of water consumed, they will sooner or later, be induced to sell that water.” (Howe: 
1985) This study seeks to determine what this upper limit price would be and to assess whether water 













2.1 Literature	  Review	  	  
Although consumed as a final good by the public, water’s main use is as an intermediate good in 
production, such as irrigation water in agriculture. In South Africa, agriculture is the major user of 
water accounting for 59% of consumption; in contrast in 1995 it accounted for 84% of water 
consumption in the United States of America (Young, 2005:3). Agriculture’s status as the largest 
consumer of water heightens the need for efficiency in its use, especially in a climate of increasing 
scarcity and rising demands.  
Sampath (1992:969) expands on the concept of Pareto efficiency in irrigation; he examines the idea of 
economic efficiency and relates it to four different time horizons. In the immediate run, economic 
efficiency is achieved when the social marginal value is equal across all users. In the short run, the 
decision is whether to increase supply, and this should be done when the additional marginal benefits 
outweigh the marginal costs. The decision of expanding the supply system and investing in new 
projects is made in the medium run and these ventures are permitted if the social returns exceed the 
social costs. The long-run dilemma is contrasting optimal investments in irrigation sector to alternative 
investments in possible water sector complements or substitutes. Johansson et al (2002:175) elaborates 
by stating that allocations, which maximise benefits in the absence of distortionary constraints, are 
labelled the first-best efficient outcome. The second-best efficient outcome occurs when maximisation 
happens under distortionary limitations.  
Water as an input affects the producer’s value of water and this concept is rooted in the 
microeconomic theory of the production function. The production function is a schedule, which 
represents the highest level of output a firm can achieve, given the combination of inputs. The firm 
aims to combine inputs in such a way as to achieve profit maximisation or cost minimisation. Producer 
welfare is measured by the change in producer surplus and the interest is to determine what a change in 
an unpriced input (water) has on welfare (Young, 2005:55).  
The firm’s production function is 𝑌 = 𝑌(𝑋,𝑊,𝐾)  and 𝑃!𝑌(𝑋,𝑊,𝐾)  is the Total Value Product 
(TVP). By taking the partial derivative of the production function with respect to the input (water), the 





In a competitive factor market the profit-maximising optimum is achieved when the VMP for each 
input is equal to its price. The VMP is a measure of producers’ Willingness To Pay for changes in the 












2005:56). Deductive methods, such as the residual method, are frequently used to approximate the 
VMP of water . According to Young (2005:58), in neoclassical theory, the basic residual methods can 
be divided into the Production Exhaustion Theorem and the Theory of Economic Rents. 
 
The premise for the Production Exhaustion Theorem is that the VMP of each input equals the 
marginal factor cost and in the long run, the sum of the VMPs equal the TVP. This is based on Euler’s 
theorem, and is therefore only true if the production function is linear homogeneous. Two principles 
are at the heart of this theory. The principle assumption is that the Total Value Product can be divided 
into shares whereby each resource is paid according to its value marginal productivity. The second 
principle is that producers are profit maximisers, meaning that they continue to produce until the value 
marginal product is equal to the price of the inputs (Young, 2005:59).  
According to these postulates in which total value product is exhausted and where the value marginal 
product is equal to input price, the production function: 
𝑌 = 𝑓(𝑋!𝑋!𝑋!𝑋!𝑋!) 
becomes: 
𝑌.𝑃! = 𝑃! .𝑋! + 𝑃! .𝑋! + 𝑃! .𝑋! + 𝑃! .𝑋! + (𝑃! .𝑋!) 
The Production Exhaustion Theorem was used by Chowdhury (2005) to estimate the marginal value 
product of irrigation water in dry seasons. The study ascertains the scarcity value of irrigation water in 
Bangladesh and compares it to India, particularly the Ganges-dependent districts. Bangladesh shares 54 
rivers with India and receives the residual flow after India’s utilisation upstream. Water shortages are 
therefore common, particularly in dry seasons. The production method relates crop production to the 
consumption of water and other inputs, and in this study, the crop produced was borro rice. The 
marginal physical productivity of water for an additional unit of water was multiplied by the crop price 











where  was the value of rice, , the cost of irrigation and , the amount of irrigation water 
measured in cubic meters (Chowdhury, 2005: 15). The marginal value of irrigation water, or the net 
returns to irrigation water, of borro rice in Bangladesh was between USD 0.002 – 0.015 per cubic 
meters. Farmers who farm on very small farms have the highest marginal value product of water, 
followed by large farmers (farm size greater than 0.40ha). Farmers in the South West region were 
willing to pay the highest amount for water and this reflected the higher scarcity levels and therefore 












The Theory of Economic Rents is particularly useful when water supply is limited, and so it is often 
used to value irrigation water. Economic, or Ricardian Rents are payments over and above the price 
needed to bring a resource into production (Young, 2005:63). A change in rents illustrates a change in 
welfare due to a change in the supply of water.  
The equation, given by Young (2005:67), shows water rents equal to total revenue minus total variable 
costs, quasi-rents and non-water rents: 𝑅! = 𝑇𝑅 − 𝑇𝑉𝐶 − 𝑄𝑅 −   𝑅!" 
Theory states that under perfect competition, producers are price takers and therefore all payments to 
variable factors are exactly equal to the total revenue, resulting in zero economic profits. Economic 
profits arise when returns to fixed factors of production exist and this could include irrigation water 
(Conradie and Hoag, 2004:287).  
Conradie and Hoag (2004:288) comment that Howe’s analysis (1985) adopts the view that residual 
profits denote the water value. Uncertainties about future supplies, population and industrial growth 
led to an increase in water demand in the Lower Colorado Basin and a search for new supplies 
instigated Howe’s study on interstate water transfers in the Colorado River (Howe, 1985:1227). 
Agricultural water rights were deemed an appropriate source for potential water transfers because 
agriculture is the main consumer of water, and water in agriculture is associated with lower economic 
returns. By assembling the seven crops grown in the Upper Basin in order of their net returns and the 
cumulating quantities of water associated at that net return, a crude demand curve of water was created 
(Howe, 1985:1228). The study was grounded in the assumption that farmers would be persuaded to sell 
water rights if they were offered prices which exceeded the net returns they experienced per acre-foor 
of water consumed. It was ascertained that by offering prices not exceeding $72 per acre foot, a total of 
1.6 million acre-feet could potentially be available for sales or leases to the Lower basin (Howe, 
1985:1229). The premise for the study was that water markets have the ability to allocate water away 
from low value users, which is the same argument used by Michelson and Young (1993). Another study 
set in Colorado, it illustrated how water could be transfered away from low economic returns generated 
from agriculture to higher value municpal uses. Conradie (2002:32) highlights that the difference 
between Howe’s study and other water value models, such as Michelson and Young (1993) and Taylor 
and Young (1995) is that Howe used average value product instead of indicating the marginal value 
product, via shadow prices. 
Taylor and Young (1995) assessed the benefit of transferring water in the Colorado Canal away from 
agriculture to meet competing demands. Water in agriculture was viewed as society’s “direct foregone 
benefit” and they questioned whether new benefits from the transfer would outweigh the foregone 
benefits or opportunity cost. As theory dictates, they assume that producers are price takers and that 












in the study were developed by imputing the residual value of water from farm budgets similar to 
Williams et al (2008) and Conradie (2002). 
Adopting an aggregate method to measure regional irrigation water demand, the model, maximised 
expected regional income across different crops types (corn, sorghum and lucerne), soil types 
(alkaline/saline to fertile), water yields and water delivery situations (Taylor and Young, 1995:250). The 
study used a discrete sequential stochastic programme (DSSP), which solves sequential problems based 
on past decisions and expected future events. It modelled three sequential stages in regional crop 
production together with the uncertainty of crop production and water supply. Decision choices were 
incorporated into the model so that decisions could be revised at each stage as new information 
became available. The model is unique in that it examines scenarios where farmers plant crops before 
they know how much water is available. Taylor and Young established that average value of irrigation 
water foregone was $37 per acre-foot and that risk reduced the value by $6 per acre-foot.  
Locally Nieuwoudt et al (2004) surveyed studies into the economic value of water in South Africa. It 
suggested that, at a national scale, agriculture is an inefficient consumer of water, generating R1.5 gross 
income per cubic meter of water, compared to R157.4 generated by industries. Water plays an 
important role in agriculture by contributing an estimated 30% to the total value of farm output and 
therefore it is important to examine the marginal contribution water makes in agriculture. Investigating 
the price elasticities, Nieuwoudt et al (2004:177) discovered that non-agricultural users have low price 
elasticity of demand indicating they place a low value on additional units of water supply. Instead, they 
place a high value to the assurance and security of water.   
Nieuwoudt et al (2004) used input-output tables out of which average relationships are determined. 
This approach is criticised for overestimating the willingness to pay for an increment of water because 
it fails to isolate the contribution that only one input (in this case, water) has on the output. It therefore 
accredits the productivity of all primary resources to the residual, thereby inflating this figure (Young, 
2005:91). The contribution water makes to total value in agricultural production is significantly larger 
than in other industries. Thus, in manufacturing industries, capital and labour are the major factors of 
production, and yet the total production is still divided by the amount of water used. This presents an 
upward bias and overestimates the true value or contribution of water makes to the total output. It is 
important to take the marginal contribution: 
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.  
Conradie (2002) chooses to value water using the more appropriate residual method, which assumes 
residual profits are payments to irrigation water. Set in the Fish-Sundays River Scheme in the Eastern 
Cape, it investigates the economic efficiency of water allocation to commercial farmers. Using linear 
programming, it models 16 typical farms to find the marginal and total water values at a farm-level 
scale. Linear programming is an effective tool to estimate shadow prices for water as it maximises 












2006:101). Conradie (2002) models six different crops, four livestock activities, five irrigation systems 
and accounts for risk using MOTAD, which maximises profit subject to an acceptable level of risk. 
Like Taylor and Young (1995), Conradie realises that risk reduces the total and marginal value of water.  
Conradie (2002) observed that ‘irrigation’ and ‘small stock’ farms are the least profitable per cubic 
metre of water, with some farms in the Fish-Sundays experiencing zero marginal value of water. Within 
the Upper, Middle and Lower Fish River, ‘dairy’ farms have the highest returns per cubic meter of 
water, with values ranging from R980/ha/annum - R1 196/ha/annum. The Lower Sunday’s River 
Valley citrus growers generally have substantially higher marginal water values, ranging from R1 
522/ha/annum to R3 950/ha/annum for the large stable citrus farms. Large stable citrus growers 
experience the highest marginal value productivity of water at R0.44/m3/annum (Conradie, 2002).  
Allocation between agricultural and urban users is also not efficient as seen in Table 49	   (Conradie, 
2002). The municipal bulk tariff rates (2009) are higher than the highest agricultural marginal values of 
water. Conradie (2002) suggests that it is possible to reallocate water away from farmers who do not 
need it at the margin, to those municipalities who are willing to pay more for it. The more profitable 
Sunday’s citrus farmers would be able to compete with the municipalities for scarce water (Conradie 
2002).  






Middle Fish 0.125 0.089 
Lower Fish 0.384 0.078 
Sundays 0.509 0.439 
      Source: Conradie (2002); DWA (2010) 
Williams et al (2008), another South African study, used linear programming to determine the water 
demand schedule for irrigation water in the Greater Letaba River Catchment. Enterprise budgets were 
used to create a regional farm budget; however, the different climatic conditions, diverse crop patterns 
and different farm sizes created difficulties. The regional farm budgets provided the main input in the 
linear programming, and although linear programming has its benefits, it was found that some detail 
was lost using this method. The marginal values of water derived from the aggregated agriculture 
demand schedule varied from R0.50/m3 to R2.50/m3 (Williams et al, 2008:82). These values are 
substantially higher than Conradie’s findings in the Eastern Cape and this could be attributed to the 
fact that high-value crops such as citrus, avocadoes and mangoes are grown in the Greater Letaba 
Catchment area. Citrus and avocadoes are export-intensive and have higher margins and so this pushes 












2.2 Howe’s	  (1985)	  Methodology	  
This chapter will follow the same methodology as Howe’s (1985) in determining the economic value of 
water. His approach deals with competition between urban and agricultural water demand and explores 
the option of transferring water rights to augment urban water supplies. The analysis aims to test 
whether the reallocation of water rights is justified and whether there is a potential market for water.  
A crude demand function for water is established, based on the net returns of the individual crops and 
the cumulative water consumed at each net return (Howe, 1985). The annual consumptive use of water 
per crop and its associated gross margin is needed to create the demand curve. This procedure indicates 
the average value of water per crop, thereby indicating the price range at which NMBM could buy that 
water and the associated yield. Howe’s (1985) approach is often referred to as a predecessor to linear 
programming techniques, important in assessing the possibility of a water market (Marais et al, 2001).   
This method is useful in comparing the average values across crops and in distinguishing which crops 
are high-value users of water and which crops are not. It gives an indication as to the direction of a 
potential reallocation of water and represents the upper limit of rational a farmer’s willingness to accept 
compensation for water lost.  
This method does not provide the marginal value of water, as the contribution water makes to the net 
return is not isolated. One needs to be aware that the agricultural return is made up of many factors, 
such as fertilizer, improved seed, capital equipment and good management. The major shortcoming of 
this method is that it fails to subtract the value of any non-water input from the Total Value Product, 
therefore assigning the entire value of output to water and overestimating the value.  
The model denotes the average value of water by assuming there is unlimited water supply and merely 
divides the residual by the net irrigation requirement. In comparison, marginal value of water is 
modelled by dividing the shadow price on a water constraint by the net irrigation requirement.  
Marais et al (2001) comment that average values are often good proxies for marginal values, although 
there is no consistent relationship between these estimates. The similarity of the values depends on the 
elasticity of water demand and the more inelastic water demand is, the closer the values are. Marais et al, 
(2001) observe that farmers who employ water saving technologies, such as micro-irrigation used in 
orchards, have an inelastic demand for water because they cannot move towards more water efficient 
technologies. Farmers who use inefficient water using approaches, such as flood irrigation or sprinklers, 
have the option of reallocating water away and adopting more efficient methods of irrigation, causing 
the marginal value of water to increase, as demand becomes more inelastic. The average values of water 
do not denote the changes in water use patterns and are therefore tend to overestimate the marginal 












For the purposes of this study, it is not critical that the water values are overestimates of willingness to 
pay and therefore simplifying assumptions are justified (Marais et al, 2001). The opportunity cost of 
water can be extrapolated from this methodology in the sense that if the low-yielding uses of water are 
abandoned, the additional water released can potentially be sold to NMBM and the change in net 
earnings can be established if farmers were to switch to high-value crops.  
2.3 Establishing	  the	  Agricultural	  Model	  
Farm budgets are needed to approximate each agricultural enterprise’s production functions. Net 
revenue minus directly allocatable variable costs and fixed costs generates the net revenue per 
enterprise. Instead of using a farm-level approach, the study analyses the profitability of the individual 
crops and their associated water requirements and thus the analysis is based on a per hectare basis.  
The analysis is founded on enterprise budgets provided by Eastern Cape Department of Agriculture 
and updated to reflect 2009 prices. The budgets were modified after interviews with Gamtoos Valley 
and Kromme farmers, meetings with the Kromme Agricultural Extension officer (van der Merwe, S 
2011, pers. comm.), the CEO of the Gamtoos Irrigation Board and c nversations with the Lower 
Sundays River Citrus Company (Gerber, D, 2011, pers. comm. 15 November). Enterprise budgets 
reported in Conradie (2002) have also been consulted and updated.  
Enterprise	  Budgets	  
Enterprise budgets are useful in providing general information on the factor inputs and corresponding 
prices, expected yields, production technology and gross margins. Enterprise budgets work on the 
average and therefore should be treated as estimates. An example of the enterprise budget used for the 
field crops in this study is seen in Table 50 (van Zyl, Kirsten, Coetzee and Blignaut, 1999).  
Table 50: Enterprise Budget Prototype 
Gross Income  
Marketing Costs 
Gross Income After Marketing Costs 
Allocated pre-harvesting costs 
Seed 
Casual planting labour 
Fertilizer 
Weed, Pest & Leaf nutrient control 
Irrigation: (O&M) 
Irrigation: water 
Machinery & Implement costs 
Allocated harvesting costs 
Packing material 
Casual labour 
Transport to market 
Machinery & Implement costs 
Total allocated costs 
Fixed overhead costs 












The gross income is calculated by multiplying the average yield for the area by the farm-gate price, less 
any marketing costs. The farm-gate prices were updated to reflect 2009 prices using national producer 
price indices, reported in the Abstract of Agricultural Statistics (DAFF, 2010).  
The allocated pre-harvest costs are costs concerned with the preparation and cultivation of the land. 
The irrigation costs involve the electricity, labour and maintenance of the irrigation system.  
Although the flat-rate water tariff is a fixed cost, it is incorporated as a variable cost in this study. The 
water tariff is based on crop-water relationships per hectare, because there is often more than one 
planting per season. This allows for the irrigation cost per crop to be isolated. The relative water tariffs 
are displayed in Table 51. 
Table 51: Agricultural Water Tariffs per site 
Water Tariff (R/m3) 
Gamtoos Valley a 0.155 
Upper Kromme b 0.039 
Lower Sundays c 0.061 
 Source: a pers. comm. 2011 Joubert, P 29 July, b NMBM (2010), c unpublished DWA (2010 pers. comm.  
Daniel, G 16 February) 
 
The machinery and implement costs include the operating costs, the maintenance of the machines, and 
the labour cost involved. The bulk of the harvesting costs involve the labour, packing costs and the 
cost of transporting the produce to market. The transport costs depend on the distance to the market 
as well as the weight of the produce. 
Although labour is often deemed as a fixed cost, it has been divided into the various budget activities 
mentioned above. Fixed costs include payments to land, infrastructure and owner’s management as 
well as administration costs, licenses, depreciation, general maintenance and rates and taxes (Conradie, 
2002). Using the enterprise budgets and Conradie (2002) as a guideline, the estimated fixed costs are 
portrayed in Table 52. The fixed costs are estimated per hectare and are adjusted for land which has 
more than one planting per season.  
Table 52: Fixed Costs according to crop and location (2009 prices) 
  intensive fruit field crops 
Gamtoos Valley a R 4 332.47 R 4 332.47 
Upper Kromme a R 4 332.47 R 1 083.12 
Lower Sundays b R 5 725.97 R 4 332.47 












The gross margin analysis has been analysed over a 20 year period and a real discount rate of 5% is 
assumed. The real discount rate has been assumed because this implicitly accounts for price growth 
rates.  
Table 53 provides the net revenues per hectare per annum according to each crop across all three 
locations. The values represent 2009 prices. Enterprise budgets are displayed in Appendix C: Table 75. 
Table 53: Net revenue/annum per hectare across crops and sites (2009 prices) 
  Gamtoos Valley Upper Kromme Catchment 
Lower Sundays 
River 
Broccoli (R 347.57)     
Cabbage R 2 003.29   R 1 600.55 
Carrots R 3 656.49   R 3 202.62 
Cauliflower R 2 888.59     
Citrus Mixed R 11 201.87     
Citrus: Clementines     R 5 598.51 
Citrus: Lemons     R 46 107.17 
Citrus: Navels     R 6 702.70 
Citrus: Valencias     R 7 730.10 
Deciduous Fruit Mixed R 1 929.88 R 2 253.88   
Deciduous Fruit: Apples   R 2 718.66   
Deciduous Fruit: Plums   R 1 789.10   
Kikuyu-Ryegrass R 2 768.01 R 2 918.16   
Lucerne R 3 610.89     
Maize R 2 332.40     
Potatoes R 6 391.84   R 5 703.64 
S Potatoes R 3 254.69     
Sweetcorn R 4 520.50     
Teff + Sorghum R 1 763.74     
Tomatoes R 2 283.57 R 3 600.51 R 1 782.61 
Wheat R 330.82     
 
The Gamtoos Valley farmers tend to plant cash crops for the market and therefore their profit margins 
fluctuate dramatically as they are dependent on market forces. For example the unit price for cabbages 
in 2009 was R29 while in 2011 it dropped to R6.97. The kikuyu and lucerne crops in the Gamtoos 
Valley are not necessarily utilised for fodder, but instead are planted as part of their soil regimes to fix 
nitrogen into the soil and break pest cycles. These crops should be represented as costs, but instead 
have been evaluated as if they are fodder crops. The deciduous and citrus fruit variety mix is unknown 












In the Lower Sundays River Valley, lemons are the most profitable and this region generates more than 
a third of all South Africa’s lemons. The unit price of lemons is 58% higher than the price of other 
citrus cultivars and each hectare produces 61% higher volumetric yields compared to other citrus fruits.  
The main reason for the difference in net revenues across the same crops is the impact of variant water 
tariffs.   
Net	  Irrigation	  Requirement	  
The net irrigation requirement is a benchmark for the amount of irrigation, above rainfall, needed per 
crop. The crop factor needed in calculating the net irrigation requirement takes into account the 
irrigation infrastructure, the crop information and the climatic conditions. The differences in rainfall 
and evaporation rates across locations are indicated in Table 54. 
Table 54: Climatic characteristics of the sites 
Location Mean Annual Rainfall (mm) Evaporation (mm) 
Main rainfall 
season 
Gamtoos Valley ⁺ 420 1 295 summer 
Upper Kromme Catchment ~ 655 1 601 winter 
Lower Sundays River ⁺ 392 1 633 summer 
Source: ⁺ Department of Agriculture Western Cape (2011), ~Rebelo (dissertation in prep)  
The net irrigation requirements for the Gamtoos Valley are taken from the Gamtoos Pilot Project Baseline 
Report a report commissioned for the Water Conservation and Demand Management Strategy by 
DWAF (2008). It contains detailed analysis of the agricultural water consumption in the Valley and the 
different cropping systems and irrigation infrastructures used. It is assumed that all vegetables are 
irrigated under centre pivots and pe manent crops are irrigated using drip irrigation (DWAF, 2008).    
The irrigation requirements calculated for the Lower Sundays River Valley were taken from Conradie 
(2002) together with the crop factors supplied by the Department of Agriculture (2011). The most 
common form of irrigation in the Sundays is micro-jets (Conradie, 2002). The water requirements for 
the Upper Kromme Catchment were determined from the farm interviews, Rebelo’s (dissertation in 
prep) modelling assumptions and the crop factors from the Department of Agriculture. Micro-jets are 
used to irrigate orchards and vegetables, whereas moveable sprinklers are used to irrigate the field crops 
in the Upper Kromme (interviews with farmers).    















Table 55: Net irrigation Requirements (mm/annum) 
Crop Gamtoos Valley ⁺ Upper Kromme Catchment ~ 
Lower Sundays 
River ° 
Broccoli 315     
Cabbage 286   472 
Carrots 322   508 
Cauliflower 322     
Citrus Mixed 781     
Citrus: Clementine     800 
Citrus: Lemons     800 
Citrus: Navels     800 
Citrus: Valencia     800 
Deciduous Fruit Mixed 1 094 639   
Deciduous Fruit: Apples   639   
Deciduous Fruit: Plums   639   
Kikuyu-Ryegrass 1 281 610   
Lucerne 1 281     
Maize 578     
Potatoes 488   674 
S Potatoes 582     
Sweetcorn 313     
Teff + Sorghum 613     
Tomatoes 360 360 569 
Wheat 429     
⁺  Gamtoos Pilot Baseline Report (2008) 
~ Rebelo, (unpublished) & farm interviews (2010), DoA Western Cape (2011) 
° Conradie (2002);  DWAF (2011)   
3 Results	  and	  Discussion 
3.1 The	  opportunity	  cost	  at	  water	  each	  location	  
The area dedicated to each crop, the different crops’ consumption of water and their corresponding net 
revenue per cubic metre of water, are indicated in the tables below. Using this information, it is 
possible to construct a crude agricultural water demand curve for each location as demonstrated in 
Figure 45 to Figure 47.  
3.1.1 Upper	  Kromme	  Catchment	  
The analysis of the Upper Kromme Catchment illustrates that 4.59 million m3/annum of irrigation 
water is consumed for agricultural purposes in the Kromme. Tomatoes have the highest value of water, 
and yet consume the least in the catchment (0.3 million m3/annum), due to the small area planted to 
them. The average value of deciduous fruit ranges from R0.28/m3 to R0.43/m3. Most of irrigation 












would expect water to be transferred away from the lower-end users of water and reallocated towards 
the high-end value crops, such as tomatoes. Around 4.56 million m3/annum of water could be released 
for prices not exceeding R0.43/m3. The total water value in the Upper Kromme Catchment is R1.98 
million/annum and the weighted average value of water is R0.43/m3. 
Table 56: Upper Kromme Catchment 
Crop Area (ha) 
Net return per cubic 
metre of water 
(R/m3) 
Crop water use in 
the Gamtoos Valley 
(million m3) 
Tomatoes 8 R 1.00 0.03 
Apples 38 R 0.43 0.24 
Kikuyu Fodder 610 R 0.43 4.10 
Average Deciduous 24 R 0.35 0.15 




3.1.2 Gamtoos	  Valley	  
Table 57 focuses on the Gamtoos Valley, where 51.5 million m3 of irrigation water is being consumed 
for agriculture each year. Citrus and potatoes are the largest consumers of water in the Valley, and also 
have high average values of water at R1.43/m3 and R1.31/m3 alike. It would be economically efficient 
if water was transferred away from the low-yielding vegetables of broccoli and wheat, and used instead 
for high-yielding crops such as sweet corn or carrots. However, as mentioned, the prices and yields of 
the cash crops fluctuate rapidly from year to year and thus it is with caution that these 
recommendations are made. To manage risk, a farmer needs to diversify the selection of crops planted, 
















cumulative yield (million m3) 






























cumulative yield (million m3) 
The weighted average value of water in the Gamtoos Valley is R 0.89/m3. The total agricultural value 
of water in the Gamtoos Valley is an estimated R48.92 million per annum.  
Table 57: Gamtoos Valley 
Crop Area (ha) 
Net return per cubic 
metre of water 
(R/m3) 
Crop water use in 
the Gamtoos Valley 
(million m3) 
Sweetcorn 160 R 1.45 0.50 
Citrus: Mixed 2 250 R 1.43 17.57 
Potatoes 2 050 R 1.31 10.00 
Carrots 690 R 1.14 2.22 
Cauliflower 140 R 0.90 0.45 
Cabbages 455 R 0.70 1.30 
Tomatoes 20 R 0.64 0.07 
S Potatoes 165 R 0.56 0.96 
Maize 685 R 0.40 3.96 
Teff + Sorghum 65 R 0.29 0.40 
Lucerne 405 R 0.28 5.19 
Kikuyu-Ryegrass 720 R 0.22 9.22 
Deciduous fruit: Mixed 30 R 0.18 0.33 
Wheat 670 R 0.08 2.87 









































cumulative yield (million m3) 
3.1.3 Lower	  Sundays	  River	  Valley	  
The market price of lemons is considerably higher than other citrus cultivars and therefore the average 
value of water for lemons (R5.76/m3) exceeds the other citrus cultivars markedly. However, 84million 
m3 of water could be transferred away from the other citrus and vegetables for prices not exceeding 
R0.97/m3. The average value of water in the Sundays River is higher than the other sites, averaging 
R1.89/m3, which means the total value of water in this area is R200.4 million/annum. The area 
produces citrus which is export driven and it is unsurprising that the water values in the Lower Sundays 
surpass those of the other locations.   
Table 58: Lower Sundays River Valley 
Crop Area (ha) 
Net return per cubic 
metre of water 
(R/m3) 
Crop water use in 
the Gamtoos Valley 
(million m3) 
Citrus: Lemons 2 750 R 5.76 22.00 
Citrus: Valencia 4 100 R 0.97 32.80 
Potatoes 18 R 0.85 0.12 
Citrus: Navel 5 500 R 0.84 44.00 
Citrus: Clementine 850 R 0.70 6.80 
Carrot 29 R 0.63 0.15 
Cabbage 40 R 0.34 0.19 
























3.1.4 The	  Opportunity	  Cost	  of	  Water	  in	  the	  Nelson	  Mandela	  Bay	  Municipality	  
In order to compare urban and agricultural willingness to pay for water, the opportunity cost of water 
in the NMBM needs to be ascertained. The opportunity cost is derived using the “next best scheme” 
approach and is interpreted as the price which the NMBM would have pay to obtain the same amount 
of water from elsewhere. 
The urban and agricultural prices are compared to establish which user values water more highly. This 
indicates which direction transfers should happen to achieve Pareto efficiency.  
The NMBM’s opportunity cost of water has been calculated over a 25 year period and thus the annual 
expected agricultural yields and profits need to be converted over a 25 year timeframe. Using the 
levelised cost approach outlined in Chapter one, the yields and revenues are discounted at a 4% interest 
rate.   
Table 59 compares the NMBM opportunity cost of water and the average agricultural opportunity cost 
at the corresponding yields. The agricultural opportunity costs are based on current agricultural 
practices and current water consumption. 
Table 59: Comparison of NMBM and agricultural opportunity costs of water over 25 years 
  Total Yield (million m³) 
NMBM WTP 
(R/m3) 
Agricultural price  
(R/m³) 
Upper Kromme Catchment 74.58 1.61 0.46 
Gamtoos Valley 896.00 3.53 0.88 
Lower Sundays River Valley 1 725.79 4.47 2.26 
 
The prices that the NMBM are willing to pay for at the associated level of water exceed the agricultural 
opportunity cost of water. This implies that water should be transferred away from the lower yielding 
agricultural consumptions to the high-yielding urban uses.  
Table 60	  compares the upper limit of farmers’ willingness to pay for water. This assumes that farmers 
move away from the low-yielding crops and instead plant crops that yield higher returns per cubic 
metre of water.  
Table 60: Comparison of NMBM and upper limit of agricultural opportunity costs of water over 25 years	  
  Total Yield (million m³) 
NMBM Willingness to 
Pay (R/m3) 
Agricultural value of 
water  (R/m³) 
Upper Kromme Catchment 74.58 1.61 0.99 
Gamtoos Valley 896.00 3.53 1.44 













The value of water in the Lower Sundays River Valley surpasses the NMBM’s willingness to pay and 
suggests that future allocations should be directed towards the high-yielding citrus production, instead 
of the urban NMBM demand. Nevertheless, even at the upper limit of agricultural demand, willingness 
to pay in urban areas is greater than agriculture’s willingness to pay in both the Upper Kromme 
Catchment and the Gamtoos Valley. 
It is important to reiterate that the agricultural opportunity cost of water only incorporates the sum of 
the individual farmers. The value of water to the rural economy is not incorporated and thus the 
reported value underestimates the true agricultural value of water.  
3.1.5 Water	  trading	  as	  a	  possible	  NMBM	  augmentation	  plan	  
Assuming that the cost of transferring water rights is based solely on the opportunity cost of water as 
calculated in this chapter, water trading is considered as a possible scheme to augment the NMBM’s 
water supply. It is assumed that perfect competition and fully tradable water rights exist.  
Using the methodology described in Chapter 1, Figure 48 shows the NMBM’s supply cost curve 
including the proposed water trading options. The upper limit of agricultural willingness to pay for 
water has been used. Table 61 provides details on all the possible water augmentation schemes studied 
in this paper. 
The incremental cost curve illustrates that possible water trading in the Upper Kromme Catchment is 
the cheapest of all the proposed schemes. The water trading scheme can supply an estimated 74.58 
million m3 over 25 years at a price of R0.99/m3. It is interesting to note that water trading in the Upper 
Kromme is a considerably cheaper option than restoration in the Upper Kromme and it supplies a total 
of 67million m3 more water. Nevertheless, the two schemes are linked: the continual degradation of the 
catchment and spread of AIPs compromises the additional water released by farmers through water 
trading. 
  
Trading water rights in the Gamtoos Valley is the third cheapest augmentation scheme. This means 
that possible water trading in the Baviaanskloof, Gamtoos Valley and Upper Kromme are the three 
cheapest supply augmentation options for the NMBM. The Gamtoos Valley has the capacity to release 
896 million m3 over 20 years at a price of R1.44/m3. The Gamtoos Valley contributes significantly to 
the province’s horticultural production and provides significant employment opportunities. The 
forward and backward linkages of the Gamtoos Valley agriculture have not been quantified and 
therefore the true cost of trading water rights will be much higher. Without irrigation, agriculture in the 
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Lower Sundays  


















cumulative volume (million m3) 
Water trading in the Lower Sundays River Valley is the second most expensive scheme proposed to the 
NMBM. The high returns that can be generated per cubic metre of irrigation water, suggest that water 
trading should not be considered in the Valley. Water trading is more expensive than the desalination 








































Table 61: Total costs and yields pertaining to each proposed augmentation scheme for NMBM 






(million m3) Price (R/m³) 
Kromme Trading 34.01 74.58 74.58 0.99 
Baviaanskloof 17.67 14.62 89.20 1.21 
Gamtoos Trading 1 286.40 896.00 985.20 1.44 
Gamtoos river irrigation return flows 176.03 109.55 1 094.75 1.61 
Upper Fish River 443.59 255.89 1 350.64 1.73 
Upstream of meters 85.83 48.90 1 399.54 1.76 
Coega fault 87.48 44.32 1 443.86 1.97 
Van Stadens 126.98 57.99 1 501.85 2.19 
Downstream of meters 133.90 48.90 1 550.75 2.74 
Bushy Park 84.92 28.68 1 579.43 2.96 
Kromme river restoration 23.28 7.21 1 586.64 3.23 
Jeffrey’s Arch 144.37 43.28 1 629.91 3.34 
Nooitgedagt Low-Level 1 652.46 468.32 2 098.23 3.53 
Sundays River 592.64 152.37 2 250.60 3.89 
Treated effluent from Coega 1 015.20 240.98 2 491.58 4.21 
Industrial standards FWF WWTW 989.39 221.33 2 712.91 4.47 
Guernakop Dam 1 745.45 366.29 3 079.21 4.77 
Tsitsikamma River diversion 75.71 13.71 3 092.92 5.52 
Kouga replacement 2 075.04 366.29 3 459.21 5.66 
Coega desalination 2 528.40 417.13 3 876.35 6.06 
Seawater 2 825.95 448.24 4 324.59 6.30 
Lower Sundays River Valley trading 11 142.10 1725.79 6 050.37 6.46 













4 Conclusion	  and	  Limitations	  
The agricultural hubs investigated in this chapter already provide 73% of all NMBM’s water. The costs 
of supply discussed in Chapter 1 reveal the storage, transport and treatment costs of obtaining water, 
but fail to account for the opportunity cost of using water for urban consumption. This analysis has 
aimed to shed light on this hidden cost by measuring the opportunity cost of water as agricultural 
revenue forgone.  
Economic theory dictates that economic efficiency is achieved when additional economic returns 
cannot be achieved from reallocating resources. Based on this premise, the option of reallocating water 
away from low-yielding crops towards high-yielding crops was investigated. The study has uncovered 
that the Lower Sundays River Valley has the highest average value of water, with prices reaching 
R5.76/m3. An estimated 106 million m3/annum of irrigation water can be released at an upper limit of 
R5.76/m3. The total value of water in the Lower Sundays according to the present agricultural water 
consumption patterns is R200 million/annum. 
The Gamtoos Valley experiences highest net returns for sweet corn at R1.45/m3. Around 4 300 
hectares is planted towards citrus and potatoes and these crops yield prices of R1.43/m3 and R1.31/m3 
indicating that water is being allocated in an efficient manner. Farmers in the Valley plant cash crops 
for the market and therefore their returns vary from year to year. They are susceptible to market forces 
which brings volatility and uncertainty into the farming profitability. The current total average value of 
water in the Gamtoos Valley is R48.89 million/annum and 55.15 million m3/annum can be released for 
prices not exceeding R1.45/m3. 
Around 4.6million m3/annum of irrigation water can be released from the Upper Kromme Catchment 
at prices not exceeding R1.00/m3. The prices average R0.43/m3, which is significantly cheaper than 
prices at the other locations. The majority of irrigation water is used for kikuyu fields, planted as fodder 
for livestock and dairy. The total average value of water in the Upper Kromme Catchment is R1.98 
million/m3. 
The analysis exposes that water should be reallocated away from agriculture in the Upper Kromme 
Catchment and the Gamtoos Valley, but that it should be allocated away from urban consumption 
towards lemon production in the Lower Sundays River Valley  
Assuming that the opportunity cost or the willingness to pay captures the total cost, the possibility of 
water trading as a means to augment NMBM water supply was considered. It transpired that water 
trading in the Upper Kromme Catchment is the cheapest of all potential schemes at R0.99/m3, 
followed closely by water trading in the Gamtoos Valley costing R1.44/m3. These costs do not take 
into account the impact of supporting industries or potential job losses in the area and therefore 












4.1.1 Limitations	  of	  the	  study	  	  
Howe’s (1985) methodology is useful for providing an indication as to the value of water across certain 
agricultural uses, but falls short of estimating the marginal value productivity of water. This 
methodology tends to overestimate the value of water and therefore the figures must be treated with 
caution. The study does not account for risk, which is known to reduce the value of water.  
The specification of the agricultural model is also sensitive to problems. If the stipulated inputs and 
factor prices are either under or over-estimated, the error is magnified in the production values, thereby 
either over or under estimating the economic value of water (Young: 2008).  
Enterprise budgets are subject to fluctuating local market prices, changing export prices, input costs 
and technologies. Seasons vary each year, with changing weather patterns, pests and diseases; factors 
which impact the crop yields and the profitability of harvests. For these reasons, gross margin analysis 
should be treated with caution. 
For an example, increases in fixed overheads, water tariffs or labourers’ wages ceteris paribus, will 
decrease the crop’s profit margin and as a result decrease the average value of water of that crop. On 
the other hand, increases in crops’ yields (keeping irrigation requirements fixed) or increases in the 
market prices will increase the profit margin and increase the average value of water per crop. 
An overriding concern in this chapter is the fact that the local economies of the three regions have 
been ignored. The chapter has dealt only with individual farmers’ willingness to pay for water, and has 
ignored the effect agriculture has on the economy of the rural sector and supporting industries. The 
agricultural value of water should not only include the individual farmers’ crops, but extend to the 
entire local rural economy and therefore the values considered in this chapter, underestimate the true 
value of water. Further research is needed to capture the true value of water in these areas.  
Another shortcoming is agricultural return flows have been ignored. Return flows in agriculture are 
significant and thus the estimated additional yields that the NMBM can expect from water trading are 
most probably lower than the pronounced figures.  
 













SUMMARY	  OF	  KEY	  FINDINGS,	  LIMITATIONS	  AND	  
FURTHER	  RESEARCH	  
	  
Nelson	  Mandela	  Bay’s	  water	  supply	  
Nelson Mandela Bay Municipality faced severe water shortages in 2010 and projections estimated that 
future demand would outstrip future supply if no action was taken. NMBM receives 70% of its water 
supply from the Western system, a concentrated area which experiences similar rainfall and weather 
patterns and has a positive covariance across dam volumes. As a result, the DWA and the NMBM are 
investigating supply schemes options with the intention to maximise supply, minimise risk and 
minimise average costs.  
The proposed schemes include building a desalination plant, utilising groundwater, expanding existing 
dams and tapping into more of the Orange River water. An incremental cost curve, using the mean 
average cost of water, was created to compare the relative costs and supply of each proposed scheme. 
The comparison took place over a 25 year timeframe and examines different methodologies. The cost 
curve assists the water manager in choosing the most secure cheap water at each step of the way.  
The analysis indicates that although the proposed desalination plant and the Nooitgedagt Low-Level 
schemes are expensive (averaging R6.18/m3 and R3.52m3 respectively), the schemes minimise the risk 
by diversifying the NMBM’s current bundle of water supply and supply the most water (432 million m3 
and 468 million m3 respectively). The cheapest water included water trading in the Baviaanskloof and 
the reuse of agricultural return flows, averaging R1.4/m3. However, these schemes do not minimise risk 
and augment water by an estimated 61 million m3 only.  
Upper	  Kromme	  Catchment	  Restoration	  
It was investigated whether catchment management was economically viable in the Upper Kromme 
Catchment and whether it should be considered a possible water augmentation scheme for the NMBM. 
The Kromme River, which supplies the Western system’s dams, provides 40% of NMBM’s total water 
demand. However, the catchment is heavily degraded due to the invasion of alien invasive plants, the 
destruction of palmiet wetlands and poor farming practises. The degradation of natural capital is 
hindering the supply of ecosystem services and in the long-term could threaten the supply of water to 
the NMBM. 
Restoration interventions in the form of ‘Working for Water’ and ‘Working for Wetlands’ have been 
working in the Kromme since 1996 and 2000 respectively. Restoration of natural capital is an activity 












and services, while enhancing the wellbeing of people” (Blignaut, 2009:696). This paper translated the 
activity of restoration into economic costs and gains and assessed if the investment was founded in 
economic rationality and efficiency.  
‘Working	  for	  Wetlands’	  
The economic viability of ‘Working for Wetlands’ could not be considered due to a lack of ecological 
data and water treatment data, and the failure to model wetlands using ACRU4. Although trends show 
that water quality decreases over time, the change in quality cannot be linked to upstream activities. It 
was however shown that water treatment costs increase over time, and that this is statistically related to 
the water quality variable, turbidity. Water costs are also strongly correlated to amount of water being 
treated.  
Wetlands provide many services such as water purification, flood mitigation and baseflow regulation. It 
is suggested that further research investigate the changes in these ecosystem services and translate them 
into economic gains. 
‘Working	  for	  Water’	  
‘Working for Water’ is a labour intensive and costly operation. According to DWA records, an 
investment of around R22.7 million has been spent in the catchment since 2002. In contrast, the GIB 
records reveal that WfW has cost around R51.4 million. The missing data from before 2002 and the 
large divergence in sources’ data is a cause for concern.  
Data concerning the actual areas cleared is also divergent and as a result McConnachie’s (dissertation in 
prep) analysis of treatment sites was used. Using historical trends and assuming a constant real cost per 
hectare cleared, it was projected that 138.34 condensed hectares are cleared by WfW each year. It costs 
around R6 568 to clear one condensed hectare in the Kromme. 
Since WfW falls under the Extended Public Works Programme, it is not surprising that employment is 
a major cost in WfW. A total of 4 625 people have been employed by the Kromme WfW team since 
2002 and for every condensed hectare cleared, at least R3 994 goes towards wages.  
Agricultural	  Benefits	  
Improved land productivity, a private benefit expected from WfW, was quantified as the additional 
land freed up due to the removal of alien invasive plants. It was assumed that additional freed up land 
would be used in the same proportion as current land-uses.  
A summary of relevant information pertaining to the different farm types in the Kromme are revealed 
in the table below. Dairy farms have the highest level of infestations and also have the second highest 
gross margins, meaning they can accrue the highest economic benefits as a result of WfW clearing. 
Fruit farms can accrue the highest economic returns from clearing a hectare of land, although they have 













Farm type Area (ha) Average gross margin per ha (R/ha) 
Alien Plant Invasion 
(ha) 
vegetable 2 430 272.88 347 
sheep 2  967 574.17 273 
‘livestock’ 2 615 622.26 392 
‘commonage’ 1 171 612.91 118 
cattle 1 407 670.35 228 
honeybush 1  037 856.76 232 
dairy 5 723 1 021.77 902 
fruit 2 577 1 807.18 127 
 
Using a weighted average, it is estimated that the economic benefits of clearing in the Upper Kromme 
Catchment are between R465 and R552. The low returns are indicative of the low productivity in the 
area and the fact that only 44% of the land is used for agricultural activities. Gross margin analysis is 
dependent on many external variable factors and thus the figures should be treated with caution. 
It was found that there is no statistically significant relationship between income and alien infestations. 
The sample size was limiting and the number of farms who experience no income distorted the 
findings. It would have been preferable to conduct a retrospective correlation analysis, but due to data 
limitations this was not possible.  
Hydrological	  benefits	  
Expected quantifiable hydrological benefits measured in this paper consisted of increased river yield. 
Due to setbacks in Rebelo’s (dissertation in prep) modelling results, the additional yield expected from 
of restoration was assumed as 3 206m3/ha/annum. This projects to an additional 443 640m3 of water 
per annum, assuming a 98% assurance of supply.  
The opportunity cost approach was used to measure the NMBM’s willingness to pay and was taken 
from the incremental cost curve in Chapter 1. Using the ‘next best scheme’ approach, it was found that 
the NMBM is willing to pay R1.21/m3.  
Cost-­‐benefit	  analysis	  
The cost-benefit analysis showed that restoration is an uneconomically viable investment in Upper 
Kromme Catchment over both a 25 year and 50 year timeframe.  
 Private benefits Social benefits Total Benefits WfW Costs Benefits-Costs BCR 
per hectare R 351 R 2 461 R 2 812 R 6 568 -R 3 756 0.43 
total R 1 212 392 R 8 685 745 R 9 898 137 R 22 329 867 -R 12 431 730 0.44 
Summary of farm type details 













Using the incremental cost curve as the medium for comparison, it was investigated whether the 
Kromme Catchment should be considered a possible augmentation scheme for the NMBM. 
Additional water from the Upper Kromme costs R3.23/m3 and thus falls within the cheaper proposed 
options. Nevertheless, it only provides a mere 7.31million m3 and does not contribute significantly to 
the augmentation of NMBM’s water supply sources and at the same time, does little to minimise the 
risk. 
One should not discard the importance of restoration as a means of catchment management. The 
delivery of the existing yield from the river will be threatened if no action is taken and river flow losses 
are estimated at 0.115 million m3/annum, costing the NMBM just under R20 000/annum. The 
sustainability of restoration rests upon land management that ameliorates the delivery of ecosystem 
services. Changing behaviour and land practices through economic incentives is crucial to ensure that 
the interests of both conservationists and landowners are aligned.  
Opportunity	  Cost	  of	  Water	  
The possibility of water trading within the agricultural sectors and across urban (NMBM) and 
agricultural sectors as a means of achieving allocative efficiency is explored in the final chapter. The 
opportunity cost of water, foregone agricultural benefits, is used as a proxy for the economic value of 
water. The Gamtoos Valley, Lower Sundays River and Upper Kromme Catchment were the selected 
sites because competition for water exists.  
The agricultural value of water was based on the sum of individual farmers’ values and thus excludes 
the value experienced by the rural sector economy and agricultural supporting industries. This is a 
major limitation of this section and needs to be addressed in future research. Howe’s methodology 
whereby a crude demand function for water is established was used where demand is based on the net 
returns of the individual crops and the cumulative water consumed at each net return. The method is 
useful in comparing the average values across crops and distinguishing which crops are high-value users 
of water. A shortcoming of the methodology is that it fails to provide the marginal value productivity 
of water and thus fails to subtract the non-water inputs from the total value product.  
The agricultural average value of water in the Upper Kromme is R0.43/m3 and the total value of water 
is R1.98million per annum. Agriculture uses 4.59million m3 of water per annum and dedicates 690 
hectares to irrigated agriculture. It is suggested that farmers in the Upper Kromme move towards 
higher value crops such as tomatoes.  
 The weighted agricultural value of water in the Gamtoos Valley is R0.89/m3 and the total value of 
water is R48.92 million. Irrigated agriculture uses 55.15 million m3 of water per annum. The Lower 












106.2 million m3 of water per annum and the total value of water in the Lower Sundays is 
R200.4million per annum.  
The agricultural value of water was compared to the urban NMBM value of water. In order to compare 
like to like, the agricultural values were adjusted to a 25 year timeframe and yields and values were 
discounted at 4% interest rate.  The opportunity cost assumes that agriculture adopts an efficient 
allocation of water and moves towards crops which are high-value users of water.  
	  
The economic value of water in the NMBM is greater than the agricultural values of water in both the 
Upper Kromme Catchment and Gamtoos Valley. It is suggested that water is transferred away from 
low-yielding agricultural uses towards high end urban uses to achieve Pareto efficiency. On the other 
hand, water should be transferred away from NMBM towards agriculture in the Lower Sundays River 
Valley.  
Assuming that the cost of transferring water rights is based on the opportunity cost of water, as 
calculated in this chapter, water trading is considered as a possible scheme for augmenting water in the 
NMBM. Water trading in the Upper Kromme Catchment proves to be the cheapest water according to 
the incremental cost curve below. It needs to be reiterated that the cost of water trading in this paper 
merely looks at the opportunity cost of water and does not incorporate the total cost of such a scheme. 









Location Total Yield  (million m³) 
NMBM Opportunity  
Cost (R/m3) 
Agricultural Opportunity  
Cost (R/m³) 
Upper Kromme Catchment 74.58 1.61 0.99 
Gamtoos Valley 896.00 3.53 1.44 
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Restoration in the Upper Kromme Catchment is not economically feasible and although action needs 
to be taken to restore the catchment, it is an expensive scheme for the NMBM to invest in. A major 
problem is that when only the annual costs are examined, it is the third most expensive water and yet 
only contributes 0.44 million m3/annum. Private landowners’ incentives need to be aligned with 
ecologists’ in order to protect the catchment and ensure the ongoing sustainability of water yield.  The 
farming activities that take place in the catchment are small; however it is often the location of the 
activities which cause damages to the river flow. Seeing that the agricultural value of water is low in the 
catchment, it is suggested that a form of water trading is considered. The graph shows that while 
restoration in the Upper Kromme costs R3.23/m3, the opportunity cost of water is R0.99/m3. If 
landowners are willing, water rights can be traded, thereby protecting the catchment and ensuring the 
delivery of water flow to the NMBM. Further research is needed to explore this possibility as a way to 
align incentives and safeguard the catchment. 
It is suggested that municipalities move towards a more holistic approach in tackling water shortages. 
The number of dams that can be built is finite and large engineering schemes are costly. Municipalities 
need to be investing in their current resources to ensure that they are being fully utilised. Although this 
paper reveals that ‘WfW’ is not economically viable, conversations around integrated catchment 
management need to be brought to the table. Although this paper only focuses on one small 
catchment, the implications of the outcome have far reaching affects on other catchments in South 
Africa. 
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Table 62: Scheme's Annual Running Costs and Yields 





Baviaanskloof 0.90 0.49 0.54 
Bushy Park 2.01 1.32 0.66 
Gamtoos River irrigation return flows 7.30 4.90 0.67 
Coega fault 3.10 2.36 0.76 
Jeffrey’s Arch 3.03 2.35 0.77 
Kouga replacement 34.00 27.16 0.80 
Guernakop Dam 34.00 27.24 0.80 
Van Stadens 4.09 3.69 0.90 
Upper Fish River 15.75 19.40 1.23 
Tsitsikamma River diversion 0.96 1.20 1.25 
Upstream of meters 3.65 5.00 1.37 
Sundays River 11.46 16.02 1.40 
Current Water Cost 93.97 133.99 1.43 
Industrial standards FWF WWTW 16.43 23.94 1.46 
Treated effluent from Coega 18.25 29.60 1.62 
Nooitgedagt Low-Level 32.85 62.76 1.91 
Echodale: potable standards 16.43 31.95 1.94 
Downstream of meters 3.65 7.70 2.11 
Seawater 36.50 132.68 3.64 
Coega desalination 29.20 153.80 5.27 
	  
Table 63: Comparison of schemes’ average cost of water over a 50 year horizon 
R/m³ SCHEMES - no discounting SCHEMES -discounting R/m³ 
R 0.44 Baviaanskloof Baviaanskloof R 1.03 
R 0.56 Gamtoos River irrigation return flows 
Gamtoos River irrigation 
return flows R 1.34 
R 0.65 Upstream (WC/WDM) Upper Fish trading R 1.60 
R 0.66 Couga Fault Groundwater Couga Fault Groundwater R 1.61 
R 0.69 Upper Fish trading Upstream (WC/WDM) R 1.63 
R 0.73 Van Stadens Groundwater Van Stadens Groundwater R 1.80 
R 0.93 Bushy Park Groundwater Bushy Park Groundwater R 2.27 
R 1.01 Downstream  (WC/WDM) Downstream  (WC/WDM) R 2.54 
R 1.04 Jeffrey’s Arch Groundwater Jeffrey’s Arch Groundwater R 2.55 
R 1.23 Guernakop Dam Nooitgedagt R 3.04 
R 1.23 Lower Sundays River Lower Sundays River R 3.11 
R 1.24 Nooitgedagt Guernakop Dam R 3.33 
































Cumulative volume (million m3) 
Incremental Cost of Water by Scheme over 50 years 
R 1.41 Industrial Standards Industrial Standards R 3.53 
R 1.45 Kouga replacement Kouga replacement R 3.91 
R 1.73 Tsitsikamma River diversion Tsitsikamma River diversion R 4.24 
R 2.10 Seawater Desalination Seawater Desalination R 5.42 
R 2.19 Echodale Echodale R 5.60 















Table 64: Sequence of Proposed Interventions recommended in the Algoa Reconc i l ia t ion Strategy  with associated 
average per cubic metre costs 
Year Intervention Price (R/m³) 
2010-2012 WC/WDM Upstream & Downstream 1.76 2.74   
2011 Nooitgedagt Low-Level Scheme; Swartkops Desalination & Bushy Parks Groundwater 3.53 6.18 2.96 
2021 Coega Wastewater Treatment Works (WWTW)  4.21 
2025 Fishwater Flats WWTW Re-use Scheme 4.47 
2029-2031 Van Stadens, Coega & Jeffrey’s Arch Groundwater schemes 2.19 1.97 3.34 
2031 Orange River Project transfers & introduce the trading of irrigation allocations 1.73 
2031 Raising of Kouga Dam 5.66 
2032 Coega Industrial Development Zone (IDZ) Desalination scheme 6.06 
2035 Sundays River Return Flow Desalination Scheme 3.89  
Source: DWA (2010) 
 
 













Table 65:  Upper Kromme Catchment Farm details 
  Farm 1 Farm 2 Farm 3 Farm 4 Farm 5 
classification dairy dairy dairy dairy cattle 
size (ha) 1 273.22 991.72 1 068.80 1 058.89 909.28 
irrigated pastures (ha) 33 60 89.14 90 14.51 
orchards  /  /  /  /  / 
irrigation system 23ha permanent; 10ha dragline 
2 centre pivots & 300m 
dragline centre pivot & draglines dragline, centre pivot sprinklers, gravity fed 
type of pastures kikuyu/ryegrass kikuyu kikuyu kikuyu kikuyu 
vegetable  /  /  /  /  / 
registered water m³/a 548 239 270 000 280 800 561 600 54 750 
dryland grazing (ha) 280 97.88 82.45 181.11 90.90 
alien invasive plants (ha) 197.68 180.37 598.01 151.97 240.31 
	  
  Farm 6 Farm 7 Farm 8 Farm 9 Farm 10 
classification sheep sheep cattle fruit fruit 
size (ha) 926.68 1 494.24 497.78 930.88 1 271.30 
irrigated pastures (ha) 18.07 20.00 0   104.00 
orchards  /  /  / 33.86 31.30 
irrigation system gravity led sprinklers gravity permanent sprinklers / drip, micro jets drip, pipelines 
type of pastures kikuyu kikuyu / kikuyu lucerne 
vegetable  /  /  /     
registered water m³/a 63 000 260 000 / 115 000 115 000 












alien invasive plants (ha) 75.99 153.24 44.63 64.78 78.29 
	  
	  
  Farm 11 Farm 12 Farm 13 Farm 14 
classification fruit vegetable vegetable Honey bush 
size (ha) 374.70 2 219.77 210.31 1 037.40 
irrigated pastures (ha) 35.25 10.35   40 
orchards 8 / 3.5 / 
irrigation system / dragline / drip 
type of pastures kikuyu kikuyu / Honey bush 
vegetable 5 3 1 / 
registered water m³/a / / / / 
dryland grazing (ha) 137.14 28.24 29.66 0 


















Table 66: Summarized farm budget details 
Farm 1 gross income per farm 
total variable 
costs per farm 
gross margin per 
farm 
gross margin per 
ha (R/ha) 
Dormer R 292 000 R 127 000 R 165 000 133.04 
Dairy R 1 374 845 R 1 143 107 R 231 738 7022.36 
total R 1 666 845 R 1 270 107 R 396 738 311.60 
     
Farm 2 gross income per farm 
total variable 
costs per farm 
gross margin per 
farm 
gross margin per 
ha (R/ha) 
Dairy R 3 338 909 R 2 776 116 R 562 792 9379.87 
Sheep R 160 326 R 61 010 R 99 316 255.45 
total R 3 499 235 R 1 657 371 R 662 108 667.63 
     
Farm 3 gross income per farm 
total variable 
costs per farm 
gross margin per 
farm 
gross margin per 
ha (R/ha) 
Dairy R 5 892 191.71 R 4 899 029 R 993 163 11141.39 
Sheep R 235 774.25 R 89 721 R 146 053 149.09 
total R 6 127 966 R 2 442 504 R 3 685 461 1065.89 
     
Farm 4 gross income per farm 
total variable 
costs per farm 
gross margin per 
farm 
gross margin per 
ha (R/ha) 
Dairy R 11 784 383 R 9 798 058 R 1 986 325 22070.28 
Cattle R 300 141.1 R 124 254 R 175 887 181.54 
total R 12 084 525 R 9 922 312 R 2 162 213 2041.97 
     
Farm 5 gross income per farm 
total variable 
costs per farm 
gross margin per 
farm 
gross margin per 
ha (R/ha) 
cattle R 570 640 R 223 843 R 346 796 381.39 
total R 570 640 R 223 843 R 346 796 R 381 
     
Farm 6 gross income per farm 
total variable 
costs per farm 
gross margin per 
farm 
gross margin per 
ha (R/ha) 
Dohne Merinos R 775 200.00 R 324 515.54 R 450 684.46 486.34 
Cattle R 184 213.21 R 78 985.08 R 105 228.13 113.55 
total R 959 413 R 413 863 R 545 551 599.90 
     
Farm 7 gross income per farm 
total variable 
costs per farm 
gross margin per 
farm 
gross margin per 
ha (R/ha) 
Dohne Merinos R 1 162 800.00 R 431 020.19 R 731 779.81 489.74 
Cattle R 261 498.50 R 145 606.49 R 115 892.01 77.56 
Boer goats R 20 888.40 R 2 348.40 R 18 540.00 12.41 



















Farm 8 gross income per farm 
total variable 
costs per farm 
gross margin per 
farm 
gross margin per 
ha (R/ha) 
Dohne Merinos R 228 000.00 R 94 710.93 R 133 289.07 267.77 
Cattle R 454 711.71 R 105 926.94 R 348 784.77 700.68 
total R 682 712 R 200 638 R 482 074 968.44 
     
Farm 9 gross income per farm 
total variable 
costs per farm 
gross margin per 
farm 
gross margin per 
ha (R/ha) 
cattle R 443 118.91 R 97 593.48 R 345 525.43 385.25 
plums R 1 492 781.52 R 1 008 243.17 R 484 538.35 48453.83 
pears R 373 195.38 R 252 060.79 R 121 134.59 5047.27 
total R 2 309 096   R 951 198 1021.82 
     
Farm 10 gross income per farm 
total variable 
costs per farm 
gross margin per 
farm 
gross margin per 
ha (R/ha) 
cattle R 454 711.71 R 98 247.48 R 356 464.23 287.47 
apples R 6 321 578.33 R 4 280 372.25 R 2 041 206.08 65204.27 
total R 6 776 290   R 2 397 670.31 1886.00 
     
Farm 11 gross income per farm 
total variable 
costs per farm 
gross margin per 
farm 
gross margin per 
ha (R/ha) 
cattle R 145 570.57 R 60 202.70 R 85 367.87 236.02 
tomatoes R 858 153.47 R 523 346.46 R 334 807.01 66961.40 
apples R 1 615 738.87 R 1 094 024.86 R 521 714.01 65214.25 
total R 2 619 463 R 1 677 574 R 941 888.89 2513.73 
     
Farm 12 gross income per farm 
total variable 
costs per farm 
gross margin per 
farm 
gross margin per 
ha (R/ha) 
cattle R 184 213.21 R 35 030.41 R 149 182.80 67.30 
sheep R 65 940.30 R 10 242.08 R 55 698.21 25.13 
tomatoes R 514 892.08 R 314 007.87 R 200 884.21 66961.40 
total R 765 046 R 325 604 R 405 765.22 182.80 
     
Farm 13 gross income per farm 
total variable 
costs per farm 
gross margin per 
farm 
gross margin per 
ha (R/ha) 
Honey bush tea 2520000 R 1 631 200.00 R 888 800.00 22220.00 
total R 2 520 000.00 R 1 631 200.00 R 888 800.00 856.76 
     
Farm 14 gross income per farm 
total variable 
costs per farm 
gross margin per 
farm 
gross margin per 
ha (R/ha) 
tomatoes R 128 723.02 R 78 501.97 R 50 221.05 66961.40 
sheep R 43 800.00 R 19 050.00 R 24 750.00 205.81 

























Table 68 Total gross margins per land type with corresponding hectares devoted to each 
 
	  
	   	  
Farm Type Area (hectares) Total Value Product 
vegetables 2 430 R 663 112 
fruit 2 577 R 4 656 897 
sheep 2 967 R 1 703 361 
honeybush 1 037 R 888 800 
dairy 5 723 R 5 847 703 
cattle 1 407 R 943 222 
total 16 141 R 14 703 095 
Land type Size (hectare) Total gross margin (R) 
vegetables 2 430 663 111.98 
fruit 2 577 4 656 896.90 
sheep 2 967 1 703 360.89 
tea 1 037 888 800.28 
dairy 5 723 5 847 702.53 
cattle 1 407 943 222.27 
livestock 2 615 1 627 276.64 
nothing 16 376 0.00 
commonage 1 171 717 810.21 
total 36 303 17 048 181.69 
Figures may not add up due to rounding up 












Table 69: Data pertaining to Cost-Benefit Analysis 
YEAR 
WFW YIELD/M3 SOCIAL COSTS PRIVATE BENEFITS SOCIAL BENEFITS 
cleared ha ideal land use current land use CLEARING COSTS AGRICULTURE BENEFITS WATER BENEFITS: PRESENT LAND-USE NATURAL STATE 
    1449.53 3206.88 GIB DWA a b A B Cº C¹ C¹ 
1 138.34 200529 443640 R 3 278 895 R 1 432 576 R 64 438 R 76 459 R 204 962 R 418 797 R 350 476 R 536 805 R 242 640 
2 138.34 200529 443640 R 3 278 895 R 1 432 576 R 64 438 R 76 459 R 204 962 R 418 797 R 350 476 R 536 805 R 242 640 
3 138.34 200529 443640 R 3 278 895 R 1 432 576 R 64 438 R 76 459 R 204 962 R 418 797 R 350 476 R 536 805 R 242 640 
4 138.34 200529 443640 R 3 278 895 R 1 432 576 R 64 438 R 76 459 R 204 962 R 418 797 R 350 476 R 536 805 R 242 640 
5 138.34 200529 443640 R 3 278 895 R 1 432 576 R 64 438 R 76 459 R 204 962 R 418 797 R 350 476 R 536 805 R 242 640 
6 138.34 200529 443640 R 3 278 895 R 1 432 576 R 64 438 R 76 459 R 204 962 R 418 797 R 350 476 R 536 805 R 242 640 
7 138.34 200529 443640 R 3 278 895 R 1 432 576 R 64 438 R 76 459 R 204 962 R 418 797 R 350 476 R 536 805 R 242 640 
8 138.34 200529 443640 R 3 278 895 R 1 432 576 R 64 438 R 76 459 R 204 962 R 418 797 R 350 476 R 536 805 R 242 640 
9 138.34 200529 443640 R 3 278 895 R 1 432 576 R 64 438 R 76 459 R 204 962 R 418 797 R 350 476 R 536 805 R 242 640 
10 138.34 200529 443640 R 3 278 895 R 1 432 576 R 64 438 R 76 459 R 204 962 R 418 797 R 350 476 R 536 805 R 242 640 
11 138.34 200529 443640 R 3 278 895 R 1 432 576 R 64 438 R 76 459 R 204 962 R 418 797 R 350 476 R 536 805 R 242 640 
12 138.34 200529 443640 R 3 278 895 R 1 432 576 R 64 438 R 76 459 R 204 962 R 418 797 R 350 476 R 536 805 R 242 640 
13 138.34 200529 443640 R 3 278 895 R 1 432 576 R 64 438 R 76 459 R 204 962 R 418 797 R 350 476 R 536 805 R 242 640 
14 138.34 200529 443640 R 3 278 895 R 1 432 576 R 64 438 R 76 459 R 204 962 R 418 797 R 350 476 R 536 805 R 242 640 
15 138.34 200529 443640 R 3 278 895 R 1 432 576 R 64 438 R 76 459 R 204 962 R 418 797 R 350 476 R 536 805 R 242 640 
16 138.34 200529 443640 R 3 278 895 R 1 432 576 R 64 438 R 76 459 R 204 962 R 418 797 R 350 476 R 536 805 R 242 640 
17 138.34 200529 443640 R 3 278 895 R 1 432 576 R 64 438 R 76 459 R 204 962 R 418 797 R 350 476 R 536 805 R 242 640 
18 138.34 200529 443640 R 3 278 895 R 1 432 576 R 64 438 R 76 459 R 204 962 R 418 797 R 350 476 R 536 805 R 242 640 
19 138.34 200529 443640 R 3 278 895 R 1 432 576 R 64 438 R 76 459 R 204 962 R 418 797 R 350 476 R 536 805 R 242 640 
20 138.34 200529 443640 R 3 278 895 R 1 432 576 R 64 438 R 76 459 R 204 962 R 418 797 R 350 476 R 536 805 R 242 640 
21 138.34 200529 443640 R 3 278 895 R 1 432 576 R 64 438 R 76 459 R 204 962 R 418 797 R 350 476 R 536 805 R 242 640 
22 138.34 200529 443640 R 3 278 895 R 1 432 576 R 64 438 R 76 459 R 204 962 R 418 797 R 350 476 R 536 805 R 242 640 
23 138.34 200529 443640 R 3 278 895 R 1 432 576 R 64 438 R 76 459 R 204 962 R 418 797 R 350 476 R 536 805 R 242 640 
24 138.34 200529 443640 R 3 278 895 R 1 432 576 R 64 438 R 76 459 R 204 962 R 418 797 R 350 476 R 536 805 R 242 640 
25 138.34 200529 443640 R 3 278 895 R 1 432 576 R 64 438 R 76 459 R 204 962 R 418 797 R 350 476 R 536 805 R 242 640 












Table 70: Present Value of Costs and Benefits of different assumptions 
2009 PRICES interest rates 
25 years 4% 6% 8% 
Social Costs       
PV: WfW Restoration GIB R 51 423 532.69 R 42 834 260.81 R 36 316 662.68 
PV: WfW/ha R 14 868.73 R 12 385.21 R 10 500.69 
PV: WfW Restoration DWA R 22 716 127.28 R 19 058 098.49 R 16 289 903.61 
PV: WfW/ha R 6 568.20 R 5 510.51 R 4 710.10 
Private Benefits   
PV: Agricultural benefits a R 1 021 782.64 R 857 242.70 R 732 727.92 
PV: R/ha R 295.44 R 247.87 R 211.86 
PV: Agricultural benefits b R 1 212 391.64 R 1 017 157.50 R 869 415.05 
PV: R/ha R 350.55 R 294.10 R 251.38 
Social Benefits   
PV: Water Sales DWA raw tariff A R 3 250 048.03 R 2 726 685.52 R 2 330 633.58 
PV: R/ha R 939.73 R 788.40 R 673.89 
PV: Full supply cost price B R 6 640 790.77 R 5 571 409.38 R 4 762 160.39 
PV: R/ha R 1 920.13 R 1 610.93 R 1 376.94 
PV: economic value oppo cost C° R 5 557 441.43 R 4 662 514.20 R 3 985 282.53 
PV: R/ha R 1 606.89 R 1 348.13 R 1 152.31 
PV: economic value oppo cost C1 R 8 512 030.55 R 7 141 319.22 R 6 104 040.33 
PV: R/ha R 2 461.19 R 2 064.86 R 1 764.94 
A: DWA tariff; B: full cost supply; C° opportunity cost using average incremental costs; C1: opportunity cost using 
levelised cost methodology 
 
Table 71: Tighter assumptions 
	  
Table 72: Working for Wetlands Cost Category 
Cost Category % 
Implementer Fees  5.8 
Professional Fees  0.3 
Training and Capacity Building 0.2 
Administration  3.1 
Contract wages 39.4 
Salaries professional staff 1.5 
Materials and Equipment  34.0 
Transport: Project Management  1.3 
Transport: Operational  6.4 
 Private benefits Social benefits Total Benefits WfW Costs Benefits-Costs BCR 
per ha R 295 R 1 607 R 1 902 R 14 869 -R 12 966 0.13 


































































































































































































































































































































% Chlorine to Water Flow 
Transport: Contractors  7.8 
Subsistence and Travel  0.3 
Source: SANBI database	  
 
Table 73: Total Cost of Working for Wetlands per annum (2009 Rand) 
Year Total Cost 
2001 R 4 134 170.14 
2002 R 2 854 273.60 
2003 R 96 168.93 
2004 R 1 348 961.79 
2005 R 2 143 694.04 
2006 R 2 584 755.14 
2007 R 2 009 766.26 
2008 R 2 541 772.02 
2009 R 1 913 641.61 
2010 R 2 809 710.04 

















Figure 48: Illustration of monthly trends of % Lime to Ml water 1987-2010 
 



























































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 52: Illustration of monthly trends of % PAC to Ml water 2001-2010 
Figure 51: Illustration of monthly trends of % Alum to Ml water 1987-1997 













Table 74: Chemical cost data 1987-2010 
YEAR LIME CHLORINE ALUM FLOC AID PAC TOTAL COST 
1987 R 26 280.22 R 46 827.33 R 52 674.08 R 47 808.12   R 173 589.76 
1988 R 15 290.63 R 23 095.47 R 42 717.29 R 20 310.15   R 101 413.54 
1989 R 20 122.79 R 33 477.49 R 56 335.28 R 21 194.29   R 131 129.85 
1990 R 56 327.32 R 103 737.93 R 142 865.16 R 67 012.54   R 369 942.96 
1991 R 29 532.69 R 62 815.15 R 58 996.12 R 38 119.08   R 189 463.03 
1992 R 6 828.12 R 16 731.58 R 12 525.08 R 6 302.08   R 42 386.86 
1993 R 66 396.14 R 74 301.72 R 127 026.83 R 54 437.28   R 322 161.97 
1994 R 59 940.56 R 69 138.86 R 86 602.21 R 59 023.10   R 274 704.73 
1995 Missing Missing Missing Missing   Missing 
1996 R 59 345.95 R 70 691.46 R 85 054.22 R 60 339.82   R 275 431.45 
1997 R 64 369.51 R 74 689.22 R 100 537.01 R 71 861.42   R 311 457.15 
1998 R 80 089.75 R 128 170.19 R 58 465.66 R 118 555.75   R 385 281.34 
1999 Missing Missing Missing Missing   Missing 
2000 Missing Missing Missing Missing   Missing 
2001 R 28 956.47 R 58 906.74       R 87 863.21 
2002 R 46 415.55 R 95 781.18     R 190 672.48 R 332 869.21 
2003 R 51 111.80 R 106 310.01     R 213 021.91 R 370 443.72 
2004 R 51 991.43 R 98 621.62     R 134 732.57 R 285 345.61 
2005 R 89 450.20 R 134 529.09     R 254 979.27 R 478 958.55 
2006 R 81 564.49 R 127 156.20     R 415 271.13 R 623 991.82 
2007 R 100 040.37 R 142 469.49     R 603 083.69 R 845 593.56 
2008 R 56 000.38 R 100 782.91     R 611 593.26 R 768 376.54 
2009 R 35 160.35 R 71 889.74     R 264 929.18 R 371 979.27 























Source 1: Kromme Interview 
Date: ___________________ 
Farm Name: _______________________________________ 
Farmer Name: ______________________________________ 
Family: ___________________________________________ 
Contact Details: ______________________________________ 
Farm Questions 
1. How long have you been farming in the Kromme River Catchment? 
2. How many hectares is your farm? 
3. What proportions are cultivated arable or uncultivated arable or unused? 
4. What do you farm? What are you producing? 
Irrigation/water-use 
1. Do you have any irrigation? 
2. Do you know how much water do you use annually? 
3. If yes, what type, what do you grow and how many hectares do you irrigate? 
4. Where do you get this water? Boreholes/runoff/directly pumped from river? 
5. How often do you irrigate? 
6. Do you have any farm dams? How many and how big? 
7. Is water for irrigation purposes a constraint on your choice of crops or yield/ha with current 
crops? 
8. How much water do you estimate your livestock use per head per day? 
Income 
1. Is farming your main source of income/revenue? 
2. What is your percentage gross income per farming enterprise? 
3. Can you estimate what you turnover is per hectare? 
4. If you had an additional hectare of arable land, but no extra water, how would this affect your 
operations? 
5. If you had the water to irrigate the extra hectare of arable land, how would this affect your 
answer? 
Costs 
1. How many labourers work for you? How many are permanent/temporary? 
2. What are your major capital costs/largest expenses? 
3. What production technology do you employ? 
4. What are the major problems you face as a farmer in this area? How have these changed 
over the years? 
Working for Water/Wetlands 
1. What do you think of WfW and their requirements from you? 
2. Do you think there are any private benefits associated with WfW? 
3. Do the wetlands provide you with any benefits? Have you noticed any affect on the river with 
and without wetlands/peatlands? 
4. Who do you think should control the WfW process? 
5. Are you prepared to allow aliens cleared on your land, if it will increase the water flow for your 
neighbors downstream? 
6. Is it a feasible way to relax your own water constraint? 
7. If you were managing PE’s water board, would you try and get more water out of the 














Table 75: Crop enterprise budgets 
 POTATOES CABBAGES BROCCOLI CAULIFLOWER CARROTS KIKUYU MAIZE 
INCOME AFTER MARKETING 
COSTS R 84 088 R 43 627.39 R 37 525.06 R 40 315.66 R 40 770.00 R 15 727.24 R 17 291.52 
Allocated pre-harvesting costs               
Seed R 25 194.14 R 7 444.85 R 7 444.85 R 7 444.85 R 1 318.47 R 510.97 R 897.89 
Casual planting labour R 97.75 R 1 666.06 R 1 666.06 R 1 666.06 R 1 222.83 R 782.61 R 1 222.83 
Fertilizer R 6 524.39 R 5 300.57 R 3 996.19 R 3 996.19 R 6 524.39 R 5 727.00 R 5 499.85 
Weed control R 431.39 R 423.24 R 423.24 R 423.24 R 259.40 R 71.77 R 770.96 
Pest control R 9 399.92 R 3 019.14 R 3 019.14 R 3 019.14 R 150.52 R 723.07 R 770.96 
Leaf nutrient R 6 698.70 R 904.22 R 904.22 R 904.22 R 3 286.90 R 723.07 R 0.00 
Irrigation: electricity ,maintenance R 5 204.69 R 5 204.69 R 5 204.69 R 5 204.69 R 5 204.69 R 194.26 R 174.87 
Irrigation: water R 795.32 R 465.43 R 513.91 R 513.91 R 524.51 R 345.00 R 942.00 
Machinery costs R 1 291.65 R 1 961.69 R 1 961.69 R 1 961.69 R 2 114.70 R 1 192.44 R 828.11 
Implement costs R 800.57 R 533.71 R 533.71 R 533.71 R 175.39 R 328.63 R 103.17 
sub-total R 56 438.52 R 26 923.59 R 25 667.69 R 25 667.69 R 20 606.40 R 10 598.82 R 11 210.62 
Allocated harvesting costs               
Packing material R 8 010.86 R 397.70 R 397.70 R 397.70 R 3 380.47 R 0.00 R 545.42 
Casual labour R 3 714.78 R 3 804.35 R 3 804.35 R 3 804.35 R 3 500.00 R 0.00 R 234.78 
Transport R 3 109.32 R 6 570.28 R 5 316.99 R 5 316.99 R 5 316.99 R 0.00 R 0.00 
Machinery & Implement costs R 878.68 R 703.34 R 703.34 R 703.34 R 211.21 R 0.00 R 652.67 
sub-total R 15 713.63 R 11 475.67 R 10 222.38 R 10 222.38 R 12 408.67 R 0.00 R 1 432.87 
Total allocated costs R 72 152.15 R 38 399.26 R 35 890.07 R 35 890.07 R 33 015.07 R 10 598.82 R 12 643.49 
















  WHEAT LUCERNE SWEET POTATO SWEETCORN SORGHUM TOMATOES 
INCOME AFTER MARKETING 
COSTS R 9 378.00 R 13 949.90 R 36 271.82 R 41 002.06 R 8 165.33 R 85 815.35 
Allocated pre-harvesting costs             
Seed R 500.61 R 505.86 R 5 636.06 R 439.70 R 260.60 R 1 521.55 
Casual planting labour R 286.54 R 61.10 R 462.79 R 5 148.02 R 74.44 R 14 591.17 
Fertilizer R 4 302.83 R 3 339.47 R 3 476.53 R 2 479.05 R 848.15 R 6 069.55 
Weed control R 358.89 R 179.19 R 597.31 R 301.48 R 792.38 R 5 686.88 
Pest control R 358.89 R 179.19 R 80.89 R 442.47 R 792.38 R 5 686.88 
Leaf nutrient R 39.64 R 179.19 R 295.81 R 0.00 R 0.00 R 971.95 
Irrigation: electricity ,maintenance R 143.64 R 375.51 R 5 782.99 R 5 782.99 R 148.57 R 5 632.68 
Irrigation: water R 698.35 R 2 087.71 R 509.70 R 509.70 R 998.22 R 578.94 
Machinery costs R 772.18 R 706.32 R 3 043.87 R 490.54 R 819.74 R 1 038.71 
Implement costs R 98.07 R 175.39 R 702.90 R 163.91 R 91.03 R 800.57 
sub-total R 7 559.63 R 7 788.93 R 20 588.86 R 15 757.86 R 4 825.51 R 42 578.87 
Allocated harvesting costs             
Packing material R 0.00 R 41.09 R 1 960.10 R 11 493.59 R 0.00 R 9 601.66 
Casual labour R 22.82 R 77.08 R 4 139.13 R 1 760.63 R 2.38 R 24 157.82 
Transport R 0.00 R 0.00 R 1 554.66 R 3 109.32 R 0.00 R 3 109.32 
Machinery & Implement costs R 229.62 R 523.80 R 888.27 R 888.27 R 641.69 R 711.16 
sub-total R 229.62 R 641.97 R 8 542.16 R 17 251.80 R 644.07 R 37 579.96 
Total allocated costs R 7 789.25 R 8 430.91 R 29 131.02 R 33 009.66 R 5 469.58 R 80 158.83 















  Navels Valencias Lemons Clementines 
Year 1         
planting cost & replacement cost -R 60 608.21 -R 60 608.21 -R 60 608.21 -R 60 608.21 
Year 2         
maintenance -R 12 773.83 -R 12 773.83 -R 12 773.83 -R 12 773.83 
Year 3         
maintenance -R 12 773.83 -R 12 773.83 -R 12 773.83 -R 12 773.83 
Year 4         
25% production R 14 500.00 R 15 187.50 R 38 937.50 R 11 542.99 
pre harvesting & harvesting costs -R 28 429.06 -R 28 633.67 -R 35 271.01 -R 31 492.04 
Year 5         
38% production R 22 040.00 R 21 262.50 R 59 185.00 R 17 545.34 
pre harvesting & harvesting costs -R 28 429.06 -R 28 633.67 -R 35 271.01 -R 31 492.04 
Year 6         
63% production R 36 540.00 R 38 272.50 R 98 122.50 R 29 088.33 
pre harvesting & harvesting costs -R 28 429.06 -R 28 633.67 -R 35 271.01 -R 31 492.04 
Year 7         
100% production R 58 000.00 R 60 750.00 R 155 750.00 R 60 750.00 
pre harvesting & harvesting costs -R 28 429.06 -R 28 633.67 -R 35 271.01 -R 31 492.04 
	  
